The Statesman, 17 Jul 2014
kuldip nayar
I find it strange that New Delhi is not seriously considering the pros and cons of what happens once the American and Nato forces reduce their presence in Afghanistan to just a few thousand troops. US Secretary of State Kerry has visited Kabul to devise policy for after the withdrawal. But New Delhi is not in the picture.
kuldip nayar
I find it strange that New Delhi is not seriously considering the pros and cons of what happens once the American and Nato forces reduce their presence in Afghanistan to just a few thousand troops. US Secretary of State Kerry has visited Kabul to devise policy for after the withdrawal. But New Delhi is not in the picture.
No doubt, most Afghans have the best goodwill towards India because it has helped them to set up hospitals, schools and build roads. Yet Islamabad, which considers Afghanistan its “strategic depth,” wants the country to be its satellite. New Delhi has tried to persuade Islamabad to let Kabul be independent and sovereign, but Pakistan has not bitten the bullet.
It all started when the Soviet Union sent its forces into Afghanistan to impose their ideology on a state which was saturated with Islamic ideas. America used the opportunity to bleed the Soviet Union by training fundamentalists in Pakistan to make inroads into Afghanistan without considering the long-term repercussions. And once the Soviet Union started retreating from Afghanistan, Washington lost all interest in the territory, leaving behind arms and other equipment in the field itself. The fundamentalists used those weapons to propagate their strict and disciplinarian interpretation of Islam.
Islamabad had in its mind the use of armed and trained Taliban against India and there are numerous examples to testify that insurgency in Kashmir was nothing but a by-product of a bigoted stance to shut out the participation of non-Muslims in governance, however unwittingly demanded. I recall when I met in Kabul a leader from the Masud group, anti-Taliban in ideology and pro-India in its approach; he told me that the road to Kabul goes through Islamabad and if New Delhi was really interested in stopping the tide of fundamentalists, it should have a serious dialogue with Pakistan.
It is a pity that India refused to have any truck with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar who was Pakistan’s confidante. No doubt, he is a nasty person to deal with, but if we had fixed our eyes on the situation that would develop a decade later, we could have swallowed some of his anti-India rhetoric. But all this is now history. The two countries, particularly India, should formulate some strategy to thwart the Taliban onslaught, which is bound to take place once they are sure that the Western forces are not in a position to match their weapons.
The most disconcerting aspect is the birth of Tehrik-e-Pakistan Taliban (TTP), an indigenous growth within Pakistan which is in a position to strike wherever it wants and whenever it wants. It has proved it again and again. The recent attack on Karachi airport is an example. However, the Karachi happening is only the symptom, not the disease. The disease is fundamentalism which, to the horror of even middle-of-the-road Pakistanis, is spreading rapidly.
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has opted for an easy path. He has been negotiating with the Taliban to accommodate their aspirations. The reason why the talks have not gone very far is the Taliban’s insistence on Pakistan giving proof of their sincerity, of taking measures like closing institutions for female literacy and making hijab (veil) a compulsory outfit for women in Pakistan. No doubt the next step they will demand is a ban on women car drivers, just like in Saudi Arabia. Music has already been sacrificed on the altar of extremism. The old time singers or instrument players have no market in Pakistan. How ironic that they come to India to earn a livelihood.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was otherwise liberal, but he was the person who began placating the fanatics. He is the one who started a government stipend for the head maulvis in mosques and declared Ahmediyas as non-Muslims. Today the graves of Ahmediyas are being dug up and the remains of whatever is left is thrown out.
The Pakistani establishment did not think even for a minute about humiliating Sir Zafrullah Khan, a prominent Ahmediya who turned the tables against India at the UN on Kashmir. In fact, the complaint which Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru made at the UN about “Pakistan’s aggression” in Kashmir went against New Delhi largely because of Khan's efforts, blessed by Britain.
The past, however bitter, should not now be recalled at a time when both India and Pakistan have few options except to organise a joint front to defeat the Taliban. New Delhi should not forget that the Taliban would be at the Attari (Amritsar) border if they are not defeated in Afghanistan itself. If it is embarrassing for the two countries to talk about their strategy in the open, they can establish a back channel as they have done in the case of Kashmir.
The repercussions of the Taliban gaining an upper hand, first in Afghanistan and then in Pakistan, are so inimical to the defence and development of India that it should go out of the way to befriend Pakistan on a joint approach towards Afghanistan. Since no serious talks take place between the two because of Kashmir, they should keep this problem aside and allow the two army chiefs to sit across the table and devise a long-term strategy which would enable Afghanistan to stay independent.
Of course, this means that Islamabad would have to change its policy and not consider Afghanistan a part of its “strategic depth”. This is in Pakistan’s own interest. The manner in which the Taliban have begun to count in the affairs of Pakistan should be a warning that the Taliban would not allow Pakistan to be a liberal Islamic state.
New Delhi should take the initiative to get America on board regarding its anti-Taliban policy. If and when they are defeated in their designs both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, they would cease to be a force which is beginning to loom large in other Islamic countries where Taliban-like thoughts have begun to assert themselves.
It is a pity that India is not seeing the writing on the wall. At least Prime Minister Narendra Modi, said to be a strong ruler, should pick up the threads with Nawaz Sharif on his matter. Both hit it off well when they met in Delhi. Nawaz Sharif has even said so in a letter to Mr Modi. Can things in the same vein go ahead in the interest of a policy to contain Talibanisation, already quite assertive in Pakistan?
The writer is a veteran journalist and commentator. He blogs at www.kuldipnayar.com
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