Elizabeth Williams
Institute for the Study of War
July 29, 2014
Taliban Summer Offensive Shows Increasing Capability
The Taliban’s annual summer offensive in Afghanistan in 2014 can be characterized by waves of violence across the country and, in particular, a string of attacks ringing the capital, Kabul. The attacks appear mainly to target Afghanistan’s infrastructure, particularly its airports. Although the Taliban attempted to focus its efforts in June on the 2014 presidential election runoff, it was unsuccessful in derailing the elections or disrupting them to a notable degree. That period of concentrated effort lasted less than two weeks. While the Taliban mobilized again at the end of June, launching a large assault in Helmand province, the group carried out only a few attacks throughout the rest of the country. That trend has reversed, however, as July has witnessed a surge of violence in the southern, eastern, and northern regions of Afghanistan. This assessment looks at the groups likely involved in the violence and describes the spread and nature of the attacks in each of the country’s Regional Commands (RCs).
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Haqqani Network
Although the Taliban has claimed responsibility for many of the summer attacks, it is probably not alone in perpetrating the violence, given its relationships with other militant organizations operating in different parts of the country. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), for example, frequently launches attacks in the north and occassionaly east of Afghanistan. Likewise, the Haqqani Network has traditionally maintained a stronghold in eastern Afghanistan. The situation in eastern Afghanistan is made more complex by the presence of an estimated 77,000 refugees fleeing from the Pakistani military’s ongoing operation in neighboring North Waziristan. Numerous reports indicate that Pakistan-based insurgents, such as the North Waziristan-based Haqqani Network and fighters from the Pakistani Taliban and IMU have also moved to eastern Afghanistan to escape the Pakistani offensive. The increased presence of militants raises additional security concerns for stability in eastern Afghanistan.
As evidenced in our March 2012 report, the Haqqani Network is active in Khost, Paktia, and Paktika provinces, also known as Loya Paktia. They also operate in Nangarhar, Laghman, and Kapisa provinces, and have staged “spectacular attacks” in Kabul province as well. The Network’s de facto leader, Sirajuddin Haqqani, is one of the most competent, dangerous, and well-financed leaders operating in the country. The Haqqani Network effectively organizes and sustains a rigorous training regimen for its fighters and for those of other affiliated groups in the region, such as the IMU.
ISW has previously assessed that, since 2009, the IMU has had an increasingly destabilizing effect in northern Afghanistan, particularly in Baghlan, Kunduz, Takhar, and Balkh provinces. The IMU began as the Islamist opposition group in post-Soviet Uzbekistan, but shifted its focus from the Central Asian states to the Afghan North, specializing in “weapons trafficking and narcotics smuggling.” The Haqqanis and the IMU have a mutually beneficial relationship in which the Haqqani Network has provided the IMU sanctuary and training, and the IMU has provided fighters for the Haqqani Network in exchange.
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