An important lesson from the India-Pakistan war of 1965 is the need to have a clear strategy before going to war. If a strategic aim had been formulated, we could have gone for decisive gains in J&K before agreeing to a ceasefire. But, the then political leadership did not quite comprehend long-term strategic issues of war and peace.
Kanwar Sandhu
The then Prime Minister Lal Bhadur Shastri atop a captured Patton tank after the 1965 India-Pakistan war. A file photograph
*The chart does not include the full range of weaponry of both sides
EVEN 49 years after India and Pakistan fought an indecisive war over it, the Western Front, bordering Kashmir, remains extremely volatile. Clearly, the two neighbours learnt few lessons from the bloody clash, because the contentious border issues that led to the 1965 war have grown only more sensitive.
Pitched battles
After Partition, though the two armies had clashed in 1947-48 over Kashmir, it was only in September 1965 that the two fought pitched battles. It was for the first time since World War II that a conventional war using armour and air force on such a scale was fought. The conflict sounded alarm bells across the world.
Although by the end of it, there was a stalemate of sorts, the Indian Army managed to redeem its image that had taken a beating in the 1962 war with China. At the same time, since Pakistan was able to hold off a bigger neighbour, its military and political leadership got emboldened. This perhaps led to the 1971 war with India, resulting in its dismemberment and the creation of Bangladesh.
The clouds of war had started forming in January-February 1965 when foot patrols on both sides started probing the Rann of Kutch area to set up border posts. In April, Pakistan launched an attack to evict the Indian guards from some of the posts. Both armies joined in and after a few weeks of fighting, a ceasefire was brokered by the then British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson on June 30, 1965.
Operation Gibraltar
The troops of both sides withdrew but remained battle ready. Within one month, Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar, codename for armed insurrection by a few thousand of Pak Army’s airborne paratroopers and guerillas in Kashmir. They were to mix up with the Indian populace and incite locals to join them. Taken aback at first, the Indian Army soon recovered and in mid-August crossed the ceasefire line. While Pakistan managed to make headway in some areas, India captured, besides other places, the strategic Haji Pir Pass between Uri and Poonch.
Having failed in its objective to create mayhem in the Kashmir Valley, Pakistan launched Operation Grand Slam on September 1 and made a bid to capture Akhnoor and threaten Jammu with the intention of severing Indian supply lines and also the lines of communication. Pakistan had the advantage of not only surprise but also superior armaments procured from America as a member of the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO).
Indian offensive
However, due to a last minute change of command of its lead infantry division, the Pak attack on Akhnoor was delayed which gave just about enough time to the Indian Army to recover and rush reinforcements. As the Indian Army held on against the offensive, it opened up another front across the International Border (IB) in Punjab on September 6.
Pakistan had not catered for the crossing of the IB at this juncture for they felt that India would restrict the war to J&K. The Indian offensive in Punjab forced Pakistan to divert its force from Kashmir to save Lahore. Between September 6 and 10, the western plains of Punjab and Rajasthan witnessed some memorable ground offensives. Indian Army’s repeated attempts to cross the Ichhogil Canal in a bid to get to Lahore failed due to Pakistan counter-attacks and also because the breakthroughs which had been achieved by some infantry columns were not followed up.
Pak counter-attack
Meanwhile, Pakistan counterattacked and took Khem Karan. But its armoured columns did not make headway as the infantry support could not fetch up and instead of making a dash for the Beas Bridge and bypass Amritsar, the armoured division withdrew into harbours at night. When they finally advanced, the Indians were ready and the famous Battle of Assal Uttar followed. The Pak offensive was stalled but not before causing panic in some military and political quarters.
Also on the Western Front, the Indian 1 Corps offensive towards Sialkot achieved a measure of success. However, in subsequent battles, the offensive was held off at Chawinda by Pak’s newly raised second armoured division (6 Armd Div).
Meanwhile in Rajasthan, Pakistan managed to advance deep inside Indian territory – up to Longewala in Jaisalmer and Munabao in Barmer sectors (Longewala was to became a battleground once again in 1971).
The unique feature of the 1965 war was the intense use of air power by both India and Pakistan. Though the IAF had the numerical superiority, the two sides were more or less evenly balanced on the Western Frontier since India had to keep a sizeable force in the east for fear of Chinese intervention. Though numerically inferior, the PAF boasted of F-86 Sabres, F-104 Starfighters and B-57 Canberra aircraft. Against this the IAF had Hunter, Gnats, Vampires, EE Canberra bombers and one squadron of MiG-21. Though neither side managed to gain air superiority that was essential for a decisive victory, but there were some heroic tales of valour on both sides. While the PAF played a great role in the defence of Lahore, the Indian-built Gnat earned the sobriquet of “Sabre slayer”.
On the bidding of the PAF, Pakistan’s Special Services Group (SSG), attempted some daring missions. Three SSG teams of about 40 commandoes each were para-dropped to neutralise the airfields of Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara. However, all three teams failed in their mission as the raids were poorly planned and coordinated. Besides, the exfiltration plan had not been thought through.
After 17 days of intense attacks and counterattacks, both sides were running low on ammunition and a stalemate set in. By then, while India had 3,000 battlefield dead, Pakistan had 3,800. When ceasefire was called out, India had captured 1,800 km territory in Lahore and Sialkot sectors, while Pakistan had captured about 550 km in Sind-Rajasthan, besides the strategic area of Chhamb in Jammu Sector.
On hindsight, tactical failures and lack of strategic foresight were evident during the six-month-long face-off between the two sides. Not only was the Indian response in the Rann of Kutch half-hearted, it lacked punitive action. What was worse, in spite of a clear warning, India was taken by surprise by Pak actions in Jammu and Kashmir, starting from August 1965. When India did react on ground, its response was reactive and poorly coordinated. Though the 1 Corps offensive in the Sialkot sector achieved operational surprise, the gains were frittered away by poor execution.
Lessons from the war
Clearly, prior to 1965 our preparation for war against Pak had been neglected. Our armoured forces were obsolete, except for Centurions and AMX tanks. Our anti-tank capability and artillery were neglected. In the IAF, except for Gnats, there was nothing else which was a match for F-86 Sabres and F-104s. The Army-Air coordination was poor. What is worse, when the war finally broke out in September, half of the Indian Navy ships, including the aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, were undergoing refit and were unfit to give battle. As a result, even when the port of Dwarka was bombarded, the Indian Navy was not allowed to retaliate, despite protestations by the then Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral B.S. Soman. Thus we failed to inflict our full war-waging potential on the enemy.
Since India went to war without a clear-cut strategic aim, it agreed to a ceasefire without decisive results. The war having been started by Pakistan provided a good opportunity to solve the Kashmir problem on our terms by continuing the war. At the end of it, our war-waging potential and ammunition reserves were terribly depleted, but Pakistan was worse off. Besides, Sino-Pak relations were yet to take a concrete shape then. Since India had after the 1962 debacle raised a couple of mountain divisions and the overall force ratio was in India's favour, the ceasefire need not have been rushed through. What was also paramount was that the national patriotic fervour too was strong.
Unfortunately, the political leadership did not quite comprehend long-term strategic issues of war and peace. If a strategic aim had been formulated, we could have gone for decisive gains in J&K before agreeing to a ceasefire. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War readily comes to mind; Israelis, though surprised initially, regained the initiative and surrounded the Egyptian Third Army to dictate terms at the post-war negotiations. Least of all, we ought to have wrested control of Northern Areas. This was a mistake we were to repeat in 1999. We agreed to a ceasefire when Pak intruders had been merely pushed back in Kargil.
What is surprising is that we also did not look at East Pakistan as Pakistan’s vulnerable underbelly. What was achieved in 1971 could have been got in 1965 itself.
Post-war negotiations at Tashkent have also come under criticism. Haji Pir Pass captured by us, which was vital to our defences in the Uri-Poonch sector, was returned while Chhamb captured by Pakistan was got back. Since we were to lose Chhamb yet again in 1971, the return of Haji Pir at Tashkent continues to rankle.
Pakistan in possession of Chhamb is definitely at an advantageous position as it makes Akhnoor vulnerable, which in turn has wider ramifications for the linkage of Jammu to the Kashmir Valley.
Weaknesses remain
Even after 49 years we appear to be found wanting in certain crucial aspects. An effective organisation for higher direction of war and the required politico-military synergy are not in place. Despite repeated rejigs of our intelligence-gathering machinery, correct inputs and assessments have belied us and thus allowed us to be surprised like in Kargil in 1999.
We are still grappling to understand Pakistan’s aims and strategy on Kashmir. Nor have we come to grips with the implications of the Sino-Pak nexus and the response thereof. With China using Pakistan to serve its strategic interests, we are today faced with the spectre of a two-front war.
Despite such a challenge, modernisation of the armed forces has been neglected. The synergy between the three armed forces of the kind required is still missing – as was evident during the Kargil war. Even though Pakistan is continuing to use irregular warfare as a weapon in Kashmir, we have failed to cobble together an effective counter to its strategy before and during a full-fledged encounter. There have been numerous rounds of talks and efforts through back-channel diplomacy but the unresolved issues have only become more intractable with the passage of time. While the 1968 Tribunal verdict resolved the larger issue of the Rann of Kutch, the Sir Creek issue, which is over a 96-km strip of marshy land, still lingers.
Though the Cease Fire Line was converted into the Line of Control (LoC) during the Simla Agreement in 1972, on ground it has made little difference. The continuing LoC dispute in Kashmir has led to tension further North in the glacial heights of Siachen since 1984.The lingering issues have led to large-scale organisational changes and augmentation in force levels and weaponry on both sides. If anything, since both are armed with nuclear weapons, the uncertainty only heightens.
Lack of readiness for war
Prior to 1965, our preparation for war against Pakistan had been neglected.
Our armoured forces were obsolete, except for Centurions and AMX tanks.
Our anti-tank capability and artillery were neglected.
In the IAF, except for Gnats, there was nothing else which was a match for F-86 Sabres and F-104s. Also, the Army-Air coordination was poor.
When the war finally broke out in September 1965, half of the Indian Navy ships, including the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant, were undergoing refit and were unfit to give battle.
Even when the port of Dwarka was bombarded, the Indian Navy was not allowed to retaliate, despite protestations by the then Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral B.S. Soman.
We failed to inflict full war-waging potential on the enemy.
No comments:
Post a Comment