September 2, 2014
But in today’s world, Gen Zinni acknowledges, not only are the issues not as simple as WW II, but the American people need to be convinced the war, or military action, is worth supporting for its entirety. While the “CNN-effect” of bleeding women and gassed children always results in a call for American military, support wanes when America suffers a casualty or polls detect a lack of interest.
That’s the problem, Gen Zinni says, there are no credible long-term thinkers like George Kennan or even an agreement on whether or not America should get involved in these small wars. An April 2014 NBC News/The Wall Street Journal poll showed just 19 percent of Americans say the United States should be more active in world affairs, versus 47 percent who say the country should take a less active role globally. Within the GOP, 45 percent of Republicans say they’d like America to take a step back on world affairs, compared to three in 10 who want to see more engagement and 21 percent who say the current level of activity is correct.
Andrew Lubin Talks to Gen Tony Zinni, USMC (Ret), About “Before the First Shots Are Fired”
Andrew Lubin interviews author General Tony Zinni, USMC (Ret) about his latest literary work, “Before the First Shots Are Fired: How America Can Win Or Lose Off The Battlefield.”
Buy the book online
Reviewed in the September 2014 issue of Leatherneck Magazine:
Retired Marine General Tony Zinni’s current book, “Before the First Shots Are Fired: How America Can Win or Lose Off the Battlefield,” is being published at a most appropriate time: Iraq is falling back into the anarchy of 2005-06 days. Ukraine remains a Putin-sponsored mess; the Chinese are aggressively looking to expand both their presence in the South China Sea and southeast Asia; and Muslim extremists fighting in Syria allegedly want to export terror tactics into Western Europe through Turkey.
Does this convergence of security crises pose a serious challenge to America’s foreign policy, and if so, what should America do?
Writing with an honesty and clarity unknown in Washington, D.C., “Before the First Shots Are Fired” is Gen Zinni’s assessment of what went wrong with America’s foreign policy and what is needed to correct it. In conjunction with co-author Tony Koltz, Gen Zinni examines America’s military-political history under Abraham Lincoln in the Civil War, Roosevelt in World War II, Johnson and Nixon in Vietnam, and then the confusing part-war/part-peacekeeping missions of Desert Storm, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq.
Gen Zinni is not an armchair general. A combat infantry officer (0302) in Vietnam, he retired in 2000 after a 40-year career that took him to the head of U.S. Central Command. His father served in WW I, his older brother in Korea, and his Marine son in Iraq and Afghanistan.
With noncombat considerations now fully blended with military dimensions, “the young Zinni under arms experiences a far different battlefield than his grandfather,” he writes. It’s this far different battlefield that is the root cause of today’s global problems, and it’s the politicians’ inability to decide on America’s role, coupled with a military that prefers to act on a huge scale or not at all, that is paralyzing America’s response.
World War II, according to Gen Zinni, was the last “good war.” Understanding the importance of defeating Hitler and the Japanese, America rallied to the cause under President Franklin Roosevelt’s clarion call to arms. While Roosevelt kept abreast of each theater, he did not meddle or overrule the military.
America’s civilians control the military-and that’s the strength and weakness of the system. A President needs an innate curiosity, Gen Zinni says, and one cannot be passive and disengaged when discussing the potential use of military force. But there is a difference between President George W. Bush (“the Decider”) simply making decisions on the recommendations being presented by like-minded people, the general writes, and truly knowing and understanding the risks and consequences of that decision.
But President Bill Clinton, according to Gen Zinni, got it about right. Gen Zinni credits him for carefully studying plans, grasping their complexities, and understanding where he might be needed to make critical decisions. President Clinton also understood that his “OK” didn’t mean he could then just stand back and watch; he had to follow events should he need to make a critical decision.
Gen Zinni also credits then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen with building relationships between President Clinton and the military: Gen Zinni and his fellow commanders briefed President Clinton several times annually; a far cry from “hyper-controlling secretaries like Robert S. McNamara and Donald Rumsfeld who limited the direct contact with generals and admirals.”
But in today’s world, Gen Zinni acknowledges, not only are the issues not as simple as WW II, but the American people need to be convinced the war, or military action, is worth supporting for its entirety. While the “CNN-effect” of bleeding women and gassed children always results in a call for American military, support wanes when America suffers a casualty or polls detect a lack of interest.
That’s the problem, Gen Zinni says, there are no credible long-term thinkers like George Kennan or even an agreement on whether or not America should get involved in these small wars. An April 2014 NBC News/The Wall Street Journal poll showed just 19 percent of Americans say the United States should be more active in world affairs, versus 47 percent who say the country should take a less active role globally. Within the GOP, 45 percent of Republicans say they’d like America to take a step back on world affairs, compared to three in 10 who want to see more engagement and 21 percent who say the current level of activity is correct.
“Before the First Shots Are Fired” is not a political expose; Gen Zinni announced years ago he has no wish to run for public office. But it is a hard-hitting book critical of the losses incurred by Marines and soldiers when America’s superb military is not used appropriately, and especially when the military is misused due to indifferent politicians and senior leaders with various agendas.
Short of an existential war, the question that needs answering is Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s, during the 1999 Balkan Crisis, “How do you commit the military to missions with limited objectives, limited political will, and limited resources?” An excellent question-and one to which America’s young lance corporals and corporals deserve a thoughtful answer before they deploy to yet another clime and place.
But the political leadership and the military commanders need to be in sync, Gen Zinni argues, as anything less ends in bloody and expensive disaster. In addition to ignoring Desert Crossing, a 1999 CENTCOM war game in which all the after-combat issues in 2003 Iraq were forecast, the Bush administration even ignored their own military commanders. “We never knew what was expected of us,” Gen Zinni writes that two of his successor CENTCOM commanders told him. “We did not have the strategic guidance to fight these very strange wars intelligently, and we were not invited to contribute to developing it.”
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