The Operations Department of the IDF C4I Directorate is responsible for operating all of the IDF's C4I resources at any time and under any weather conditions
Col. Miki Buskila
The IDF C4I Directorate is undergoing a revolution with regard to the employment of C4I resources in operational environments: instead of employing communication channels in a vector manner, according to need, the Directorate is switching to the regional communication methodology. This architecture is similar to the one used by the cellular service providers.
"The same principles that apply to the civilian telecom market, where the user turns on his cellular phone and connects to the cell that provides the best service, apply to the battlefield: the communications officer requests a bandwidth and it is assigned to him by the regional C4I element," explains Col. Miki Buskila, Head of the Operations Department at the IDF C4I Directorate. "As far as he is concerned, the question of where the bandwidth comes from is irrelevant. You need communication and you will get it. The user of the cellular communication service providers does not know which cell serves him and how the network architecture is constructed. As long as everything works OK – he does not want to know."
Unlike other directorates of the IDF, which operate their own C4I resources, in the case of the IDF Ground Arm the C4I Directorate is responsible for operating the Arm's C4I resources in the field. Buskila commands the C4I operations center at the Quirya compound in Tel-Aviv. This center is responsible for responding to the regional commands' demands for bandwidth during operational and routine security activities. "Every regional command has C4I resources, and we also have GHQ resources like satellite communication or airborne relays. If the regional command wants to employ C4I resources, they will request these resources from us and we would coordinate the allocation to them. It is not really different from a situation where the regional command requests fighter aircraft support from GHQ," explains Buskila.
In the past, the communications officer was independent in operating telephone systems or computers in the field. In recent years, the IDF have switched to a centralized concept. The trigger for this decision was the need for bandwidth that would be wider than the narrowband radio channels normally employed at the front line. With systems like the Tzayad (Digital Ground Army) and other systems that are evolving into the default selection in the operations of ground forces, bandwidth is either a facilitator or an inhibitor, and only a regional architecture can provide high rates in a combined configuration of wireless ground communication.
"You will need us in order to operate some of the systems deployed on the border," says Buskila. "The operational doctrine says that the warfighter should receive whatever he needs from the regional C4I element in the area where he operates, with a sufficient bandwidth. It does not matter for the user where the communication resources are coming from and how things work in the background. The change stems from the need for bandwidth and also from the desire to provide communication that is better suited to the needs of combat operations. The IDF currently possess many other sites and capabilities, and the regional C4I element can provide a service that is superior to the single channel they used to allocate in the past."
If you think about it, the regional concept of the C4I Directorate corresponds with the IDF's fire employment concept as presented during the last fire conference. In both cases, an end user (a communications officer/infantry battalion commander, respectively) demands services from the IDF regional command element in that that area, as required – whether those services consist of bandwidth or fire support. "Today you can open a communication channel opposite several sources. It provides flexibility to the communications officer. This is not about 'red tape' that may interfere with the employment of the capabilities, but rather about providing the regional command with additional capabilities. We operate an operations center at the Quirya compound in Tel-Aviv 24/7, through which we manage the IDF regional C4I elements – from Eilat to Manara," says Buskila. "This model had worked as far back as 2006, during the second Lebanon war. Since then, it has been put to the test in all of the IDF's operations and routine activities."
"Plasma Screen in the Field"
The regional C4I element is managed by assigning priorities to the various activities. If we take into account the fact that each regional element has a finite bandwidth, the main activity of the C4I operations center focuses on the allocation of bandwidth resources according to the operational priorities. "Each C4I system has a priority grading (SLA). Take, for example, the system designated Vered Harim (= Mountain Rose). It is the IDF's encrypted cellular telephone system, serving tens of thousands of subscribers. How do you see to it that all of them can communicate at the same time? This is one of our tasks. For this purpose, we analyze how many users will be communicating within an area cell where a specific activity is expected to take place, like in Gaza, for example, and then we allocate the resources accordingly," explains Buskila.
"That's what we do with every system, according to the activity on the ground – in operational or routine activities. In a world of shortage, the smart thing to do is manage your resources. That is the advantage offered by GHQ. Everyone wants more communication to improve their flexibility. Our job is to manage the resources available vis-à-vis the operational needs. The challenge has become more complex since the introduction of the Tzayad (Digital Land Army) system. Instead of having the commander go over to the plasma screen, the plasma screen is delivered to him on the ground and for this you need to make substantial bandwidths available to the end user right on the battlefield."
In order to accomplish this task, the people at the C4I Directorate are very strict about standardization. On the one hand, they demand that the developers of new applications see to it that their applications do not require substantial bandwidths. On the other hand, they match the available bandwidth to the existing systems. If the Corps of Intelligence, for example, develops a new application, they must coordinate with the C4I Directorate the bandwidth the new application will consume. Buskila told us that in some cases, the developing party had to change the application in order to improve bandwidth consumption efficiency. Additionally, they implement, for the various systems of the IDF, dynamic bandwidth management mechanisms (QoS: Quality of Service) that enable them to assign priorities within the network to the various applications.
The regional C4I element also helps the IDF with regard to the legitimacy of the operational activities. In an era where Israel is constantly examined under the magnifying glass of the international community, almost every shooting incident must be backed up by visual incrimination of the target. "In one of the recent incidents in Gaza, a terrorist detachment had fired mortar bombs (into Israel) and then dashed for cover in the nearby bushes. In order to eliminate them, visual incrimination was required. The video footage provided by the UAV to the forward command center for incrimination and actual engagement purposes was transmitted through C4I Directorate infrastructure systems, all in real time. Without that, it is impossible to close the sensor-to-shooter cycle," says Buskila. "Our systems contribute to the public information service of the IDF by visual incrimination which provides legitimacy to the operations of the IDF by influencing public opinion."
Is my Enemy as Good as Me?
"We must all realize that the time constants of war have changed," explains Buskila. "Once, you could mark the positions of the enemy tanks and infantry elements on a map and plan your moves accordingly. Today the situation is different. In this era, the changes that take place during wartime are so rapid that you cannot work with maps. Today, the soldier is connected to the network. You see him on the screen during the actual operation. If you want to prevent a friendly aircraft from hitting your troops in a situation where there is a friendly detachment on the ground floor and terrorists on the fifth floor (of the same building), you need a real-time C3 system that would present this information to the pilot. In all of the recent training exercises we saw that if a C3 system was unavailable – we would be paralyzed. There is no way to manually update the amount of rockets being launched from Gaza on a map. Without a computerized system, it is impossible."
Along with the expansion of bandwidth, the people at the C4I Directorate are currently addressing an equally important issue – the operational/functional continuity of the regional C4I elements, subject to the assumption that even if you provided the bandwidth required in order to conduct the war, unless it is continuous – you would lose. Initially, they divided the systems into administrative (for example, personnel management) systems and operational systems. The operational systems should meet a continuity criterion of 5/9, namely – system downtime must be less than 5.26 minutes per year. Buskila adds that some operational systems meet a continuity criterion of 100%. "This is an active-active configuration with multiple energy and communication backup circuits. These are systems that eventually affect human lives."
Up to this point, the people at the C4I Directorate have explained their peacetime preparations regarding the aspect of operating the regional C4I elements so that in an emergency, the systems will operate and the IDF would be able to fight. If you delve a little deeper, however, a question arises: what happens in a scenario where everything works OK, but the enemy is as good as you? In other words – what will happen if the enemy has the same C4I as you, or even better? "As far as this aspect is concerned," explains Buskila, "It depends whom you are fighting against. On the near field, we can cope effectively. On the more distant field, you are talking about superpowers possessing highly advanced technological capabilities. If they join the game, it will be a challenge, and yes, it concerns us. We try to educate our people to operate under circumstances where no systems are available. It is a complex challenge. Cyber warfare is a part of it, and not just in the military context. If someone attacks the electrical corporation and power supply is down nation-wide, it will affect the military, too."
Efficiency in a Time of Need
As part of the preparations for the future war, they realized at the C4I Directorate that the people should be prepared – not just the systems. Today, says Buskila, the generals commanding the IDF regional commands understand C4I and so do the IDF division commanders. "They know that if you fail to deploy your Tzayad trailers, you will not be a part of the network so in fact you will be nonexistent. Another aspect involves system accessibility. Our current applications are not civilian-standard applications and are not simple to operate. These are cumbersome military systems. We are currently working on simplifying the user interfaces, but that will take time. It is an aspect that we must improve.
"Today, the field commander starts up the Tzayad system and the Masu'ah system and they will take him to wherever he wants to go. This may lead to a degradation of the commanders' navigation skills, but will improve their battle effectiveness. Instead of having the trooper keep an eye on the map, he can look ahead, searching for the terrorist, and the map will instruct him, through his earphone: go right or go left. This is a revolution in the way the military conducts its combat operations."
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