By Romi Jain
On the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Brazil in mid-July 2014, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jingping, in their first ever meeting, underscored the imperative of solving the India-China “boundary question.” Mr. Modi said that an amicable solution would set an example for the entire world, on peaceful conflict resolution. But the occasion coincided with the reported incursions of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops in Ladakh sector of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.
Downplaying the incident, which is generally considered a “regular affair”, India’s Home Minister Rajnath Singh explained that incursions take place due to the difference of perception about boundary or the Line of Actual Control (LAC) which is 3,488 km long. He added that Indian forces respond by pushing the PLA forces back. Though a diplomatically measured response, the explanation ran counter to Modi’s election speech in Arunachal Pradesh prior to becoming the prime minister. Clad in a colorful local attire, he had emphatically said:
“Times have changed. The world does not welcome the mindset of expansion in today’s times. China will also have to leave behind its mindset of expansion.”
Understandably, it is not uncommon for leaders to project themselves as die-hard nationalists for election gains by upbraiding their nations’ rivals. This is what President Bill Clinton, rather known for his policy of comprehensive engagement with China, did as a presidential candidate, when he came down heavily on China for its human rights violations. But it is the electors who are confounded by opposite signals from the same leader–before and after the election.
On a different note, there is an opinion that New Delhi’s restraint vis-à-vis provocation has been necessary to prevent a war with its neighbor. But the question is: does China have an incentive to maintain status quo? If it calculates that in future, based on foreign policy priorities, it can occupy a land forcibly by dint of its formidable military power, it is unlikely to relinquish the use of force. Its brinkmanship in the South China Sea is a case in point, which challenges the “peaceful rise” premise. Further, the role of Pakistan in influencing China’s approach to India is an additional irritant. China perhaps sprinkles some salt to avoid sweetening hobnobbing with India that might injure the health of its “all-weather” friendship with Pakistan.
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder
Hence, China’s behavior tends to turn bizarre on the heels of a bilateral dialogue with India. A recent chronicle of events, highlighted below, suggests that the hopes of a long-term peaceful relationship vanish with incursions. In fact, the PLA spectacle appears as an obsessive compulsive disorder syndrome that is activated as a self-assurance exercise, viz., dialogues do not dilute China’s territorial claims, as well as conveying this message to India.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the PLA’s incursion was reported in the Indian side of Lake Pangsong Tsa in eastern Ladakh during Indian Vice-President Hamid Ansari’s visit to Beijing in late June 2014. Importantly, it was the occasion of the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the India-China Panchsheel agreement that sets out principles of peaceful coexistence. Moreover, the intrusion preceded the shortly following visit to China by Indian Army Chief, General Bikram Singh.
His visit was aimed at improving military ties between the two countries and strengthening peace and tranquility on borders through implementation of the border defense mechanism. As reported, Mr. Singh held talks with China’s top military brass including General Fang Fenghui, Chief of General Staff of PLA, and General Fan Changlong, Vice Chairman of Central Military Commission. In itself, the visit was an important step in establishing a rapport between military leaders of the two countries. Also, Mr.Singh spoke on the subject of strategic military leadership in his address to Chinese cadets, as well as interacting with the latter.
Interestingly, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei stated: “Military to military relations are an important component of bilateral relations. The two countries should enhance mutual trust and practical cooperation, properly manage disputes and establish a military to military action that is commensurate with the bilateral relations.”
No doubt, the statement pinpointed an indispensable aspect of normal bilateral ties. It was, however, essentially vacuous or a diplomatic ritual, since China tends to pour cold water on goodwill initiatives. For example, it appeared in the China Daily (July 18, 2014) that the PLA Daily had reported that “new, more accurate” maps” will be provided to China’s all major army units in the near future, and that in its first upgrade in 30 years, the country had distributed millions of updated maps to its military. The new maps have been reported to be controversial as they display Arunachal Pradesh as a Chinese territory. China had released a controversial map in June 2014 as well, following the visit of its foreign minister Wang Yi to India. And not long back, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to India in May 2013 was followed by transgression by Chinese army that reportedly took away Indian army’s surveillance camera from South Ladakh’s Chumar district. Upon India’s concern, it returned a “non-functional camera.”
Similarly, a month prior to Mr. Keqiang’s visit, a Chinese platoon intruded into Ladakh’s Depsang Plains, reaching 19 kilometer inside the Indian territory, which sparked off a three-week long standoff between the two armies. But New Delhi preferred downplaying the incursion in welcome of the Chinese premier, like the host of a show ignoring spectators’ teasing gestures.
Distrust Deficit
Is distrust really an issue in India-China relationship, as often underlined by scholars? If so, CBMs can be efficacious in building trust. If not, CBMs would lose force since a border agreement would be difficult to conclude in the face of rigid stances and stubborn claims. What is needed is a sincere desire for a mutually acceptable solution; otherwise, the relationship will be defined more by a veiled stratagem than distrust. Further, it is ironic that on the part of New Delhi, there is a distrust deficit instead. Its ruling leaders seem to exhibit inordinate faith in the effectiveness of dialogue and reconciliation, without undertaking fast-paced defence modernization in preparation for any unpalatable eventuality or to deter the neighbor’s belligerent practices.
In fact, the challenge before Indian policymakers is to devise and play a strategic move to incentivize China to forgo border misadventures against India. On this front, unfortunately, a sense of defeatism seems to have prevailed among India’s policy practitioners. It reflects in their lack of strategic foresight and imagination either to interlock China into a relationship of dependency on India or to checkmate it by building and deepening India’s politico-military influence in China’s vicinity. Aside from this, bold and concrete measures in the domain of border management, such as the contemplated “civilian settlements” along the border, should not be delayed. A dialogue is like a pillar to bilateral ties, but the cement needs to be fortified by military prowess and flexible and dramatic gestures, backed by an ingenious diplomacy, when a bilateral relationship is faced with acerbic unresolved issue(s).
Romi Jain is Editor-in-Chief of the Harvard Asia Quarterly, summer 2014 issue, and Vice President of the Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, a bi-annual, refereed journal. She is an MBA from SFSU, California, and has extensively contributed articles on China to refereed journals, including a forthcoming one in the American Journal of Chinese Studies, and to Asia Times Online and The Diplomat. Jain is a recipient of the Gerald Ford Presidential Foundation Grant Award, Michigan, and is currently at work on her book on China at the WTO.
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