Wednesday, 23 July 2014 | Ashok K Mehta |
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There’s no strategy behind the Pakistani military offensive in Waziristan, except to create internally displaced persons and disperse some terrorists. Rawalpindi needs lessons from India on effective counter-terrorism
Thank heavens the legendary Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw did not opt to join the Pakistan Army in 1947, as he would have learnt all the wrong lessons of counter-insurgency from that country’s sporadic forays into repressive pacification operations. The Field Marshal laid the foundation for the Indian Army, which was on the learning curve, for ending insurgency in Mizoram through an integrated politico-military strategy.
The Pakistani Army, which rules the roost, is merely shadow-boxing yet employing kinetic force to sift the bad from the good Taliban. There is no strategy or vision in the use of force except to create internally displaced persons and dispersing rebels. Operation Zarb-e-Azb (Strike of the Prophet’s Sword) in North Waziristan was first planned at the behest of America in 2010 but never launched. Then Army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani could not muster the will to go for the jugular of the militancy.
The epicentre of terrorism in Pakistan is the stronghold of, among others, the Haqqani network, the Afghan Taliban, and king maker Hafiz Gul Bahadur — comprising the Army’s strategic assets on the western front. Former Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, would say that the Haqqanis are a veritable arm of the ISI. Gen Kayani was never confident of the success of his operations and feared the response of the religious Right.
Peeved US lawmakers have long been saying that they pay Pakistan to send the Haqqanis to kill American soldiers in Afghanistan. The key driver of the two-phase Zarb-e-Azb is the one billion dollar bounty in the US Coalition Support Fund, besides reprisals for the Karachi airport attack, the killing of an Army General, the breakdown of talks with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and the violation of a ceasefire deal.
A Pakistan military delegation visited the Pentagon before the operation, but US Generals in Afghanistan complain that they were given 72 hours to organise the anvil on which the sword would strike. Hafiz Gul Bahadur gave one million civilians five days notice to evacuate to IDP camps in Bannu, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
After two weeks of intense aerial bombing, supported by drones, a two-Division ground offensive cleared three main terrorist hubs: Meer Ali, Miranshah (Haqqanis) and Ghulam Khan. The Army claims that 400 militants were killed and 130 wounded for the loss of 24 soldiers. Eleven bomb factories and 23,000 kg of explosives, in addition to ammunition and equipment, were recovered.
North Waziristan is the hotbed of the Punjabi Taliban, Al Qaeda, the Turkmens, the Uzbeks, the Uighurs, the Chechens as well as the Pakistani Army’s own strategic assets who are allowed to slip away. Hafiz Gul Bahadur is sheltering the Haqqanis but control of the Wazir-dominated North Waziristan has shifted into the hands of foreign terrorist groups. The Army has claimed that there has been no discrimination in its operations: ‘The Haqqanis were also targeted... Anyone who challenges the writ of the state (Haqqanis do not) will not escape... This is the beginning of the end of terrorism in Pakistan.’
Such tall claims belie proper comprehension of insurgency, especially when collusion with terrorist groups is rampant, and indiscriminate use of force — fighter jets, helicopter gunships and artillery — has flattened habitation and blown infrastructure to smithereens. Some American think-tanks have commended Pakistan’s decision to act against violent extremism, without observing the latter’s selective targeting of terror groups. By making the distinction between good and bad Taliban, Pakistan’s self-delusion is apparent. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, a conscientious supporter of the Punjabi Taliban, asserted in Parliament that he wouldn’t let Pakistan become a sanctuary for terrorists, that the country has suffered $103 billion in losses.
The National Security Council has approved the new counter-insurgency strategy aimed at eliminating terrorism. A new National Internal Security Policy coupled with National De-radicalisation Policy Programme is at work, but unlikely to succeed, as long as terrorism is compartmentalised. Despite the facade of unity, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf’s Imran Khan has given the Pakistan Army just 40 per cent success rating in its counter-insurgency campaign. Still several myths have been perpetrated.
Myth 1: Pakistan is a victim of terrorism. Islamabad is wholly responsible for creating the instruments of terror. Only recently, after the breakdown of talks with the TTP, is it speaking India’s language: Terror and talks can’t go together.
Myth 2: The Pakistani Government and the Army are on the same page when it comes to combatting terrorism. The truth is that the Army has forced the Government to fall in line. Gen Kayani had refused to shadow-box in North Waziristan. Afghan President Hamid Karzai says that the US has been fighting the wrong enemy. The US’s former AfPak envoy Richard Holbrook had said that the US was fighting the wrong enemy in the wrong country.
Myth 3: Pakistan-based terrorist groups are fighting in Afghanistan due to the presence of foreign forces. On the contrary, their presence pre-dates the arrival of foreign forces.
Myth 4: Pakistan is fighting the US’s proxy war. The Army is belatedly fighting terrorism but only half-heartedly, to rescue Pakistan from disintegration.
Myth 5: The Army’s avowed objective is to eliminate terrorism. This is beyond its present capacity and not its mission. The half-cock counter-insurgency campaign driven by US money and the military hardware it will leave behind. Pakistan annually receives $295 million in military support, and an additional billion dollars from the Coalition Support Fund, for counter-terrorism operations.
The US Congress has frequently asked: What does Pakistan deliver for a billion dollars? US Congressmen have wanted a thrust into North Waziristan targeting the Haqqanis. They have it, but minus the Haqqanis.
Myth 6: The Army is on the verge of a paradigm shift in its counter-terrorism policy to target all terrorist groups. The Haqqanis have long provided strategic depth in Afghanistan and targeted Indian assets. They cannot be abandoned.
Ultimate Truth: The Pakistani Army is not trained for counter-insurgency but to fight the conventional Indian Army. Operation Zarb-e-Azb has dispersed, not destroyed, Pakistan’s ‘Terrorist Inc’. They will all come back once the Army withdraws.
Compare this with the Indian Army’s time-tested counter-insurgency strategy. The striking variation is in the minimum use of force, in good faith, circumscribed by sensitivity to human rights and codified by the Ten Commandments. A soft footprint, with a taboo on the use of heavy weapons like artillery and helicopter gunships, and a veritable ban on fighter aircraft, are the hallmarks of ground operations by the Indian Army.
In both cases pointing the gun at one’s own people is the ultimate failure of governance. Pakistan, for its own good and for that of its neighbours, must cease playing good Taliban-bad Taliban.
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