By MICHAEL COHEN
July 17, 2014
Vladimir Putin has been playing a dangerous game in Eastern Ukraine. On Thursday, it backfired badly.
Ever since seizing Crimea earlier this year, the Russian president has been offering tacit – and sometimes more direct – support to pro-Russian separatist groups battling the Ukrainian government. Although Putin seems to have backed off the idea of a cross-border military invasion and has been trying, half-heartedly it appears, to disengage himself from the conflict, he’s yet to make a full break with the rebels.
After Thursday’s shoot-down of a Malaysian Airlines flight over rebel-held territory in Ukraine’s volatile east, killing 295 people, he may no longer have much choice in the matter.
If the rebels are responsible for the downing of Flight 17 (and from all appearances that seems to be the case), they have dealt Putin a grievous blow – one that will likely force him to cut ties with them or face even harsher economic and diplomatic censure. But whatever choice he makes, the fallout from this tragedy could reverberate for years to come. It provides an object lesson in the dangers of getting too cozy with insurgents who are neither under one’s control nor with whom one’s interests are firmly aligned.
That lesson extends to Washington. For many months, armchair military strategists on Capitol Hill and elsewhere have harshly criticized President Obama for refusing to arm the motley groups of rebels in the Syrian civil war. In recent weeks Obama has begun to ramp up moves in that direction. But the blowback from Putin’s support of the separatists in Ukraine is a reminder that such a policy brings with it real downsides.
While few of those calling for U.S. aid have been pushing for surface-to-air-missiles to be sent to the Syrian rebels, the larger point holds. Insurgents who are armed with U.S. weapons but who are not governed by U.S. law or American military chains of command can do what they like; they could easily sell them to other, more extreme groups or, even worse, use them to commit human rights atrocities. Both the death squads in Latin America supported by U.S. aid in the 1980s and more directly, the Sabra and Shatilla massacre in Beirut by Christian groups allied with Israel are tragic examples of the latter. Or, as was the case with American support for the Afghan mujahedin during the 1980s, the freedom fighters of today could one day in the future turn their attention—and their guns—against America.
To be sure, every situation was different, but well before the downing of Flight 17, Putin had been facing plenty of fallout from his effort to destabilize Ukraine. On Wednesday, the United States imposed a new set of sanctions on Russia that targeted some of the country’s major banks, defense firms and key energy companies, including the country’s largest oil firm, Rosneft. The European Union followed suit by suspending new investment in Russia by the European Investment Bank and seeking to stop loans from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
Although these were a tougher set of sanctions than those already in place, the impact was unlikely to be dramatic, but that has never been the intention of sanctions. Instead, they were geared toward increasing international pressure on Putin. And guess what: It’s worked. The combination of sanctions, regional instability and Russia’s isolation helped to scare away foreign investment and spurred major capital flight from the country. Already this year there has been $75 billion in capital outflows, more than twice the amount in 2013. With this latest incident, earlier predictions of $100 billion for the year seem low. Russia is already headed toward recession and the downturn that began earlier this year will likely only get worse.
Diplomatically, Russia is more isolated than ever, and its efforts to bring Ukraine back into the Russian orbit have failed spectacularly. The new Ukrainian president, Petro Poroshenko, has signed the association agreement with the EU that was at the root of the initial protests in Kiev that sparked the current crisis. And the continued fighting in Eastern Ukraine—and Putin’s apparent culpability in encouraging the rebels—was further driving Ukraine into the arms of the West.
So even before today’s disaster, Putin’s ill-considered decision to wrap himself in the mantle of Russian nationalism was taking a toll.
The rebels in Eastern Ukraine were at the heart of his problem. On the one hand, Putin was unable—or unwilling—to control the separatists as they ratcheted up the violence with the downing of Ukrainian military aircraft. On the other hand, as he stayed quiet over Kiev’s military gains against the rebels, he was criticized by Russian nationalists for failing to fully offer his support.
That was then. Now Putin’s ability to control events has likely been taken away from him—and he faces greater challenges down the road. If he continues to support the rebels he will undoubtedly face further sanctions (any reluctance on the part of the EU to tighten the screws on Putin likely ended today). The smarter choice for Putin would be to abandon the separatists and endure the humiliation and domestic backlash from backing down—though considering the authoritarian nature of his regime it’s one he can certainly weather. But even if he takes the safer route, Putin’s ability to bully his neighbors is going to be severely constrained—and one has to believe he will be gun-shy about supporting the next pro-Russian separatist group looking for his support. Beyond that, any hope of a softening of relations with the West has likely disappeared for the near term.
Having boosted and actively supported the rebels, Putin was unable to control the monster he created. What seemed like a cheap and easy way for Russia to exert influence in Ukraine has boomeranged against him. Proxy warriors—and their powerful backers—around the world, beware.
This is not to say that every country—including the United States—should refuse to support other nations or even insurgent groups. One could even argue that U.S. backing for the Syrian rebels today, as the battle lines have stabilized, is less dangerous than it would have been three years ago when the situation was more fluid.
But Obama must tread with care and take into account the potential unforeseen consequences to U.S. national security interests of getting involved in someone else’s fight. Even U.S. engagement from afar can blow up in your back yard. If you don’t believe me, just ask Vladimir Putin.
Michael Cohen is a fellow at the Century Foundation.
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