KARGIL WAR 15 YEARS ON Strategic lessons that we need to learn

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20140723/edit.htm#7
Operation Vijay, the Indian codename of the war, was a blend of strong and determined political, military and diplomatic actions which enabled us to transform an adverse situation into an emphatic military and diplomatic victory
General V.P. Malik


Artillery helped the Indian Army to drive away the intruders.


The regiments that took part in the Kargil conflict. Tribune photos

Sophisticated weapons were recovered from various sites that were occupied

THE Kargil war, forced on India by Pakistan 15 years ago, will always be remembered for (a) its strategic and tactical surprise (b) the self-imposed national strategy of restraint keeping the war limited to the Kargil-Siachen sector (c) military strategy and planning in keeping with the political mandate and the (d) dedication, determination, and daring junior leadership at the tactical level.

In fiercely fought combat actions, on the most difficult terrain that gave immense advantage to the enemy holding mountaintops, we were able to evict Pakistani troops from most of their surreptitiously occupied positions. The Pakistani leadership was forced to sue for ceasefire and seek withdrawal of its troops from the remaining areas.

Diplomatic victory

Operation Vijay, the Indian codename of the war, was a blend of strong and determined political, military and diplomatic actions which enabled us to transform an adverse situation into an emphatic military and diplomatic victory. As two Prime Ministers of Pakistan later acknowledged, “Kargil war was Pakistan's biggest blunder and disaster.”

In this article, I will briefly narrate two of the most important battles of the war, some important strategic lessons and how do we look ahead.

The Battle of Tololing

Tololing Top in Dras, occupied by the enemy, interfered with our vehicular movements on the Srinagar-Kargil highway and overlooked the town and our logistic positions. It was necessary to recapture it as early as possible and thus it became the first major battle. After 18 Grenadiers set the stage, 2 Raj Rif finished the task against overwhelming odds on June 13, 1999, after three weeks of bitter fighting. 2 Raj Rif captured a large quantity of weapons and ammunition, including rocket launchers and 81mm mortars held only by Pakistan's regular forces. This large haul of weapons and some vital documents, shattered the myth that Pakistan had created assiduously that the men who had intruded across the LoC were jihadi militants.

Anxiety about battle

We were anxious throughout this battle. As the Army Chief, I could not afford to convey my feelings to anyone, nor could I interfere with the battle which had been planned and conducted at the brigade and division levels. The list of casualties kept growing. We lost three officers, four junior commissioned officers and 16 other ranks. The enemy losses, based on the number of bodies recovered were put at 27.

Tololing Top was the first turning point in the Kargil war. The events that transpired during the battle made me think of the difficult days ahead when we had to clear the enemy from other areas. But realising the determination and the fighting spirit of our troops, I was convinced that we could do it.

Capture of Tiger Hill

The Tiger Hill, an awe-inspiring steep mountain top within our territory, was considered as a major thorn and the most difficult feature occupied by the enemy in the Mushkoh-Dras sector. During my visit to the front on June 28, 1999, Major-General Mohinder Puri, GOC 8 Mtn Div, told me that the Tiger Hill would be his next objective.

The attack on Tiger Hill started on June 30/July 1. The objective was engaged effectively by the Air Force and with intense indirect as well as direct artillery fire. The infantry assault went in on July 3.

At 6 am on July 4, I was informed that 18 Grenadiers had captured the Tiger Hill Top but heavy fighting was still going on the feature. I spoke to GOsC 15 Corps and 8 Mtn Div to learn about the latest situation and asked them to let me know when the objective would be fully secured. At 7.30 am, Mohinder Puri confirmed that the enemy would not be able dislodge our troops from the Tiger Hill Top.

I then informed the Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee who was scheduled to address a public meeting at 10 am. The Defence Minister was flying to Amritsar. I gave him this news when he landed at the airport.

Blow to Pakistan

That date became important for one more reason: Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was to meet the US President Bill Clinton. Before their meeting, the National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra and I made sure that the whole world came to know about the recapture of Tiger Hill and thus the likely outcome of the war.

The loss of Tiger Hill was a hard physical and psychological blow to the Pakistan Army. In India, jubilation and relief replaced the earlier gloomy mood of the people. After the entire Tiger Hill feature had been cleared by 4 Sikh and 2 Naga battalions, 18 Grenadiers proudly hoisted the Indian tricolour on the Tiger Hill Top.

Holistic national review needed

Many lessons have emerged from the Kargil war which necessitated a holistic national security review as well as rethinking on the nature of conflict in the new strategic environment and the conduct of such wars.:

n There may be remote chances of a full-scale conventional war between two nuclear weapon states but as long as there were territory-related disputes — currently we have them with China and Pakistan — the adversary can indulge in a proxy war, a limited conventional border war, or both.

n A major military challenge in India is the political reluctance to a proactive grand strategy or engagement. It has invariably led us to a reactive military situation. This disadvantage is enhanced manifold because no loss of territory is acceptable to the public and the political authority. This is a strategic handicap and a risk in any war setting, which increases in a limited-war scenario. To deal with such situations, it is essential to have credible strategic and tactical intelligence and assessments, effective surveillance and close defence of the lines of control.

n The successful outcome of a border war depends upon our ability to react rapidly. The new strategic environment calls for faster decision making, versatile combat organisations, rapid deployment and synergy amongst all elements involved in the war effort, particularly the three services.

n Military capabilities cannot be built when the conflict is on. This can be done only through careful assessment of likely contingencies and defence planning.

n Any war in future will require close political oversight and politico-civil-military interaction. It is, therefore, essential to keep the military leadership in the security and strategic decision-making loop.

n India has a National Security Council but there is no official document outlining its broad national security (including defence) policy and strategy. The government has hesitated in spelling it out due to the lack of political consensus on its policies and the inability to address the crucial issues of coordination to formulate and address national security. The absence of a coherent policy tends to make our responses ad hoc and less convincing.

All-weather surveillance

Kargil war had highlighted gross inadequacies in all-weather surveillance capabilities. Since then, this capability has been made up with indigenous satellites and aerial imagery with synthetic aperture radar. We have also acquired effective unmanned aerial vehicles, and most importantly, acquired and deployed hand-held thermal imagers, surveillance radars and ground sensors along the lines of control. Individual service and joint services doctrines have been revised. Some Special Forces units have been added to the strength of each service.

At the politico-military strategic level, however, the situation is dismal. Most of the reforms recommended in the National Security Review in 2002 to improve the higher defence control organisation, its systems and processes were either not implemented or implemented only cosmetically.

There is no policy document or a white paper on broad national security policy and strategy for the near or long term.

The Ministry of Defence has not been integrated meaningfully nor is there any improvement in defence planning and procurement systems. The civil and military relations have worsened.

Over the last 15 years, due to reactive security postures, our deterrent capabilities have been eroded. This tends to encourage our adversaries to take liberties on the disputed borders or through cross-border proxy war. We need to build credible deterrence at the political as well as military levels.

In June 2012, the government appointed the Naresh Chandra Committee to carry out yet another national security review. Till date, its recommendations have neither been de-classified nor implemented. A strong, competent and committed political leadership is required to bring about improvements in the security policies, higher defence control organisation and its systems, including its rules of business.

— The writer was the Army Chief during the Kargil war

After the conflict
The Kargil war had highlighted gross inadequacies in all-weather surveillance capabilities. Since then, this capability has been made up with indigenous satellites and aerial imagery with synthetic aperture radar.
We have also acquired effective unmanned aerial vehicles,
In June 2012, the government appointed the Naresh Chandra Committee to carry out yet another national security review. Till date, its recommendations have neither been de-classified nor implemented
Military capabilities cannot be built when the conflict is on. This can be done only through careful assessment of likely contingencies and defence planning.