D. Suba Chandran
The call for jihad in South Asia by Al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri is to augment his falling fortunes within the jihadi infrastructure, rather than expanding the focus of the operations of the Al-Qaida.
HOW real is Zawahiri’s threat to have an Al-Qaida base in India? Will he succeed in establishing a jihadi base in India for the Base? Perhaps, Zawahiri is buoyed by Al-Qaida’s success and reception in Pakistan and Afghanistan in the region, and believes he could repeat the performance of his organisation in India and the rest of South Asia as well. Zawahiri’s enthusiasm is misplaced and his strategy is unlikely to succeed, for the following reasons.
First, Al-Qaida today is not what it was until few years ago. Especially, after the killing of Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaida has lost much of its lethality and sheen. In fact, the erstwhile franchisees of the Al-Qaida have become more powerful and have formed their own franchise independently, as in the case of the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq. Even within Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Al-Qaida network has been hounded by the American intelligence on the ground and by the drones and attack helicopters. Most of the top leadership belonging to the Al- Qaida has been neutralised by military and covert operations.
Weakened Al-Qaida
MATTER OF FAITH: Sufi shrines in India are the greatest inter-faith laboratories, and will remain the centre of Islamic practices in the country. Devotees at the Hazrat Nizamuddin Dargah, New Delhi. Tribune photo: Manas Ranjan Bhui
The fact that the Al-Qaida has to consider starting an operation elsewhere in South Asia in itself shows its growing weakness. The Islamic State (IS) is able to better attract a section of the radicalised Muslim Youths. From US and Canada to Philippines and Indonesia, a substantial number within the radicalised section have joined the IS, and not the Al-Qaida. Perhaps, Zawahiri fears that the IS becoming the “real base” today to lead the radical Islamic movement, and not the Al-Qaida.
There are more Muslims living in India and Bangladesh combined, than most of the other regions — either the Middle East or Southeast Asia. The Al-Qaida needs human resources to fight jihad, though it may have adequate financial support. Hence, the call for jihad in South Asia by Zawahiri is to augment his falling fortunes within the jihadi infrastructure, rather than expanding the focus of the operations of the Al-Qaida.
Establishing a network
A 2012 file photo of Ayman al-Zawahiri
Second, India is remarkably different from Pakistan, and most of the other countries where Al-Qaida has succeeded in establishing its own network. It has not been the policy of the State in India to promote radical groups – either to achieve an internal political objective or to pursue a foreign policy agenda, as has been the case in Pakistan. The military leadership under Zia, needed political legitimacy, hence used the Islamic groups, which paved way for radical groups get entrenched within the Establishment. Externally, the use of jihad in Afghanistan and also in Jammu and Kashmir in the 1980s and 1990s, provided a base to radical groups such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi to establish themselves closely with the ruling regime and intelligence agencies.
Osama bin Laden’s entry into Pakistan, establishment of “the Base” and his final hiding before being neutralised by the Americans few years before by the Neptune Spear – none of them would have happened without the knowledge and links with the Pakistani intelligence agencies. In other words, Al-Qaida could find its place and become a success subsequently, mainly due to an active State support – both overt and covert. In the case of India, Bangladesh and other countries such as Nepal and Sri Lanka, Zawahiri is not likely to receive any such support – either for domestic or external reasons. Without the State support, it is difficult to accept that the Al-Qaida would have survived in Pakistan until now; and without a similar support, it would not be easy to establish a network in India.
India a stable state
Third, a cursory look at where Al-Qaida and its franchises have established their operations – from North Africa to the Middle East and Central Asia – most of these States are fragile states, led by autocratic rulers. Despite being run in the name of religion, governance remains a far cry in most of these States, with a majority having no access to decision making process. Equally importantly, the strength of legal institutions and mechanisms delivering justice in most of these countries has been rigid and questionable. The “justice” delivered by the Taliban and TTP has not been acceptable to a majority; but, a section still welcomes them, because the alternatives were even worse.
Perhaps, Zawahiri would find it difficult to accept this reality in India. Despite the internal problems, including corruption and weak delivery mechanisms, India still remains a stable State, unlike the other countries where the Al-Qaida has found a space. The legal institutions, despite criticism are seen as delivering justice, and people cutting across multiple faiths do believe in the higher judiciary, especially the Supreme Court of India.
Indian democracy
Fourth, the nature of Indian democracy, unlike the Western democracies is not extremely “pure”; there is an Indian strain that makes the Indian democracy sufficiently elastic to accommodate multiple interests. During and after elections, there are multiple bargains and politicking within, which a “purist” democrat may abhor and discount; but the same process gives enough space for minority groups in India – ethnic, religious and caste, to bargain with the mainstream political parties to have their own agenda as a part of larger mainstream. They may not have adequate numbers either at the national level or at the provincial levels, but they occupy a considerable electoral strength that the mainstream parties cannot ignore.
As a result, the Indian democracy is a process where there is so much of dialogue and bargain on a continuous process. And this elasticity makes the larger politics inclusive and encompassing. Perhaps, this could be one reason why Indian democracy has succeeded where the Western democracies have failed – to provide adequate space to the minorities electorally and make the politics inclusive. Perhaps, that is why there are more British youths along with the ISIL and the Al- Qaida, than the Indians.
Nature of Islam in India
Fifth, the nature of Islam in India is its greatest strength vis-a-vis the radical groups such as the Al-Qaida. Both in terms of tenets at the theological level and in actual practice by common people in their everyday lives, Islam in India is remarkably unique. Though Pakistan also had the same moorings, the State and the society failed to protect a great legacy. Unfortunately, the State in Pakistan, especially its establishment played a negative role, which ultimately gave the space to Salafist and Wahabi sentiments overtaking the inherent Sufi discourse. Once “Islam” was made as the State religion, the obvious follow up question was whose Islam it should be. It resulted in a larger Shia-Sunni faultline, and within the Sunni fold subsequently.
Theological leadership
On the contrary, within India the Deobandi and Barelvi schools remain strong even today at an ideological level. In terms of foundations and discourse, these schools, though may not be internationally popular, but provide the basic essence to the theological leadership within India. There might have been differences within at the theological level, but they have not resulted in violent expressions on the streets in India, as one could see all over Pakistan — from Khyber pass to Karachi. Not only the Shias and Ahmediyas have been targeted violently by the Sunni radical groups in Pakistan, but even the Brelvis. Today, the Sufi shrines and worship is being systematically targeted by the radical Sunni militants within Pakistan. And this onslaught by radical groups professing the Salafaist-Wahabist ideology provides the much-needed space for the Al-Qaida, and the necessary human resources.
For the sake of jihad
* On September 4, 2014, fugitive Al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri issued a video announcing the formation of a new wing dedicated to waging jihad in the Indian subcontinent. In the video, al-Zawahiri promises the expansion of Al-Qaida operations throughout in the Indian subcontinent.
* He says, the group will defend the “vulnerable in the Indian subcontinent, in Burma, Bangladesh, Assam, Gujarat, Ahmedabad, and Kashmir.” He tells Muslims in the region that “your brothers in Qaedat al-Jihad did not forget you and they are doing what they can to rescue you from injustice, oppression, persecution and suffering.”
* Named the Jamaat Qaidat al-jihad fi'Shibhi al-Qarrat al-Hindiya, or Organisation of The Base of Jihad in the Indian Subcontinent, the organisation released online a manifesto written by its spokesperson sama Mahmoud.
Practice of Islam at ground level
In India, from Baba Ghulam Shah shrine in Rajouri close to the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir, to Hazrat Nizamuddin in New Delhi and Ajmer Sharif in Rajasthan to the Erwadi dargah near the East Coast in Tamil Nadu, the majority within the Muslim community practise Sufi faith. India is one of the biggest Sufi-practicing nation; these shrines attract multiple communities cutting across religions. Those who are afraid of Zawahiri brand should visit these Sufi shrines all over the country to witness and experience the practice of Islam at the ground level. In fact, some countries, for example Singapore, have been spending substantially for their de-radicalisation programmes; an easier way out for such programmes is to keep those radicals in these shrines and see the pace in which they get de-radicalised!
The Sufi shrines in India are the greatest inter-faith laboratories, and will remain the centre of Islamic practices in the country. The above factors will prevent a larger radical movement supporting the Al-Qaida in India. While the State is unlikely to provide that space for the Al-Qaida, the Sufi thought and its practice at the ground level will act as a bulwark against any larger ingress.
If the above is reality, what makes Zawahiri confident of having an Al-Qaida network in the Indian subcontinent? Perhaps the sheer number of the Muslim community in India; even if he gets less than a percentage of the 13 million plus, the numbers would still be substantial for him. This is where India – both as the State and the nation; and both at the national and provincial levels will have to become proactive.
There have been enough warning shots already. Even if it remains in double digits, in terms of Indian youths joining the Islamic State, it is still substantial. What makes the youth get attracted to joining the IS? Why should someone, for example from Tamil Nadu, become a suicide bomber for the IS in Iraq?
There are two issues that the Indian State and the entire society, especially the Muslim community, will have to be extremely careful about. First, there is an element of alienation and anger amongst the youth, cutting across all the sections in India. With a rapidly growing youth bulge and the “India Shining” slogan not being experienced by everyone, a section, irrespective of the religious background is bound to be angry and unhappy with the State. It is this anger that provides space for radical groups from the Islamic State to the Naxal groups. Second, the slow but steady ingress of Wahabi influence is something that the mainstream Islam in India will have to carefully watch and counter.
— The writer is Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies , New Delhi
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