September 08, 2014
Key Points
Special operations forces are the military’s innovators; conventional forces are the military’s amplifiers. These are complementary capabilities.
History reveals that the relationship between conventional and special operations forces is cyclical and governed by two primary factors: a competition for resources and a lack of understanding between the two kinds of forces.
Current plans to expand US Special Operations Command threaten to repeat this cyclical pattern, creating a dangerous imbalance.
To maximize the effectiveness of both conventional and special operations forces, their roles must be carefully delineated, giving maximum flexibility to the overall force.
As the military’s innovators, special operations forces should maintain responsibility for direct-action missions and covert and clandestine foreign military assistance and should establish a mechanism to train conventional forces in the art of the indirect approach.
As the military’s amplifiers, the conventional force should take responsibility for certain missions currently assigned to special operations forces, such as foreign internal defense, most psychological operations, and civil affairs.
Executive Summary
American special operations forces (SOF) are in the midst of a golden age. From references in pop culture to commendations from the White House, praise for America's quiet professionals has become anything but quiet.
Such adoration is well-deserved, but underlying SOF's newfound popularity, questions remain as to how they should be employed in the future. When should they lead conventional forces, and when should they act in a supporting role? How might we apply the counterinsurgency lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan to a conventional conflict? Above all, should SOF retain all of their current responsibilities, or should the tip of the metaphorical spear be sharpened to allow SOF to focus on the tactics and techniques that only they can bring to the battlefield?
Many crises are best addressed with the innovation and discreetness of SOF, but others require the mass that only conventional forces bring to bear. More often than not, successful military campaigns involve some mixture of both conventional and special operations forces, but tensions between the two have impeded successful cooperation in the past.
The United States military remains the world's most formidable fighting force, but tools of military power are just that. Neither a scalpel nor a sledgehammer has intrinsic value-their utility is a function of the skill of the beholder. Without a careful calibration of its overall force, the United States risks failure in both conventional and asymmetric conflicts--or, at the least, continuing the cycle of misunderstanding and competition that has characterized the relationship between conventional and special operations forces. This report traces the history of the relationship between these two forces to examine how each might be optimized to face future conflicts.
Although their roots extend as far back as the Revolutionary War, the modern identity and ethos of American SOF were forged during World War II. Their interaction with foreign partisans and relative isolation from their conventional counterparts acted as a crucible, one that was understood only dimly by conventional commanders and was thus undervalued. In subsequent years and wars, their identity evolved from an undervalued and misunderstood force to a force of elite regulars to a force with skills and a purpose distinct from conventional forces.
But by the early 21st century, the roles of each force also became increasingly blurred: conventional forces conducted SOF-like missions in Iraq, for example, and SOF were employed in a manner more suited to conventional forces in the early stages of the War in Afghanistan. Current directives to increase the flexibility of America's fighting forces, though important in spirit, also threaten to erode skill sets that take careers, not days or months, to build.
Special operations forces are currently defined in Joint Doctrine literature as constituting units that are "particularly well suited for denied and politically sensitive environments" that apply their unique capabilities in circumstances "for which there are no broad conventional force requirements."[1] This definition leaves plenty of room for interpretation, as nearly every military operation might be defined as "politically sensitive," and the complexities of modern warfare present many requirements that, strictly speaking, might be interpreted as outside of "broad conventional force requirements."
Today, the scales that balance the use of conventional and special operations forces are increasingly heavily weighted toward the latter. But can a small, elite force on its own adequately address the breadth of national security threats that America might face in the future?
Achieving the optimal balance between conventional forces and SOF will require recalibration through sound policy. The policy recommendations in this paper reflect the conclusion that each force brings a different comparative advantage to the fight. The peculiar capabilities of special operations forces are crucial tools in America's quiver, but they are not the only ones. The mass of the conventional force is ideal for missions aimed at a large population-that is, those that require an amplification of America's military power. Conversely, the flat hierarchy and cutting-edge war-fighting skills of SOF are ideal for surgical and secretive missions-that is, those that require innovation. Given this, some missions currently assigned to SOF should be transferred to the larger conventional force. Carefully delineating the roles of each force, taking a measured approach to flexibility, and allocating missions based on each force's comparative strengths will bring a sustainable equilibrium between the forces.
Notes
1. United States Special Operations Command, Joint Publication 3-05: Special Operations, April 18, 2011, www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3-05.pdf.
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