By Tamer Badawi
This article addresses the potential threats posed by ISIS trans-regionally to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and India (as well as China) through several scenarios and questioning the likelihood of an ISIS East-pivot.
Maliki’s strategy of subjugating Sunnis in Iraq that boosted ISIS’ moves in Iraq could have far-reaching implications beyond the Middle East, which is already witnessing a process of re-configuration aimed at remapping the region and altering Sykes–Picot boundaries.
ISIS’s robust expansion in Iraq is raising concerns over a similar trans-regional scenario. Afghanistan, a country that is threatened by a looming crisis of legitimacy over the alleged fraud in the presidential elections, could be vulnerable to a spillover from Iraq.
Although Afghani Taliban is ideologically different from ISIS, gaps could be de factobridged if the situation proved to be suitable for Afghani Taliban to make strategic inroads on the ground. However, while until the present, the current moment Afghani Taliban has not shown any signs of allegiance to ISIS in this context. Lately, it has been reported that Afghani Taliban has been warning ISIS of extremism.
Nevertheless, it seems that ISIS’s psychological boost has reached Pakistan, a notorious safe haven for Islamic militants. It was reported that Tehreek-e-Khilafat, an Islamist militant group in Pakistan (Operating under the umbrella of TTP) has pledged its allegiance to ISIS. The group declared it will raise the flag of ISIS above South Asia and Khurasan (comprising parts of Afghanistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan).
These developments are definitely raising Islamabad’s concerns. The Pakistani military has been carrying out an operation against Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the North Waziristan Tribal Agency after the negotiations between the state and the militants reached a deadlock. If the TTP follows its offshoot Tehreek-e-Khilafat in joining ISIS, it will be deemed as a menacing precedent not only to Pakistan, but also to Iran and India.
According to one of the published reports, analysts assert that there are proper grounds for ISIS’s influence in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions, pointing to the fact that 234 militant groups already operate in Pakistan, about 60 of which seem eager to join ISIS.
Nonetheless, if speculations of Islamabad’s Saudi-induced support for armed opposition in Syria turns out to be correct, Pakistan would be conducting inconsistent policies towards Islamic militancy and ipso facto playing with its own security. However, it’s unclear if Pakistani support would be a byproduct of canny calculations or merely in response to Saudi pressure or some sort of bargain.
In this context, Tehran has its own concerns if the situation develops in this direction. Iran’s Sistan-Baluchistan province in the South East has been vulnerable to surging insurgency inflamed by the complex interplay between Sunni radicalism and ethno-nationalist factors. The Baluchi militants cross the Iranian-Pakistani border despite surveillance, which means that adverse developments in Pakistan and especially in its Baluchi province could threaten Iran’s security from the perspective of the Iranian establishment.
Iran’s Sistan-Baluchistan province has been facing discriminatory policies and uneven distribution of petrodollars by the central government in Tehran. In the underdeveloped province, which is suffering under a hard-pressed economy, unemployment reached 50%.
Also, internal developments in Pakistan could affect Iran potentially as Pakistan’s military is continuing its operation in Waziristan. As more people are fleeing the area to Karachi, demographic changes are likely to affect the sectarian situation between Sunni and Shiites in Pakistan and thus Iran. These changes could have touchable implications on Iran in the context of a region that is in a state of flux. Consequently as Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence rise in Pakistan, Iranian-Pakistani relations usually become tense.
India, a country that fought against Pakistan in a prolonged war, is also concerned by the Middle Eastern developments and their potential impact on its security. India is a country that contains 177 million Muslims, both Sunni and Shiites (15% of its population). An adverse sectarian situation in Iraq and Pakistan would probably instigate more sectarian problems among its Muslim population.
India’s security problem with Pakistan has been associated with Pakistan’s notorious “Strategic depth” strategy. During the 1990s Pakistan took its Afghan strategy to the extreme by incorporating the use of Afghan territory into its fighting plans against India and utilizing Afghan soil to train and launch militants fighting Indian rule in Jammu and Kashmir.
Although Islamabad’s crackdown on the Islamic militants in Waziristan seems to be altering the old Pakistani strategy, Islamabad’s potential support for militants in Syria raises the following questions: Is India on Islamabad’s Middle Eastern agenda? Does its potential support for militants in Syria mean something to New Delhi?
Narendra Modi’s rise to power in India has made Indian Muslims apprehensive of further marginalization as he was allegedly involved in state-backed violence against Muslims or at least being accused of standing idle. This also raises the likelihood of resorting to militancy in the future if state marginalization and violence potentially increases (Bearing in mind the developments in Iraq).
Also China, despite its coercive statism and heavy handed policies towards its Muslims, it is not far from ISIS’s radical impact and the whole fragile scene. However, as Beijing’s influence is rising in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia, the current situation could bring New Delhi and Beijing together to ensure regional security. Also, it is unclear how the ongoing developments will affect Indo-Pakistani relations.
ISIS rise has deep-seated implications trans-regionally to the extent of changing the existing security paradigms in the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia.
About the author:
Tamer Badawi is an Egyptian researcher and writer specializing in Iranian affairs. He regularly contributes to Aljazeera.net (Arabic) and publishes papers with Aljazeera Center for Studies.
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