http://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20140811/edit.htm#8
Zahid Hussain
One wonders whether the Pakistan Prime Minister actually believes the army will come to his rescue in a time of crisis. Nawaz Sharif needs to take lessons from history for his own sake. It is a great plunge to take from the politics of confrontation to the politics of survival
THE elephant is already in the room and surely by invitation this time. A panic-stricken civilian administration has handed over the security of the nation's capital to the army at its own peril.
The Triple One Brigade, whom we hear about mostly in times of military coups, is now deployed around key government installations. All this is happening as Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri threaten, separately, to force the government out through a “revolution march”, providing enough fuel to keep alive our ever-active rumour mill. The development is ominous nonetheless.
One does not expect anything like the storming of the Bastille on August 14. Neither Khan's young brigade, nor Qadri's few thousand fanatical followers are the vanguard of revolution. But the government's own ineptness and paralysis is proving to be its unravelling. An absentee prime minister, a sulking interior minister and some other irrelevant members of the cabinet do not evoke much public faith in a crumbling power structure.
True to his self, Nawaz Sharif plans to counter the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf’s (PTI) long march with unprecedented pomp and show on Independence Day, starting with a military parade and the hoisting of supposedly the biggest-ever national flag. Curiously, this military drill is not a routine part of Independence Day celebrations; it is taking place as the civilian administration has abdicated the responsibility of security of the capital, leaving it to the army to handle reported terrorist threats. This lends some credence to the opposition allegation that it is a deliberate move by the government to involve the military in the political conflict — with dangerous consequences. For sure, Article 245 has routinely been used in conflict zones in order give legal cover to security forces fighting insurgencies. But this provision has rarely been invoked in urban areas in times of peace. It was in 1977 that the army was summoned by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto at the height of the Pakistan National Alliance movement in Lahore and Karachi under Article 245. And that “mini martial law” was perhaps the beginning of the end of the Bhutto government. Article 245 was later also invoked by Nawaz Sharif in Karachi in 1998.
Surely one cannot draw a parallel between the situation then and now, but the outcome may not be very different. What is worse this time is that the army has been called in even though there has not been any serious incident of violence or a law-and-order situation that cannot be handled by civil law-enforcement agencies. One wonders whether it is pure naivety on the part of the prime minister or whether he actually believes the army will come to his rescue in a time of crisis. Sharif needs to take a lesson from history for his own sake. One oft-repeated argument offered by the government is that the invocation of Article 245 was linked with the operation in North Waziristan meant to give legal cover to the troops dealing with any militant backlash. But why has this only been exercised in Islamabad? Why not Peshawar, Lahore or Karachi? Interestingly, the provision has been invoked more than six weeks after the start of the operation. Is there any explanation for why now? Particularly since there has been virtually no major terrorist incident in the city during that period that it would require extraordinary measures?
It is now open season with Khan and Qadri having clearly pronounced their intention of bringing down the Sharif government. They may not be following a prepared script, but it is apparent that they cannot achieve their goal in a constitutional way. There is no way Imran Khan can force early elections with his party's relatively small presence in Parliament. He certainly would not have the support of any other political party for his demand. Early elections would only be possible if Sharif agreed to dissolve the National Assembly. But why would he do that with no serious challenge emanating from within the house? The only option left to Imran Khan is to increase public pressure through violent street protests. It is a big gamble that may have worked in a cricket match but surely not in the complex game of politics. Assuming that the PTI is able to mobilise hundreds and thousands of people for a prolonged sit-in and completely paralyse the capital. A protracted stalemate with the government unable to use the coercive power of the state would inevitably lead to complete chaos and anarchy. This would strengthen the military's position as the sole arbiter of power. Much before this stand-off, the military had already started reasserting its authority through rising tension with the Sharif administration on Musharraf's treason trial and a host of other policy issues. The public profile of the military leadership has further risen with the North Waziristan operation. The well-publicised picture of army chief Gen Raheel Sharif spending Eid with his soldiers on the frontline and with the IDPs in Bannu came as a sharp contrast to Sharif — missing from the scene and spending time between his two favourite destinations — Saudi Arabia and Murree. Sharif's lacklustre attitude has increasingly raised questions about his leadership capability. All that was certainly in Imran Khan's calculations when he decided to up the ante, declaring war on the Sharif government. It is not going to be that simple. He seems to be in a hurry to grasp power, but he may not be the winner in the endgame. Army intervention, which he may well be aware of, would not put him on the throne. There is no probability of early elections even if Imran Khan is able to create a situation for Sharif's exit. It will not be the politicians, but the generals who would then decide the future course. It’s yet another episode of the Pakistani political soap opera, a tragicomedy.
By arrangement with the Dawn.
Banking on the army
In 1977, the army was summoned by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto at the height of the Pakistan National Alliance Movement in Lahore and Karachi under Article 245.
That mini martial law was the beginning of the end of the Bhutto government.
Article 245 has routinely been used in conflict zones in order to give legal cover to the security forces fighting insurgencies.
Zahid Hussain
One wonders whether the Pakistan Prime Minister actually believes the army will come to his rescue in a time of crisis. Nawaz Sharif needs to take lessons from history for his own sake. It is a great plunge to take from the politics of confrontation to the politics of survival
THE elephant is already in the room and surely by invitation this time. A panic-stricken civilian administration has handed over the security of the nation's capital to the army at its own peril.
The Triple One Brigade, whom we hear about mostly in times of military coups, is now deployed around key government installations. All this is happening as Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri threaten, separately, to force the government out through a “revolution march”, providing enough fuel to keep alive our ever-active rumour mill. The development is ominous nonetheless.
One does not expect anything like the storming of the Bastille on August 14. Neither Khan's young brigade, nor Qadri's few thousand fanatical followers are the vanguard of revolution. But the government's own ineptness and paralysis is proving to be its unravelling. An absentee prime minister, a sulking interior minister and some other irrelevant members of the cabinet do not evoke much public faith in a crumbling power structure.
True to his self, Nawaz Sharif plans to counter the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf’s (PTI) long march with unprecedented pomp and show on Independence Day, starting with a military parade and the hoisting of supposedly the biggest-ever national flag. Curiously, this military drill is not a routine part of Independence Day celebrations; it is taking place as the civilian administration has abdicated the responsibility of security of the capital, leaving it to the army to handle reported terrorist threats. This lends some credence to the opposition allegation that it is a deliberate move by the government to involve the military in the political conflict — with dangerous consequences. For sure, Article 245 has routinely been used in conflict zones in order give legal cover to security forces fighting insurgencies. But this provision has rarely been invoked in urban areas in times of peace. It was in 1977 that the army was summoned by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto at the height of the Pakistan National Alliance movement in Lahore and Karachi under Article 245. And that “mini martial law” was perhaps the beginning of the end of the Bhutto government. Article 245 was later also invoked by Nawaz Sharif in Karachi in 1998.
Surely one cannot draw a parallel between the situation then and now, but the outcome may not be very different. What is worse this time is that the army has been called in even though there has not been any serious incident of violence or a law-and-order situation that cannot be handled by civil law-enforcement agencies. One wonders whether it is pure naivety on the part of the prime minister or whether he actually believes the army will come to his rescue in a time of crisis. Sharif needs to take a lesson from history for his own sake. One oft-repeated argument offered by the government is that the invocation of Article 245 was linked with the operation in North Waziristan meant to give legal cover to the troops dealing with any militant backlash. But why has this only been exercised in Islamabad? Why not Peshawar, Lahore or Karachi? Interestingly, the provision has been invoked more than six weeks after the start of the operation. Is there any explanation for why now? Particularly since there has been virtually no major terrorist incident in the city during that period that it would require extraordinary measures?
It is now open season with Khan and Qadri having clearly pronounced their intention of bringing down the Sharif government. They may not be following a prepared script, but it is apparent that they cannot achieve their goal in a constitutional way. There is no way Imran Khan can force early elections with his party's relatively small presence in Parliament. He certainly would not have the support of any other political party for his demand. Early elections would only be possible if Sharif agreed to dissolve the National Assembly. But why would he do that with no serious challenge emanating from within the house? The only option left to Imran Khan is to increase public pressure through violent street protests. It is a big gamble that may have worked in a cricket match but surely not in the complex game of politics. Assuming that the PTI is able to mobilise hundreds and thousands of people for a prolonged sit-in and completely paralyse the capital. A protracted stalemate with the government unable to use the coercive power of the state would inevitably lead to complete chaos and anarchy. This would strengthen the military's position as the sole arbiter of power. Much before this stand-off, the military had already started reasserting its authority through rising tension with the Sharif administration on Musharraf's treason trial and a host of other policy issues. The public profile of the military leadership has further risen with the North Waziristan operation. The well-publicised picture of army chief Gen Raheel Sharif spending Eid with his soldiers on the frontline and with the IDPs in Bannu came as a sharp contrast to Sharif — missing from the scene and spending time between his two favourite destinations — Saudi Arabia and Murree. Sharif's lacklustre attitude has increasingly raised questions about his leadership capability. All that was certainly in Imran Khan's calculations when he decided to up the ante, declaring war on the Sharif government. It is not going to be that simple. He seems to be in a hurry to grasp power, but he may not be the winner in the endgame. Army intervention, which he may well be aware of, would not put him on the throne. There is no probability of early elections even if Imran Khan is able to create a situation for Sharif's exit. It will not be the politicians, but the generals who would then decide the future course. It’s yet another episode of the Pakistani political soap opera, a tragicomedy.
By arrangement with the Dawn.
Banking on the army
In 1977, the army was summoned by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto at the height of the Pakistan National Alliance Movement in Lahore and Karachi under Article 245.
That mini martial law was the beginning of the end of the Bhutto government.
Article 245 has routinely been used in conflict zones in order to give legal cover to the security forces fighting insurgencies.
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