Faisal Sidiqui
Can constitutional legitimacy flow from the barrel of a gun … If reliance on coercive force in gaining power is legitimised or condoned, there can be no rational basis for decrying the assault on the writ of the state by any band of marauders, robbers, adventurers and zealots of varying extremes in the political spectrum.”
— Justice Jawwad S. Khawaja
Pakistan's army chief General Raheel Sharif at the change of command ceremony at the army headquarters in Rawalpindi. Sharif, a career infantry officer, is considered a moderate army chief. However, the Pakistan army, it appears, is changing to remain the same. Reuters
JOHN Mortimer’s fictional character, Rumpole (of the Bailey), always introduces his wife not by her name but as “she who must be obeyed”. If Rumpole was a citizen of Pakistan, he would certainly adapt the same description to portray the Pakistani military establishment, ie “they who must be obeyed” or maybe, “they who must be feared”.
These notions of “obedience” and “fear” attached to the military establishment may be critical to the functioning of any modern army but in view of the political role of the Pakistani military establishment, they are obstacles to the possible dual transition taking place in Pakistan.
The military is adapting to changes, but only in order to remain the same.
The first transition concerns a modern army operating under, and in accordance with, a modern constitutional state; the second pertains to a post-Zia Pakistan with the state neither using nor protecting nor promoting nor tolerating religion-based militant groups. The first will ensure that Pakistan is a normal, modern constitutional state and the second that it is becoming a part of the world community.
In view of the military establishment’s history of unconstitutional interventions and linkages with religion-based militant groups, the key to these transitions is a Pakistan, which is neither monopolised nor controlled by the Pakistani military establishment. We can examine five key aspects of this transition.
Foundational realities: Why do serving and retired generals rush to the hospital, when summoned by the courts? In the existential world of the military establishment, the primary source of power and legitimisation is the military institution itself, ie military discipline and rules. All other sources, including the Constitution and law, are secondary. This is their belief, their institutional DNA. It is precisely for this reason that every military coup, or intervention, is based on the false choice between saving the state (as defined by them) and saving the Constitution.
Therefore, the Constitution, independent courts and civilian oversight undermine this existential military world leading to taboo questions being raised regarding the personal and institutional accountability of military personnel and their institutions. It is not surprising that there is a connection between military personnel being admitted to hospital and the institution being subjected to the Constitution and the law.
Military coups: Military coups are bad not only because they are unconstitutional. They are bad because they have not worked in Pakistan as they have failed to provide political stability, a government representative of multiple communities and groups. They are completely unaccountable and have a force-based governing model. In short, they are a failed model of authoritarian governance in Pakistan.
Moreover, like empires, military authoritarian models are no longer in fashion in this post-modern world. Anyone tempted by the recent events in Egypt and Thailand, should remember the institutional and public mobilisation in Pakistan during the 2007-2009 period and the enduring consensus among the main political parties against military rule. Like the Soviet coup of 1991, any future Pakistani coup will face resistance from the judiciary, political parties and civil society.
Politics by other means: Using Article 58 (2) (b) to dismiss political governments during the 1990s, not having martial law administrators but merely a “chief executive” model of military governance in 1999 and a mere 42-day military rule in November-December 2007 show that the military establishment is acting on Tomasi’s advice that “everything needs to change, so everything can stay the same”.
Moreover, recent events involving their alleged use of an intra-media commercial conflict to impose media restrictions or the alleged campaign against the Supreme Court by targeting a sitting Supreme Court judge known for his integrity and his past record against military excesses eg the initiation of the Musharraf trial, missing persons’ cases, audit of intelligence agencies, show that the military is adapting to changes but in order to remain the same.
The new legitimisation: The paradox is that the military establishment’s role in the fight against Islamist militants is critical but dealing with this existential threat would also involve the massive transfer of power in areas of internal and external security policy to the military establishment.
The “war against terror”, the “fight against the Baloch insurgency” and their role in fighting against various organised violent crimes in Karachi and in other parts of the country, seem to provide a basis for the legitimisation of their dominant political role. Moreover, the present phase of the “war against terror” in Fata may provide a long-term basis of a new legitimisation for them, which will involve tremendous power with little accountability.
Institutional vacuum: The Ministry of Defence is purportedly a department of the government, theoretically controlled by the defence minister and located outside Islamabad — being the main bridge between the civilian institutions and the military. But no one, (including the civilian government and institutions such as the judiciary, GHQ and intelligence agencies), takes the ministry seriously.
Therefore, the critical problem seems to be that there is no permanent institutional structure between the civilian government on the one hand, and GHQ and the intelligence agencies on the other, which allows for an institutional dialogue. The latter would include the articulation of both grievances and perceived institutional interests. Such an institutional vacuum does not allow for a timely, and constant, institutional dialogue, which leads to unnecessary conflicts.
The military establishment seems to be lost in transition. The failure to achieve this transition may lead not to the break-up of Pakistan but to a country which is medieval in its outlook, engrossed in perpetual domestic violent conflicts and a constant migraine for the world. Not a nice place to live even for our brave soldiers.
The writer was formerly consultant to the office of the attorney general of Pakistan.
By arrangement with the Dawn
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