02 Jul , 2014
SU-30MKI
During the past decade, India’s defence preparedness has steadily and inexorably deteriorated despite constant clamour by the defence forces for modernisation and upgradation to meet assigned roles and tasks. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s anti-India stance and Chinese aggressive actions and iterations have neither helped to push away the trepidation of possible military conflagration with either one individually, nor done anything to liquidate the possibility of a two-front war. A combined and collusive threat from China and Pakistan would overstretch the Indian military machinery and, given the inordinately delayed modernisation in certain domains, could well be a recipe for an ignominious debacle reminiscent of the 1962 India-China War.
The PAF may be expected to be not far behind the leading edge of technology in the next five years…
In the past five years or so, the challenge of being militarily engaged by China and Pakistan simultaneously has exercised government and public attention visibly. On the other hand, since long, the three Services have always considered a ‘two-front war’ not just a possibility but highly probable. In February this year, the Indian Air Force (IAF) told a Parliamentary panel what the latter probably knew anyway – that it would be difficult for the IAF to manage a ‘two-front war’ although it had plans for doing so. As expected, the media played up this iteration by the IAF as ‘dropping a bomb’ and ‘an alarming admission’. No follower of military affairs is surprised though.
During the past decade, India’s defence preparedness has steadily and inexorably deteriorated despite the persistent clamour by the defence forces for modernisation and upgradation to meet assigned roles and tasks. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s anti-India stance and Chinese aggressive actions and iterations have neither helped to push away the trepidation of possible military conflagration with either one individually, nor done anything to liquidate the possibility of a two-front war. A combined and collusive threat from China and Pakistan would overstretch the Indian military machinery and, given the inordinately delayed modernisation in certain domains, could well be a recipe for an ignominious debacle reminiscent of the 1962 India-China War. The distended aerial battlefield encompassing the Western, Northern and Eastern perimeters of our extensive borders, and the air defence of our vast territorial expanse could burden the IAF to a spine shattering level. In addressing the issue of preparedness of the IAF for a two front war, it is important at the outset to study the contending air forces.
Pakistan Air Force (PAF)
The PAF is a professional service with pride in its past and current capabilities. It believes that in 1965 and 1971, it came out superior to the IAF. It has a good exposure to modern aircraft and tactics through its relations with the West, especially the US. After the Pressler Amendment, the US placed sanctions and an arms embargo on Pakistan, forcing it to look towards Europe and China. The latter has been a willing supplier of aircraft and equipment to the PAF which currently has 22 combat squadrons comprising about 465 combat aircraft (around 50 JF-17s, 75 F-16s, 75 Mirage IIIs, 80 Mirage Vs and 185 F-7s).
The JF-17 is a Chinese design (co-produced in Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, Kamra in Pakistan, and Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group, China) and is claimed to be a fourth generation, multi-role aircraft. The PAF plans to acquire a total of 250 to replace its Mirage IIIs and F-7s; some of these would be Block 2 aircraft with 4.5 generation features while some more would be Block 3 (entry into service 2016) which are expected to have fifth generation characteristics. The PAF is also said to have placed an order for 36 Chinese J-10 (4.5 generation) aircraft. The J-10 is expected to be inducted as the FC-20, an advanced PAF-specific variant of the Chengdu J-10. These aircraft are expected to be delivered by 2015 and, according to some reports, the FC-20 fleet may eventually be increased to 150 fighters. In addition, PAF is on the lookout for surplus F-16s from air forces using them and has recently acquired a squadron worth from Jordan. Thus, as far as combat aircraft are concerned, the PAF may be expected to be not far behind the leading edge of technology in the next five years or so.
Recent development of several airfields in Tibet and adjoining Lanzhou and Chengdu MACs are of special concern to India…
To keep up with the IAF, the PAF is also in the process of acquiring Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missiles (BVR AAM) for its fighter fleet. This is a lethal capability represented by the American AIM 120-C Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) to arm the F-16C. Another BVR AAM, the Chinese PL-12 is expected to arm the JF-17 in the future. The PAF is also acquiring four Airborne Early Warning (AEW) platforms – Swedish SAAB-2000 aircraft equipped with the ERIEYE phased array radar. In addition, it is acquiring four Y-8 AEW platforms from China. These acquisitions will enhance the PAF’s air surveillance envelope, enable combat aircraft to operate more effectively in both defensive and offensive missions against India and improve survivability of ground-based air defence network (based on the Crotale missile system).
It may be mentioned here that one can come across sporadic writing in Pakistani media expressing a hope that PAF would attain superiority over the IAF in the hazy future.
Peoples’ Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF)
The PLAAF, officially formed in 1949, remained insignificant for the first three decades of its existence. Deng Xiaoping’s Four Modernisations strategy in 1978 brought in defence modernisation and set the PLAAF on a path to turn into a modernised air force with a strategic role and reach, capable of projection of air power through classic offensive missions. Currently, the PLAAF has a total strength of 398,000 personnel and is organised into an air command each in the seven Military Area Commands (MACs) located at Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Chengdu.
Recent development of several airfields in Tibet and adjoining Lanzhou and Chengdu MACs are of special concern to India. In addition, it commands one airborne corps (representing strategic airlift). To meet perceived strategic offensive and defensive operational needs, the PLAAF is strengthening the development of a combat force structure that focuses on reconnaissance and early warning, air strike, air and missile defence, and strategic projection. It is concentrating on new generation fighters and ground-to-air missiles and radar systems, improving its early warning capability, command and communications networks, and raising its strategic early warning, strategic deterrence and long distance air strike capabilities.
At the beginning of 2000, the PLAAF had more than 3,500 combat aircraft; most were J-6/J-7 types (equivalent of MiG 19/21 respectively). Thereafter, it got Su-27 SK/UBK, Su-30 MKK and Su-30 MKK2 aircraft from Russia which were a quantum jump over the earlier holdings. From 2002 onwards, China produced J-10s and J-11s, which could be classified as fourth generation aircraft. It is now on a focused course to have an essentially fourth generation air force with the J-10/J-11 in air superiority roles complementing the Su-27/Su-30 fleet, JF-17 in interceptor role and the J-20/J-31 as stealth multi-role types.
The IAF aims to achieve an effective strength of 42 squadrons by 2022…
The J-20, based on the F-22 Raptor, first flew in January 2011 while the J-31, China’s second modern aircraft based on the F-35, was flight tested in October 2012.The J-20 and the J-31, talked of as fifth generation aircraft, are expected to join the PLAAF between 2017 and the end of this decade. The extent of second generation characteristics that these aircraft actually emerge with is yet to be seen as Chinese technological levels in the power plant and leading edge stealth technology appear to be far behind the US.
The power plant problem has partly been solved through buying more Su-35 from Russia. Deliveries of 24 Su-35s and an unknown number of spare engines are expected to start in 2015, while the J-20 is slated to be operational in 2017. Some experts feel that the J-20 would finally be powered by the Su-35 engine (117S engine, a derivative of the Russian AL31 which is the engine on one of the J-20 prototypes). If that be the case, the J-20 would be a formidable aircraft. Meanwhile, current holding of PLAAF is about 1,265 (around 200 J-10 variants, 125 J-11s, 40 Su-27s, 180 J-8s, 370 J-7s, 70 JH-7s, 100 Su-30s, 120 Q-51 ground attack aircraft and 60 H-6 bombers) . Thus, the combat aircraft strength is nearly double that of the IAF.
In keeping with the strategic perceptions of the PLAAF, China has ordered 70 IL-76 transport aircraft and 30 IL-78 air-to-air refuellers. In addition, China continues to upgrade its H-6 bomber fleet (originally adapted from the late 1950s Soviet Tu-16 design) with a new variant that possesses greater range and is armed with a long-range cruise missile. China has converted some of its old H-6 bombers (essentially Russian Tu-16s) to the air-to-air refuelling role for many of its indigenous aircraft, increasing their combat range. China is also developing an AWACS capability on the IL-76 airframe while the Y-8 is being modified for Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) roles. China’s aviation industry is developing a large transport aircraft (referred to as the Y-20) to supplement China’s small fleet of strategic airlift assets, which currently consists of a limited number of Russian-made IL-76 aircraft.
F-22 Fighter Raptor
Ongoing development of long range Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), including the BZK-005, and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV) will provide capability to conduct long-range reconnaissance and strike operations. In the area of air defence capabilities, the PLAAF is focussing on long range systems designed against aircraft and cruise missiles. Currently, it holds the Russian S 400 Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) system (400 km range) and is indigenously working on the domestic HQ-9 SAM (200 km plus range).
At the beginning of 2000, the PLAAF had more than 3,500 combat aircraft…
Thus, the PLAAF would be a large force containing technologically advanced aircraft and equipment and with a formidable offensive and defensive capability. The overall PLAAF threat needs to be seen in the context of gradual militarisation of Tibet and the building of infrastructure there. The rail head at Lhasa, connecting it to Xining (the capital of Qinghai province) over a distance of 1,956km is of immense strategic importance and a major threat to Indian defence. There are now 14 airfields in Tibet which can support operations in the Himalayan region. Their significance to any PLAAF operations against India is self-evident. Air-to-air refuelling capabilities have added further potency to PLAAF capabilities. Needless to say, hostilities with just China alone would be a major challenge for the IAF and when supplemented by a simultaneous Pakistani aggressive action, the resultant two-front war could be a major test of the IAF’s confidence in itself as a professional force.
IAF Readiness
So how does the IAF stand in comparison? During the 1960s, the IAF was authorised to build up to a 64 squadron force, including ten transport squadrons and a heavy bomber squadron. Subsequently, the figure was pruned down to 45 squadrons. However, it actually was able to build up to just 39.5 squadrons and is currently at a 34 squadron level. The gradual descent to this number has been an agonising tribulation for the IAF with the MiG-21 valiantly continuing to fight on beyond its constructive years. Indigenous production of the Indian Light Combat Aircraft Tejas has already taken more than three decades and is perhaps still a few years shy of operationalisation in the IAF. Even when it does get its operational clearance, it is unlikely to be greeted by the IAF with amiable cordiality. The Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) deal is taking its own time and incredibly, could not be signed during the FY 2013-2014 as funds ran out. The current strength of combat aircraft is around 650. The IAF fervently awaits the signing of the 126 aircraft MMRCA deal.
H-6 Bomber
Hoping to overcome almost a decade of neglect, the IAF aims to achieve an effective strength of 42 squadrons by 2022. This is expected to be done with the ongoing induction of 272 Su-30s, future plans for induction of 126 MMRCA Rafale as soon as the deal can be signed and the Tejas LCA whenever the Indian defence industry can get its act together and the T-50, the fifth generation fighter being jointly developed by Indian and Russia. Twelve C-130J Super Hercules and ten C-17 Globemasters are expected to provide strategic airlift capability. The IAF has a fairly good integrated air defence set up and has been making all endeavours to become a strategic air force. Speaking at an IAF base recently, Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha, Chief of Air Staff said, “The IAF is on a trajectory of modernisation and is transforming into a strategic aerospace power with full spectrum capability.” So how well is the IAF equipped to deal with a two-front war?
The IAF’s answer to the two-front war conundrum currently appears to be the Su-30…
A Two Front War
The above appraisals of the two neighbouring air forces are not comprehensive inasmuch as they do not catalogue their total assets and aircraft exhaustively. However, it is evident that each one is a force that cannot be ignored or derided. Despite the fact that the combat strength of PAF is only about two-thirds of the IAF’s, its aircraft are not very inferior to the latter’s, and its pilots well-motivated and competent. Moreover, the territorial expanse which is to be defended and over which PAF would be required to support friendly land forces is much smaller than India’s. This factor could be seen as a disadvantage for the IAF as it would have to spread its resources thinly as compared to the PAF.
However, if the PAF and the IAF were to be compared as adversaries, the IAF still enjoys significant advantages over the PAF. It has larger numbers of high performance aircraft, operates more BVR-capable platforms; its aircraft deploy better on-board sensors and electronic warfare systems and its pilots are more proficient in advanced air combat tactics – especially operations in a BVR environment. The IAF possesses superior combat support aircraft, better infrastructure and a continually improving integrated air defence network. However, the IAF’s steadily falling numbers could become critical in the event of a large-scale or protracted war with Pakistan.
With the PLAAF, the numbers game is reversed as it has an overwhelming superiority in numbers of combat aircraft. China’s use of its military on the ground in the ‘disputed territories’ to remind India of its territorial agenda is a continual irritant. It is not difficult to envisage a scenario wherein manned and unmanned flights over Indian territory would supplement the transgressions on the ground. When that does happen, India’s political will is likely to come under trial as there appears to be no decisive rules of engagement laid down for such contingencies. The gradual militarisation of Tibet and the build up of infrastructure there is another area of concern for India. The PLAAF’s air-to-air refuelling capabilities render operational ranges threatening and menacing for India.
The Su-30 needs to be supplemented by the MMRCA at the earliest…
The IAF’s answer to the two-front war conundrum currently appears to be the Su-30, a truly air dominance fighter permitting multiple offensive missions due to its speed, firepower, manoeuvrability and extended range. The Su-30 gave a good account of itself in Exercise Live Wire last year; one of the major aims of the exercise was practicing the IAF’s capability for a two-front war. As part of the exercise, Su-30s flew 1,800-km long missions taking off from an airfield in Assam in the East and flying to the Western front with air-to-air refuelling en route. With such extended ranges possible, the IAF has the choice to build or develop air bases all around the country (as opposed to the earlier ones close to the border with Pakistan). Thus, we now have Su-30s located at Thanjavur (South), Chhabua (North East) and Pune (West). There is the issue of numbers though; the planned strength of 272 will still be far short of the number of aircraft with similar capabilities that China can deploy.
Another worrying factor is the poor serviceability of the Su-30 fleet in recent months. With 12 hard points for armament, the Su-30 can also carry the air launched BrahMos cruise missile which may be expected to be used against strategic targets such as dams, power stations and industrial clusters. The Indian Strategic Forces Command (SFC) has also asked for 40 nuclear capable strike aircraft for the IAF (their command and control is not in the public domain yet). In all probability, this task will devolve upon the Su-30 fleet. Clearly, these two roles of the Su-30 render it the keystone of the two-front war. However, by itself, the Su-30 may not be an adequate deterrent or war winner in a two-front war scenario.
Conclusion
As can be seen, the PLAAF would be a formidable opponent while the PAF, although on a lesser level, would still be a tough antagonist. The probability of complicity between China and Pakistan is very high. There is also the possibility that Pakistan jumps in just to exploit a situation arising out of hostilities between China and India. After all, Pakistan has still not stopped thinking and talking about the 1971 War. Should the two engage India militarily at the same time, the IAF would indeed be inadequate to the roles and tasks assigned to it.
Political and bureaucratic obstructionism is the ‘third front’ that the defence forces have been constantly fighting against…
The Su-30, discussed earlier, needs to be supplemented by the MMRCA at the earliest. Even if the inordinately delayed deal was to be signed today, it is only the first 18 aircraft that come off the manufacturer’s assembly line. The rest will have to be assembled in India in a facility yet to be set up. The first Indian aircraft may take a year to emerge and the total figure of 126 may take three to five years. The Tejas, despite the hype raised about its Initial Operational Clearance in December, is still far from operationalisation. In any case, it cannot compare with the Su-30 or the MMRCA or with the frontline Chinese aircraft pitted against the IAF.
The apathy of the Ministry of Defence and indeed, the government, towards the needs of the defence services to be equipped and prepared to meet the mandate given to them is a cause of concern today. Tomorrow, it could lead to humiliation at the hands of our neighbours. This political and bureaucratic obstructionism is the ‘third front’ that the defence forces have been constantly fighting against during the last decade and more; if the IAF fails to touch the sky with glory in a possible two-front war, military historians would undoubtedly ascribe its ignominy to this third front.
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