By Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan, U.S. Army retired and
Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, U.S. Army retired
No political or military leader responsible for the lives of citizens who become soldiers ever wants to give the order to put American servicemembers at risk. That desire is even more present after more than a decade of waging and fighting war. The decision to employ American forces should be based upon U.S. interests and an objective assessment of what kinds of forces are needed to achieve the outcome the nation’s interests require, not merely what its leaders desire. The U.S. sustains its military forces to defend itself and its interests. These forces exist to provide options for political leaders. The current “no boots on the ground” mantra is a policy, not a strategy; moreover, it is problematic from five important perspectives: strategically, operationally, institutionally, historically and morally.
Strategic Perspective
The “no boots on the ground” mantra has three key strategic audiences: domestic, international and enemy. Domestically, the mantra appears to reflect America’s tiredness of war. This tiredness, however, could be more a reflection of not wanting to use lives and funds to no end. America generally supports wars seen as “righteous” (waged for the right reasons) and progressing in pursuit of achievable aims (waged well). The righteousness of the war in Afghanistan and against al Qaeda is not in question, but in the eyes of many Americans, the war in Iraq was. How well each of these three wars has been and is being waged, however, is a reasonable question. Americans do not support wars whose aims are unachievable or wars that do not progress toward even reasonable aims. With respect to waging the post-9/11 wars, our performance is certainly mixed. If the U.S. could articulate a strategy that had a reasonable chance of success in ending these wars in ways that are favorable to U.S. security interests, perhaps Americans would not accept this mantra as a reflection of their will. Current polling does not make this nuanced distinction.
Internationally, the mantra sends a mixed message. On the one hand, it signals allies, friends and other partners of the need to step up their willingness to act and their security force capacity. On the other hand, the signal is “we’re out.” The former is a necessary message; the latter is an abrogation of leadership responsibility. Even if the latter signal is more mildly stated as “we could be in but only to a limited degree,” it is a signal of weak leadership at a time when the world needs strong leadership. The balance is a delicate one to be sure. America cannot be the world’s policeman, nor should it be. Timid leadership, however, puts U.S. interests at risk in a global security environment.
It is this broad interest that led American leadership after World War II, in conjunction with allies and partners, to craft a world that averted major interstate war for almost 70 years. Global trends have been unraveling these post-World War II arrangements since at least 1989. The current international security threat posed by a non-nation-state, al Qaeda and its ilk, is a poster child for multiple aspects of this unraveling. America must be a leader in reversing this trend and helping put in place structures that make sense for the new world in which we live. Such leadership cannot be from behind, nor can it be remote. The international community hears “no boots on the ground” as timid leadership, and our enemies hear the mantra as an opportunity to advance their agenda.
Operational Perspective
Simply put, the mantra cedes initiative to our enemies. Once our enemies know that the U.S. has limited its options to technical intelligence gathering, airpower, special operations forces and perhaps advisors (but only under conditions of limited risk), they can advance their political agenda by conducting their operations in ways that hide from most technical intelligence-gathering capability, limit the utility of airpower, and negate or reduce the capacities of special operations forces.
This provides our enemies with a significant operational freedom, a freedom that they have taken advantage of already. They retain a safe haven in Pakistan, which threatens the Pakistani government, and they seek to return to Afghanistan once the U.S. departs. They are established as a main contender for power in a post-Assad Syria. They have created an Islamic state that stretches from northeast Syria to northern, central and western Iraq, and now they are working to solidify this gain. They exist on both sides of the Gulf of Aden, the southern entrance to the Red Sea. They are present in Algeria, Mali, Niger and Mauritania, hoping to create another caliphate there. They also operate in North Caucasus, Chechnya and the surrounding areas.
The strategic solution is certainly not to conduct protracted operations using large numbers of U.S. ground forces in each of these areas. Equally certain, however, is this: An a priori and self-limiting “no boots on the ground” policy cedes initiative to our enemies. Not being able to summon the will to fight them now plays to their political agenda. Once that agenda is firmly in place, the clarity of threat to America and its allies, friends and partners will demand action but under conditions much more difficult than they are today. In a very real way, the 9/11 attacks on U.S. soil were the result of insufficient and timid action in the years before 2001. The “no boots on the ground” mantra is recreating similar conditions now.
Institutional Perspective
The current mantra feeds disharmony among the U.S. military services. It engenders interservice rivalry at a time when, for budget reasons, interservice cooperation is very much needed. The nation’s experience in Vietnam is a constant reminder that America is not well-served by such rivalry.
One of the consequences of the current mantra, even if it is not intended, is that ground forces appear to be second-class citizens among the services. Appearance becomes reality with respect to size, composition and funding of the military services. Underinvestment now results in reduced options later. Another potential and unintended consequence may be to reduce the “propensity to serve” in both active and reserve forces, and in conventional and special operations.
The current mantra is also illustrative of institutional denial. It denies several realities: that the U.S. lacks the ability to forecast war, that multiple administrations have had to do what they did not want to do, and that these administrations had to use in-being military forces to respond to the unexpected and undesired.
Historical Perspective
The “no boots on the ground” mantra reflects three perennials in American history. First is the overreliance on remote application of force, a historical American bias that has been proven wrong each and every time it arises. For example, as Gen. George C. Marshall recalled, even in September 1941, just before the attack on Pearl Harbor, “the opposition to a large army was very widespread and there was a feeling that such an army was passé, no longer needed. … Once the real fighting began and … understanding of the situation grew [there was] a proper appreciation [that] a balanced force [was needed].” This bias reappeared after World War II, when atomic weapons seemed to negate the necessity of ground forces, but the conflict in Korea proved otherwise. Technology is necessary, but it does not win wars, prevent conflict, or assure allies and friends.
The mantra also reflects a second American constant: the false belief that “we’ll never do that again”—after World War II, never another land war in Asia, but then Korea and Vietnam; after Vietnam, never another nation-building, but then Afghanistan; never another counterinsurgency, but then Colombia, El Salvador, Afghanistan and Iraq; and after the first Gulf War, never another tank battle, but then Iraq. Reality has a way of imposing itself on biases and false beliefs.
Lastly, the mantra reflects the false belief that the expansion of the nation’s ground forces is easy. It is not.
Ground forces are expected to succeed in the very worst of conditions: when soldiers, marines and their leaders are at their lowest ebb in terms of fatigue and stress; in the rain, heat, sleet or snow; dispersed in desert, jungle, cities or mountains; in the dark; in direct contact with the enemy; and in a constantly changing and ambiguous environment. Ground forces often wake up wet, cold, tired and hungry; fight that way, all while coordinating air support, indirect fires, direct fires and other ground forces; then go to sleep under the same, often miserable, conditions. The professionalism that the American people have come to expect of their ground forces requires a degree of training, cohesion, leadership, discipline and readiness that cannot be created quickly.
Moral Perspective
War and morality are the ultimate example of an uneasy marriage, but they are essentially linked nonetheless. Without moral limits, war becomes even more horrible and hellish than it already is. A “no boots on the ground” policy, even if it admits to exceptions, results in an approach that emphasizes remote application of force—either by manned or unmanned airpower. Fortunately, the U.S. is prudent in the application of such power, always ensuring the targets are legitimate and the force is proportional.
The fact is, however, that such application of power always puts the innocent at greater risk than the combatants who apply that force. In using either manned or unmanned airpower, there is near-zero risk to the combatants in question. Using special operations forces, when such use is warranted, acknowledges the need to balance “due care” given to the innocent with demanding only “due risk” of the combatant. Use of remote delivery is less morally troubling when it is one of many ways in which a war is fought and force is applied, but when it becomes the dominant (or even the exclusive) means, America places itself on thin moral ice.
War, in general, should always be a matter of last resort. No group is more anxious for peace and stability than those who have an obligation, by oath, to respond to all missions to which they are assigned. Commitment of U.S. ground forces should be limited to cases of national interest and then as part of an overall strategy in pursuit of reasonable aims with associated policies that increase the probability of success. The “new old” mantra often decreases the probability of success and sends too many wrong messages. It is no substitute for strategy and makes little sense as a general policy for the U.S.
Gordon R. Sullivan, USA Ret., is President of the Association of the U.S. Army. Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, USA Ret., is a former commander of Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq and a senior fellow of AUSA’s Institute of Land Warfare.
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