Sep 27, 2014
Iran has been deliberately excluded from the coalition against ISIS. But Iran knows full well, as do the Americans, that it has a central role in promoting regional stability.
Barely three years after they withdrew from Iraq, US forces have once again unleashed their fire power in the region, this time not against an abhorred regime but on a non-state actor — the “Islamic State” (ISIS).
The US is not just attacking an Arab enemy alone; its aircraft are accompanied by war planes from allied Arab countries that have hardly ever participated in military assaults before. The Arab forces are all from Sunni countries and are attacking a Sunni enemy, a curious development in an environment fraught with sectarian cleavages.
The trail of this imbroglio goes back to two developments in West Asia: regime change in Iraq in 2003 and the Arab Spring.
The first empowered the Shias in Iraq, opening the doors to Iranian influence in the country. Over the next few years there was steady expansion of Iranian power across the region, and a “Shia Crescent” embracing Yemen, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon appeared to be a threatening reality. The Arab Spring only exacerbated the situation from the Saudi perspective by depriving it, first, of its principal strategic partner Hosni Mubarak, and then bringing the possibility of Shia ascendancy to its very door step in the shape of the reform movement in Bahrain, which it feared would advantage the majority Shia community. Saudi Arabia abandoned its traditional moderate posture in regional affairs and decided to confront Iran across West Asia, with regime change in Syria being a priority concern.
The post-Arab Spring strategic scenario was also characterised by Saudi estrangement from the US, which it blamed for not preventing
Mr Mubarak’s fall and for not bombing Syria to facilitate regime change. To compound Saudi concerns, from mid-2013 the US commenced robust engagement with Iran on the nuclear question, with every indication that this bonhomie could lead to a deeper relationship. In this bleak situation, another hostile element was injected: the jihadi “Islamic State”, which in the first six months of 2014 occupied territory in Iraq and Syria the size of Great Britain, with a population of six million, and threatened its Sunni and Shia neighbours in equal measure.
However, the regional scenario dramatically changed to Saudi advantage when the ISIS commenced public killings of Western hostages. Two American journalists, James Foley and Steven Sotloff, were executed on August 19 and September 2 respectively, and the video released on social media. The grisly images of these killings created a popular surge in the US in favour of an all-out war on these barbarians. American outrage over these executions swept the President in its wake: under attack from the Right-wing and facing mid-term elections in November, Mr Obama was compelled to undertake expanded military operations against the ISIS in Syria and Iraq so that it was “degraded and ultimately destroyed”. Air assaults began on September 21-22, with the participation of forces from the Arab monarchies of the Gulf and Jordan. The firepower is mainly American, but the Arab presence gives the operation a regional complexion so that it is not viewed as yet another unilateral Western attack on Muslims.
Many observers doubt the efficacy of air attacks alone in destroying the ISIS, and suggest that ground action might be necessary. But the US is reluctant to put its boots on the ground, and no other regional player is eager to assume this responsibility. It is feared that while the air attacks may yield considerable collateral damage, the top leadership and most of the cadres of ISIS will remain intact. In fact, there are widespread concerns that the assaults may actually enhance the appeal of the ISIS, with new recruits, Arab and Western, seeing it as a beleaguered Islamic force under wanton attack from the West.
The declaration of the caliphate by the ISIS has set up an interesting competition between the ISIS and Al Qaeda. Tracing its origins to the jihadi zealot Al-Zarqawi, the ISIS has a long tradition of independence from Al Qaeda which Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has upheld. Today, the ISIS is dominant in the Arab heartland — it has dramatic military victories to its credit, controls defined territory, considerable revenues and committed cadres, and has a leadership and bureaucracy providing governance. None of these advantages are available to Al Qaeda Central, shut away in remote areas of the Pak-Afghan border. Already, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have pledged support for the ISIS. Thus, a new trans-border jihadi force may emerge, replacing Al Qaeda in appeal, armed efficacy and territorial control. When it does, it’ll have significant implications for regional and perhaps even global security.
The Americans entered the West Asian military arena reluctantly, under considerable domestic pressure. As of now their engagement is limited to air attacks. However, as their experience in Afghanistan and Iraq has shown, even American boots do not make much difference on the ground: the Taliban, the progeny of those killed in carpet bombings in 2001, now control nearly two-thirds of Afghanistan, while the US-trained Iraqi Army collapsed without a fight in an environment of deep national malaise and rampant corruption. Armed assault does not provide a quick-fix solution to complex national problems; instead, it leaves behind a long legacy of bitterness and ill-will. It will be no different this time round.
Iran has been deliberately excluded from the coalition against ISIS. But Iran knows full well, as do the Americans, that it has a central role in promoting regional stability. Already there are ongoing consultations between Iran and the US, as also an interaction between the Saudi and Iranian foreign ministers. When the din of battle has died out, Iran will have to work with Saudi Arabia to shape moderate and inclusive governments in Iraq and Syria, even as the Saudis attempt to wean moderate Sunni elements from the embrace of the ISIS. Achieving this cross-sectarian cooperation, rather than sectarian and military confrontation, is the only way for these Islamic leaders to combat effectively the challenge posed by the ISIS.
The author is a former Indian ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Oman and the UAE
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