Kargil panel: No checks & balances in Intelligence system

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20140725/edit.htm#7

Status of KCR followup

The Kargil Committee Report (KCR) recommended sweeping changes in India's national security apparatus. While a few have been implemented, some critical requirements like having a Chief of Defence Staff are nowhere in sight.
The integration of the service headquarters with the MoD is not at the desired levels
A lot still needs to be done in the area of civil- military liaison

No headway in lateral induction of ex-servicemen into the para-military.
Defence Intelligence Agency created.
.
ON July 29, 1999, three days after the Kargil conflict officially ended, the then government, headed by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, set up a four-member, high-powered committee to analyse the situation. The terms of reference of the committee, headed by strategic analyst Late K Subrahmanyam, were to review the events leading up to the Pakistani aggression in the Kargil District of Jammu and Kashmir, and to recommend such measures as are considered necessary to safeguard national security against such armed intrusions. The other members were Lt Gen KK Hazari, former Vice Chief of Army Staff, senior journalist BG Verghese and Satish Chandra, then Secretary, National Security Council Secretariat. The committee had the authority to interview any person associated with the security establishment, including former presidents and prime minister and was given access to all classified documents and reports. The committee presented its findings and recommendations, christened From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Committee Report (KCR), to Vajpayee in January 2000. Some of its key observations are:

Pakistan’s aggression came as a total surprise to the Indian government. Infiltration by armed irregulars was considered to be feasible in the area but not an intrusion and occupation of territory by Pakistani troops.

There were lapses in communication and dissemination of information between different intelligence agencies, which illustrate deficiencies in the system.

There were many bits and pieces of information about activities within the FCNA region. Most of them tended to indicate that Kargil was becoming a growing focus of Pakistani attention which had been clearly demonstrated by the marked increase in cross-LOC shelling in 1998. The reports on ammunition dumping, induction of additional guns and the construction of bunkers and helipads all fitted into an assessment of likely large-scale militant infiltration, with more intensive shelling in the summer of 1999. RAW assessed the possibility of "a limited swift offensive threat with possible support of alliance partners," in its half-yearly assessment ending September 1998 but no indicators substantiating this assessment were provided. Moreover, in its next six-monthly report ending March 1999, this assessment was dropped. In fact, its March 1999 report emphasised the financial constraints that would inhibit Pakistan from launching on any such adventure.

No specific indicators of a likely major attack in the Kargil sector such as significant improvements in logistics and communications or substantial force build-up or forward deployment of forces were reported by any of the agencies. Information on training of additional militants for infiltrating them across the LoC was not sector-specific. Indian intelligence appeared to lack adequate knowledge about the heavy damage inflicted by Indian artillery, which would have required Pakistan army to undertake considerable repairs and re-stocking. That would partly explain the larger vehicular movements reported on the other side. The Indian Army did not share information about the intensity and effect of its past firing with others. In the absence of this information, RAW could not correctly assess the significance of enemy activity in terms of ammunition storage or construction of underground bunkers.

The critical failure in intelligence was related to the absence of any information on the induction and deinduction of battalions and the lack of accurate data on the identity of battalions in the area opposite Kargil during 1998. Several Pakistani units present in the sector did not figure in the Order of Battle (ORBAT) supplied by RAW to the Directorate-General on Military Intelligence (DGMI). In the Committee's view, a significant gap in information prior to the detection of the Kargil intrusion was the inability of RAW to accurately monitor and report changes in the Pakistani ORBAT in the FCNA region during 1998 and early 1999 and to a lesser extent that of DGMI, and field intelligence units to notice the additional forward deployment of troops near the LoC.

Unlike other countries, India has no tradition of undertaking politico-military games with the participation of those having political and diplomatic expertise. If such games had been practised, then the possibility of limited military intrusions to internationalise the Kashmir issue might have been visualised.
The Indian Intelligence structure is flawed since there is little back up or redundancy to rectify failures and shortcomings in intelligence collection and reporting that goes to build up the external threat perception by the one agency, namely, RAW which has a virtual monopoly in this regard. There is a general lack of awareness of the critical importance of and the need for assessed intelligence at all levels. JIC reports do not receive the attention they deserve at the political and higher bureaucratic levels. There are no checks and balances in the Indian intelligence system to ensure that the consumer gets all the intelligence that is available and is his due.
— Vijay Mohan

Changes recommended
Revamping the intelligence apparatus, enhancing information- collection capabilities
Structural reforms. Integrating the service headquarters with the MoD.
Appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff as a single-point advisor to the government on military matters.
Publication of a White Paper on Indian nuclear weapons programme.
Conduct a detailed study on border management to evolve force structures and procedures to ensure improved surveillance.
Restructuring the role, training and tasks of the para-military forces in view of terrorist threats and proxy war.
Examine possibility of integrated manpower policy for the Armed Forces, para-military forces and the Central Police Forces as well as lateral induction of ex-servicemen into the para-military.