19 Jul , 2014
The ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict has once again brought into sharp focus the technological disparities between the two adversaries. Although there are news reports indicating use of UAVs by Hamas, most of these are unconfirmed. It could be very much possible that these were rudimentary aero-models with explosive payloads. On the other hand these could actually be some of the obsolete Iranian birds procured through the Hezbollah or Syria. In any case none of it still amounts to any credible air threat to Israel by any yardstick.
The Iron Dome is the primary AD system deployed by Israel to counter the rocket threat.
The Palestinian Threat
The main threat that Israel faces from Hamas or Hezbollah is in the form of rockets of all kinds. The Palestinians have been using rockets upon the Israeli mainland since 2001. Most of these rockets have failed to cause any major material damage to Israeli assets but have scarred the Israeli psyche irreversibly. What the combined military might of Arab states could not achieve in many wars, has been achieved by a ragtag militia with these crude rockets. So, that way, the legend of David versus Goliath has been turned upon its head and the puny Palestinians have been able to challenge the might of the Goliathic Israeli state with their modern sling shots. Most of the Israelis now live under a constant threat of these rockets and suffer from various traumatic-stress related psychological disorders.
The rockets used by the Palestinians are commonly referred to as the Qassams. More specifically, these constitute of the Katyusha, WS-1B, Grad, M-75 and the Iranian Fajr-5. These have been targeted mostly at the Israeli cities of Beersheba, Ashkelon, Ashdod, Haifa and Tel Aviv. The rockets have been so effective in disturbing the lives of the Israelis that the country now spends considerably upon developing defence systems against these threats.
In order to safeguard its population against rocket attacks, Israel has taken elaborate steps including fortifications, alarm systems, bomb shelters and deployment of air defence (AD) systems. The Iron Dome is the primary AD system deployed by Israel to counter the rocket threat.
The effectiveness of AD depends on the ability to detect and identify aerial targets as friendly or hostile and to engage hostile aircraft or missile in the least possible time with the most appropriate weapon systems.
Israeli Air Defence
The Israeli AD Command is the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) unit responsible for the surface front of Israel’s AD, complementing the AD provided by Israeli Air Force. Initially a part of the IDF Artillery Corps, the AD Command has been subordinate to the Israeli AF since 1970.
AD Command and Control System (ADCCS). The AD Command and Control System (ADCCS) is an integrated system developed by Ness AT Ltd of Israel – designed to support AD Command & Control (C2) functions, including provision of an Air Situation Picture (ASP); threat evaluation from both aircraft and tactical ballistic missiles (TBM); mission planning and control; and Electronic Warfare (EW). The system architecture consists of Central AD Command Centres (CADCC), AD Command Centres (ADCC) and remote users. The ASP is generated in a CADCC and disseminated to all the other sites after being filtered according to their privileges. The various users (according to their privileges) can interact with the ASP, regardless of their actual geographical location.
The effectiveness of AD depends on the ability to detect and identify aerial targets as friendly or hostile and to engage hostile aircraft or missile in the least possible time with the most appropriate weapon systems. This entails the detection and identification of targets in the earliest possible time frame, thereby giving the AD system enough time to react effectively. And this is where the real challenges of the iron Dome lie. The most difficult part of AD is to pick up the launch and track the approach of a very short range ballistic weapon. The situation becomes all the more challenging when the weapon has a short range and a relatively flatter or random trajectory. The Hamas rockets are fairly sophisticated now and follow a clear ballistic trajectory. Besides, most areas of launch are known to the IDF as these are mostly located in the narrow Gaza Strip.
Iron Dome System
This is the latest AD system designed by Rafael Advance Defence Systems Ltd of Israel. The Iron Dome is a mobile defence solution for countering short range rockets and 155 mm artillery shell threats with ranges of up to 70 km in all-weather conditions, including low clouds, rain, dust storms or fog. The system uses an interceptor having a special warhead with a proximity fuze that detonates any target in the air within seconds.
The most difficult part of AD is to pick up the launch and track the approach of a very short range ballistic weapon.
The Iron Dome radar detects and identifies the rocket or artillery shell launch and monitors its trajectory. Target data is transmitted to the Battle Management & Weapon Control (BMC) for processing. The threat’s trajectory is quickly analysed and the expected impact point is estimated. If the trajectory poses a critical threat, a command is given within seconds and an interceptor is launched against the threat. The interceptor receives trajectory updates from the BMC via uplink communication. The interceptor approaches the target and uses its radar seeker to acquire the target. It then guides the interceptor within passing distance. The target warhead is detonated over a neutral area, therefore reducing collateral damage to the protected area. The system has the capability to handle multiple targets simultaneously.
Effectiveness. While the Iron Dome system has been projected as the ultimate AD system by Israel and the western media, the reports can at best be accepted with a pinch of salt. One cannot be undiscerning enough to see through the West’s inherent vested interests in doing so. Noted journalist John Mecklin has already raised some pertinent questions on the reporting of major American journals on the efficacy of the Iron Dome. For example, the New York Times has reported a 27% interception rate within a given time period. Now, the paper has not mentioned anything about the number of rockets fired. Besides, 27% interception rate is nothing great to write home about.
Ted Postol, an MIT-based missile defence expert has inferred from video images and photographs that the Iron Dome system is not working very well. Postol says, “It hits a targeted missile maybe 5 percent of the time – could be even lower. … and when you look – what you can do in the daytime – you can see the smoky contrail of each Iron Dome interceptor, and you can see the Iron Domes trying to intercept the artillery rockets side on and from behind. In those geometries, the Iron Dome has no chance, for all practical purposes, of destroying the artillery rocket.”
In our case the long border and limited aerial surveillance over the IB makes things more difficult.
Some experts also argue that the success of the Iron Dome system is being overstated with a deliberate design so as to give the Israeli government a face saver formula in the face of aggression, to project Hamas as the unjust aggressor targeting innocent civilians, to earn the sympathy of the non-Muslim world and, last but not the least – to earn the interest of prospective customers like India. Those who have tracked the long and abysmal record coupled with the exorbitant cost of the US’ efforts to create a defence system against ICBMs, will find the apparent success of Iron Dome very difficult to digest.
Suitability for India
It is but natural for Indians to get interested in the Iron Dome as a BMD system for deployment against the Pakistani short range ballistic missile threat. However, it is a well known fact that India has already rejected the Iron Dome system in 2013. Air Chief Marshall NAK Browne is on record saying that the system is not suitable for India. Another system called David Sling developed jointly by Raytheon of US and Rafale of Israel is also unlikely to be procured. In any case India is wary about the questionable performance of many Israeli systems like the Barak. Besides, the Indian defence establishment is likely put the spanner in any such proposal with the home grown Prithvi based PAD system already in advanced stages of development.
The Indian interest in having a system like the Iron Dome stems not only from the need to defend against a possible tactical nuclear strike in the TBA based on the Nasr battlefield missile system of Pakistan but also against the perception that an imploding Pakistan may enable non state actors like the LeT to acquire capabilities similar to that of Hamas to target the Indian homeland with targeted projectiles from across the border. However, the effectiveness of such a system in the Indo-Pak context is something very difficult to predict.
The advantage that goes in our favour is the probable defence against the Pakistani TNW in the TBA.
Israel faces its rocket threat from a narrow piece of land over which it has absolute air supremacy. Thus locating of rocket launch sites and timely initiation of the interception procedure is easier. In our case the long border and limited aerial surveillance over the IB makes things more difficult. Secondly, the problem of tracking and interception gets compounded in mountainous terrain.
Thirdly, unlike Israel, India does not have major cities and population centres within 20-30 kms of the border so the LeT’s future missiles will mostly hit our villages. Fourthly, the cost of deploying the system along a long border will be prohibitive with questionable dividends. The only advantage that goes in our favour is the probable defence against the Pakistani TNW in the TBA. For this, it will be enough to equip the highly mobile Battle Groups with a battery of the home grown PAD or a similar system.
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