By Shashank Ranjan
August 18, 2014
During the third week of July, print media reported on, ‘Fake Surrender Cases in Jharkhand’ wherein the police officials were allegedly involved in misusing funds by inducing surrender of as many as 514 youth who were promised government jobs. These surrenders, as per the report took place between 2010 and 2013 and the surrendered ones had no links with the rebels. NHRC, too has taken suo-motu cognisance of the news report, followed by the Union Home Ministry directing Jharkhand police to submit a detailed report on the purported racket, which according to the media, persuaded desperate tribal youth to pretend being Maoists, eager to surrender and get government jobs and rehab benefits. In exchange, the report alleged, youth had to pay scamsters money ranging from Rs. 40,000- to Rs. 2,50,000/-. The Sunday Express reported on 20 July that the Jharkhand government had asked for a CBI enquiry into the alleged ‘fake surrenders’. The Union Home Ministry, as per the latest reports on 30 July, is however learnt to have declined the request. Sources, as per the report, said that the MHA was of the view that this was a “cheating case between two private parties and therefore not fit for a CBI enquiry”[1].
The stand of MHA doesn’t come as a surprise since the ownership lies with them, owing to direct involvement of CRPF in the matter. Rather than trying to brush the issue under a carpet and / or merely addressing the symptoms, an analytical evaluation of the indicators emerging out of the said issue need to be carried out. Reports like this have far reaching ramifications, shadowing the entire effort of the state towards counter insurgency, which is meant to be people centric.
Fortunately for the government lack of adequate media coverage of the issue, to include the electronic media, was noticeable. It is felt that with each passing year of our security forces’ involvement in counter insurgency, media has grown insensitive towards such news which no longer has a ‘NEWS’ value, especially in face of deluge of high profile scams and crimes that are TRP boosters. Also, such news is more of a routine these days, getting obliterated from the radar horizons of society in no time. Irrespective of the area of deployment, these hollow endeavours have become synonymous with modus operandi of security forces. Worryingly, it is not only the media but also the local population that has started forming an opinion about the security forces indulging in such activities as part of their race to show results and depict ‘tangibles’, that validate performance in counterinsurgency. Given the circumstances, it is the security forces that deserve to be blamed rather than any extrinsic factor, for this misplaced notion. While combat in a conflict zone, in an insurgency / terror affected area is a tough job; the need for recognition pushes units to scout for easy heads to scalp and candidates for surrender. Viciously, it creates a demand for an illegal arms trade, too, since security forces often resort to buying weapons to display as ‘captured’ or ‘recovered’. Signs are more of the tail wagging the dog, wherein the ends that seem to be apparently desirable, are chased with total disregard to means, comprising ‘hows’ of the accomplishment.
As a first step, the incentive system that tempts such actions needs review. Unfortunately, the system headed by the hierarchy that controls it, continues to cling upon the age old parameters for success in counter insurgency. Changed dynamics warrant efforts for peace building, consolidation and conflict management; with its inherent volatility marked by presence of media as also an aware citizenry. Adding to the aforesaid is ever changing and evolving modus operandi of militants, to which the security forces invariably find themselves reacting to, rather than controlling it. The system led by top brass in security forces has just refused to mould and adapt to these dynamics. “Tangibles or numbers prove performances” – continues to be the bottom-line, mainly owing to factors like limited tenures, primacy of short term gains, competitive career environments, false sense of glory & recognition for units etc.
It is an accepted and established fact that the tactical operations, duly backed by psychological operations in a conflict zone, have to be people centric since they constitute the ‘sea’ in which swim the insurgent ‘fish’. Although our security forces i.e. Army, PMF and CAPF has been combating insurgency for last six decades or so, perseverance to address people’s aspirations is always sacrificed at the altar of so called performance imperatives – the tangibles that beget career enhancement and a professionally respected brand name. It is noteworthy that although various agencies of state involved in a conflict zone do formulate and execute people centric policies, yet the cultural shift towards the same at tactical levels is not visible. These agencies operate in respective silos without any harmonisation, unity of effort and institutionalisation that gets accentuated by dark shadow of internecine turf war.
Coveted HUMINT requirements are met by the intelligence associates who form hub of this malaise. These elements, driven by their ulterior motives of livelihood concerns than anything else, have often misled the system at tactical levels. And lessons learnt, while handling them over the years, are repeatedly overlooked by security operatives who refuse to reappraise the manner in which these intelligence operatives are dealt with. Much is left on the ingenuity of tactical leaders invariably fending for themselves without any institutional support. While the intelligence imperatives may make the existence of intelligence associates indispensable, by now SOPs and cultural learnings in respective areas should have taught the security forces that these elements are hardly in the ‘game’ for nationalist interests[2]. In the present times of ‘strategic corporal’, it bears rethinking whether the strategic cost is worth any tactical gain, if at all it accrues.
Spin offs of such lapses on part of the security forces undergo intense drumming up by rebel inclined media, intelligentsia and front organisations. Also, it casts a gloomy shadow on morals, ethics and traditions of security forces who essentially and in principle, have to fight the battle on basis of popular support. Given the antipathy prevalent amongst the large sections of the population, the challenge to gain support and goodwill, faces much steeper gradient. Any unwarranted incident that takes place even in remote corner of an area tends to negatively impact the overall image of the entire force in particular, and of the state in general. Just as positivity, motivation and courage are contagious, so are poor morals and dwindling ethical standards; further corrupting and demolishing the decades of respectable standings in matter of days. While the immediate gains seemingly create an artificial state of temporary satisfaction, it is not long before the lack of values impact the motivation of an organisation and destroys its professionalism[3]. Morals and ethics remain important intangible contributory factors for long term outcome towards conflict management and resolution. These are also amongst the most critical factors for retaining the fibre that binds a force guided by righteousness and morality.
Wild chase on part of security forces to punch tickets, hurts the dignity of populace. An awareness of people’s political and strategic culture is an important starting power while analysing conflict management. Immanuel Kant stated that humans possess moral and political reason and that they should treat themselves and others as an end rather than as a means. The German philosopher considered dignity to be priceless, as it remained embodied in a person’s identity and culture. People feel let down and humiliated, when victimized and humiliation becomes the emotional manifestation of the absence of dignity[4]. Given our setup, the nation must imply people. A security force of the nation must defend its people and their dignity, even at its own cost. Leadership is all about compensating any cost to the soldier, with the leader standing up to bridge the gap between interests of people and soldiers, which he achieves by striking the synchronous chord. In fact, there should be no contradiction between the requirements of people and soldiers, who have to be commanded accordingly. Clearly, if people’s acceptance is the ‘end’, then vigil over the ‘means’, provisioned by soldiers is indispensable[5].
Views expressed are personal.
[1] “CBI Must Probe Fake Naxal Surrenders”, The Indian Express, 20 July & “CRPF Used Fake Surrender Youths as Guide on anti Naxal Ops”, The Indian Express, Delhi, 30 July.
[2] Ali Ahmed, “Lessons from Bandipore”, Kashmir Times, Jammu, 10 August 12.
[3] Vivek Chadha, “Role of Morals, Ethics and Motivation in a Counter-insurgency Environment” Journal of Defence Studies (2013), Vol-7, Issue-2, pp 57 & 58. URL: http://idsa.in/jds/7_2_2013_RoleofMoralsEthicsMotivation_vchadha
[4] Chatham House, Rapporteur Report, “The Role of Values in Counter-Insurgency and Stabilisation: Mil- Mil, Civ-Mil and ‘Civ- Civ’ Dialogue from the Balkans to South Asia”, September 2011.
[5] Ibid.
- See more at: http://www.claws.in/1240/countering-insurgencies-let-the-tail-not-wag-the-dog-shashank-ranjan.html#sthash.taELlYlq.dpuf
No comments:
Post a Comment