Author: Gurpreet S Khurana
The concept of ‘Maritime Silk Road’ (MSR) was proposed by China’s President Xi Jinping during his Indonesia visit in October 2013. The concept may be traced back to the Han Dynasty when key land and sea trading routes carried Chinese silk to Europe. Since the MSR idea was first announced, China has approached all countries strategically located along the key shipping lane from Southeast Asia to Europe across the northern Indian Ocean to seek their partnership to further the aims of MSR concept.
The map and details of the MSR were first brought out in April 2013. It essentially involves China helping its MSR partners to develop their port infrastructure, establish production zones and free-trade areas, and enhance coordination to facilitate trade. A major portion of the MSR transits through the Indian Ocean and its strategic chokepoints. The map (url:http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/chinas-new-silk-road-vision-revealed/) also depicts a continental route linking China to Italy through Central Asia and West Asia.
For seeking their support, China has offered the prospective MSR partners several economic incentives beyond trade benefits. This led to these countries – like those in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa and the Gulf to extend their whole-hearted support. However, the proposal received a guarded response from India. While New Delhi backed the BCIM corridor, it sought more details and greater “transparency” from Beijing.
China’s rationale for proposing the MSR concept may have been driven by its economic imperatives with regard to maritime trade connectivity. In 2013, China surpassed the United States to become the world’s largest trading nation. At present, 40 percent of its total foreign trade crosses the Indian Ocean, and this proportion is increasing. The MSR concept may have been envisaged to reinforce this trend, besides catering for security and safety of its shipping. China’s overseas crude-oil supply constitutes another related driver. In 2013, nearly 60 percent of its oil imports (sourced from Africa and West Asia) transited through the choke points of Western Indian Ocean. This constitutes a major strategic vulnerability for China. The MSR may also be an element of Beijing’s grand-strategy to propagate influence, to ‘soften’ its maritime ‘rise’, and negate the ‘String of Pearls’ theory. Concurrently, the MSR concept would enable China’s maritime-military power to break free from the geographical constraints of the island chains in the Western Pacific, along with the military pressures mounted on China by the US ‘rebalance’ strategy.
India has its own imperatives with regard to economic connectivity. Its ‘Look East’ policy is severely impeded by constraints of land connectivity. Its endorsement of the BCIM corridor may be seen in this context. Hence, nearly all of India’s merchandise trade with these countries transits via the sea. In 2013, 30 percent of India’s total foreign trade transited east across Southeast Asia’s maritime choke-points. This proportion is likely to increase in the coming years, which would necessitate security and safety of shipping and seafarers. Will the MSR contribute to it?
Like China, India is as vulnerable in terms of access to energy resources. In 2013, nearly all of its oil imports transited through the western choke-points, with only three percent coming from East Asia, Southeast Asia and Australia. Being boxed within two sets of maritime choke-points on both extremities of the Indian Ocean, source-diversification is not easy for India. Besides, it may not be prudent for India to diversify to Eastern Asia, due to the prevailing inter-state maritime disputes in the China Seas. However, if the MSR concept could contribute to enhanced security assurances with regard to freedom of navigation in this region, India could benefit from it.
An additional aim of MSR is to encourage Chinese companies to shift their manufacturing hubs to the partner countries due to rising labour costs in China. While this would make Chinese exports more competitive, the MSR countries would gain through infrastructure development and increased employment opportunities. For India, this bears promise, only theoretically. India’s policy thus far has not permitted Chinese investments in such ‘strategic’ sectors due to the imperatives of ‘national security’.
Would the management of MSR be based on a ‘web’ of partnerships or a ‘hub-and-spoke’ model? Considering that MSR is being financed by China’s ‘deep pockets’, its management is likely to be in China’s firm grip. Secondly, Maritime economics cannot possibly be disaggregated from maritime security. The China Seas has lately become a highly insecure maritime space with contesting maritime claims. Would the MSR concept contribute to maritime security in the China Seas? This is a moot point, which needs to be addressed.
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(*The author is the Executive Director, National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Indian Navy or the NMF. He can be reached at gurpreet.bulbul@gmail.com)
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