August 12, 2014
The U.S. Needs More Drones
So writes Paul Scharre, in the online publication DefenseOne.com. Mr. Scharre begins by noting that the terrorist group al Qaeda “is morphing and metastasizing, spreading like cancer in an arc of jihadism from the deserts of Northern Mali, through Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq.” And, he adds, “Islamic extremists continue to gain ground in Iraq; and POTUS Obama has authorized more than a dozen airstrikes as the fighters of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, threaten to take Irbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan.”
“Meanwhile,” Mr. Scharre writes, “the Defense Department is cutting one of its most vital tools against this threat: loitering, unmanned aircraft, aka drones, to provide persistent surveillance of terrorist networks.” “When DoD has had drones overflying Iraq for over a month,” he notes, “a drastic shortfall in global supply means that their presence in Iraq….is at the expense of another vital mission elsewhere. And yet,” he notes, “not only is DoD not moving to address this shortfall, it is taking steps to reduce its drone fleet, a dangerous move,” he contends, “that will make it harder to keep tabs on a growing and changing terrorist threat.”
“In it’s recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),” Mr. Scharre writes, “the Pentagon announced a 15 percent cut to its Predator and Reaper fleet, the bulk of the unmanned aircraft currently used to surveil terrorists around the globe. This isn’t because there is an excess of capacity,” Mr. Scharre argues. Indeed, he argues, “demand for airborne surveillance for critical missions like countering terrorism far outstrips supply. It’s because the ugly disease of “next war it is,” that [then] Secretary of Defense Robert Gates repeatedly warned about during his tenure — has flared up yet again at the Pentagon.”
“Despite guidance from the POTUS, that prioritizes fighting terrorism, Pentagon force planners have take their eye off today’s threats; and, are overly concentrating their budget dollars on potential future challenges — at the expense of current threats.” Mr. Scharre observes. “With U.S. troops on their way out of Afghanistan, DoD leaders have mistakenly assumed that demand for unmanned aircraft will abate. In reality, the threat from terrorism is changing in ways that make intelligence collection all the more important.”
“The number of jihadist radicals is increasing; and, they are spread across a larger geographic area — among a more diffuse array of groups,” Mr. Scharre adds. “A recent report from The Rand Corporation revealed that from 2010 to 2013, the number of Salafi jihadist groups increased by more than 50 percent; and, the total number of fighters more than doubled. Not all of these groups pose direct threats to the United States; but, understanding which ones are homeland threats and which ones have only local ambitions — depends on good intelligence. Drones are vital intelligence collection tools — and, yet are precisely what DoD is choosing to cut.”
“Air Force officials have made no secret of their dissatisfaction with Predators and Reapers, citing their lack of survivability in contested airspace,” Mr. Scharre wrote. “A senior Air Force officer has gone so far as to call them “useless,” in roles outside tracking al Qaeda. But, penetrating the air defenses of a sophisticated nation isn’t the mission of low-cost drones. What Predators and Reapers allow is persistent overhead surveillance at relatively low cost, a 24/7 unblinking eye watching terrorists, tracking their movements, and mapping their networks.”
“It is true,” Mr. Scharre writes, “that the way in which unmanned aircraft are used today is very personnel-intensive. While the air vehicles themselves are relatively cheap, there are a tremendous number of people behind each “orbit” flying the aircraft, managing the sensors, and processing the reams of intelligence they produce. A smarter way to go about lowering costs in today’s budget-conscious environment would be to invest in new technologies that can reduce the manpower burden for operating these aircraft; and, exploiting the intelligence. These include multi-aircraft control technology to reduce the number of pilots, wide area sensors that multiply the amount of information collected from each aircraft; and, automated video processing to cut down on the number of intelligence analysts needed to manage the deluge of data. Together, these could dramatically reduce operational costs, conceivably even allowing a greater amount of intelligence to be collected at lower cost,” Mr. Scharre notes. “Some of these manpower-reducing technologies are already fairly mature; and, are exploited in greater detail in the Center for a New American Security’s recent report: “Robotics On The Battlefield – Part I: Range, Persistence, and Daring.”
“But, rather than invest in the necessary upgrades to make the current Reaper and Predator fleet more capable, and cost-effective, the USAF is looking to simply reduce its investment in this mission. Meanwhile, the strategic need is increasing,” Mr. Scharre contends. “The terrorist threat is changing and evolving, and DoD’s preoccupation with future threats at the expense of today is strategically flawed, inconsistent with the POTUS’s guidance, and dangerous,” he concludes.
“That this is occurring is no surprise,” Mr. Scharre concludes. “From mine resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAPS), to countering improvised explosive devices (IEDs), to fielding intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft, the Pentagon’s normal, bureaucratic processes have been unable to sufficiently address wartime needs when they have arisen in the most recent conflicts, instead of requiring the creation of ad-hoc processes, in some cases reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense. If the U.S. is going to be prepared to keep tabs on the evolving terrorist threat and be poised to act when needed, whether in Iraq or elsewhere, urgent senior leader attention and involvement — at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the White House, and Congress is needed.”
Drone Debate Highlights Obsolescence of U.S. Strategic Concepts
In late June, 2014, The Stimson Center, an important Washington think tank that studies global security, released a major report on U.S. drone policy. Stephen Metz, writing in the July 2, 2014, World Politics Review, writes that this report was “noteworthy both because the topic is such a hot one and because of the stellar cast involved. The task force that produced the report was led by retired Gen. John Abizaid, former commander of the U.S. Central Command, and Georgetown University law professor Rosa Brooks, who recently served as counselor to the undersecretary of defense for policy. The other task force members also brought deep and wide-ranging experience in the military, security policymaking, law enforcement and intelligence.”
The report notes that “the availability of lethal UAV technologies, has enabled U.S. policies that likely would not have been adopted in the absence of UAVs. In particular, UAVs have enabled the United States to engage in the cross-border use of lethal force against targeted individuals in an unprecedented and expanding way.” This is in part because drones make the use of force politically easier and thus more likely.”
“The increasing use of lethal UAVs may create a slippery slope leading to continual or wider wars,” the report adds. “The seemingly low-risk and low-cost missions enabled by UAV technologies may encourage the United States to fly such missions more often, pursuing targets with UAVs that would be deemed not worth pursuing if manned aircraft or special operations forces had to be put at risk.”
“The report’s authors,” Mr. Metz writes, “expressed concern that the U.S. government “takes the view that it has a legal right to use force in the territories of foreign sovereign states when those states are ‘unwilling or unable’ to take what the United States considers appropriate action to eliminate what it sees as imminent threats.” They worry that if the United States does this, other nations may as well. America, in other words, sets the norm for state behavior. The report warns that, “Because UAV strikes do not require placing U.S. troops into combat situations-and because such strikes may be sporadic-the administration has asserted that it is not required to notify the full Congress of targeted strikes or seek congressional authorization,” thus bypassing constitutional checks and balances on the use of military force.”
As the report states, “Evidence suggests that the broader strategic struggle against terrorist entities is not succeeding.” That is true mostly because the United States approaches the struggle using old conceptualizations of war and victory. The main source of instability today is not states, but non-state groups that do not participate in making the rules of the global security system. Conflicts cannot be quarantined or limited, but have cascading effects across regions. Threats are fluid in form and location, fading out in one place and re-emerging elsewhere. There are no formal, lasting peace agreements. Since no state or combination of states can be strong and effective everywhere, there are always pockets of weakness that violent non-state groups can exploit. And there are always dark networks and black markets they can exploit to gain needed resources, whether arms, money, information or something else. Threats like this are not defeated or eradicated through military campaigns or old-fashioned wars. They are only managed,” Mr. Metz writes.
“This leads directly back to the new drone report,” Mr. Metz contends, “and, in the broader sense, to the orthodoxy that the report represents. In the old global security system there were distinct period of war and peace. Hence concepts like deterrence, sovereignty, law-based norms and checks and balances on the use of force made sense. But there is no indication that world will return. In the current environment, a strategy based on multi-tiered disruption of threats wherever they emerge and the building of resilient communities that can manage and adapt to threats is the only one that makes sense.”
“The technology matters much less than the concepts,” he argues.
“The new Stimson Center drone report is important,” Mr. Metz concludes. “In the short term, its recommendations merit serious consideration and adoption. But it also shows that Americans badly need to move beyond the orthodoxy and re-examine basic concepts related to security. Now is the time for big ideas and new thinking rather than simply tweaks,” he observes.
Lots to think about, no easy answers. We’ll need to hedge our bets. V/R, RCP
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