Contributor: Richard de Silva
Posted: 06/05/2014
For the past ten years, the face of unmanned military aircraft has dominated the front pages of national press, ministerial reports and strategic briefings. Off the back of an extended Afghanistan campaign, the capabilities offered by a high-flying, high-endurance asset tasked with either reconnaissance or targeted strike have been seized upon with unabashed enthusiasm by commanders and politicians eager to play a trump card in the war on terror. Now, thanks to a decade’s worth of technological advance and a proven track record in theatre, the world’s governments are collectively exploring a rich market in hopes to outfit such a capability into their own national force.
According to a recent report by the RAND (Research And Development) Corporation – a US-based policy think tank – at least 23 countries have developed or are in the process of manufacturing UCAVs, with over 50 already having manufactured UAVs of any description, and more than 70 having acquired the capability. Armed variants include those that are capable of precision strike, but also demonstrators and so-called ‘suicide UAVs’ that can effectively perform the role of a cruise missile. Given the predicted curve of future information acquisition, investment and strategic deliberation, analysts (from the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Duke University) estimate that “virtually all” countries well be in a position to possess a UCAV one way or another.
Interestingly, it is on the very cusp of this global upswing that the United States – the leading developer and employer of UCAVs – is taking a step back from further large-scale investment into the capability. At the height of the boom in unmanned systems, the UCAV was seen as a game-changer, but with a pivot in the operational landscape and the reality of constrained budgets, justifying the same levels of expense is difficult, particularly when the path ahead is littered with uncertainty.
Like many allied countries, the US Government is in a process of restructuring its armed forces to account for both the budget deficit and the requirements of future conflict. It currently has 11,000 UAVs in its stocks, 450 of which are capable of being armed (in a traditional sense). For Pentagon bean-counters and strategists alike, this is too many. Maintaining them in what is expected to be a peacetime period is seen as an unnecessary cost, but whether the wrappers will ever need to be removed from every single aircraft again is debatable. The new American stance is likely to be a key influencer in the rebalance of the UCAV market in the years ahead, but there are a variety of reasons as to why the capability itself may continue to diminish in the long-term without a few fundamental changes.
First to note is that while cost always seems to be the tallest hurdle when it comes to equipping militaries, the price tag of acquiring basic unmanned platforms continues to fall, and is a chief reason for the impending shopping trip that the rest of the world is planning to take. In one recent example, engineers at the Advanced Manufacturing Research Centre (AMRC) at the University of Sheffield successfully printed a 1.5m-wide prototype UAV for a research project aimed at exploring the possibilities of 3D printing of complex designs. Such feats are becoming increasingly easy for even low-skilled engineers, given access to the right information or software. However, the payloads and related systems on these makeshift aircraft are – and will continue to be – considerable cost drivers. Hence, in spite of a receding market in the West for platforms, industry will continue to be involved in a ‘gold rush’ era for sales of UCAV platforms and integrated systems.
Access to either technological expertise or development, or indeed the ability to manufacture in lieu of expertise, is already proving a worry to western governments. This month, Iran unveiled what it claimed to be a successful copy of the US RQ-170 it captured in 2011. Iranian officials announced that it had decoded and reverse-engineered the aircraft. Photos that emerged from China in 2013 also seemed to show replicated RQ-170s. Of course, in either case there is no solid evidence that the internal systems have been successfully reproduced, but speculation suggests that the two nations may have teamed up in efforts to build something that is at least close enough to the original model to have a wider impact on strategic planning. Several weeks before the Iranian announcement, tensions in Southeast Asia were done no favours by the discovery of rudimentary reconnaissance UAVs in South Korea, later determined to have been launched by North Korea and built with Chinese parts. Armed variants are almost inevitable. Adding to the issue is the willingness of some advanced nations to begin exporting their products for profit to countries that are otherwise unable – or legally restricted – from developing the capability, then sharing access to that technology to third parties.
North American and European nations, having a higher percentage of democratic governance, are also more susceptible to the influence of public perception than authoritarian nations with little public accountability. The US in particular has seen widespread controversy over its use of UCAVs and, for obvious reason, has been reticent to release figures on system errors, civilian casualties or details on all overseas deployment. The Obama administration sees a need to protect this information for security reasons, but in doing so shades the notion of public transparency and has been accused of impeding technological innovation. The ethical debate remains a serious one for planners, as also demonstrated in Germany. Earlier this year, Lieutenant Colonel Roland Runge, head of the German Air Force's Tactical Air Reconnaissance and UAS Division, told Defence IQ that with the establishment of a German coalition government, the debate will now be more important “because the contract for the coalition must identify the way we will go in terms of procuring unmanned aircraft in the future.”
The biggest question mark remains in the validity of the unmanned system in tomorrow’s operational environment. Afghanistan presented a scenario in which the adversary was without an air force or major air defence capability, and UCAVs could operate largely without resistance. By the latter stages of the campaign, insurgents were acquiring electronic jammers to try to combat the systems, hinting at the efforts being done by other nations to readdress the balance. Now, there is less likelihood of western forces re-engaging in a large-scale counterinsurgency campaign on the ground, and perhaps more likelihood that the next major conflict will take place in a contested environment. As previously explored, the notion of replacing all manned aircraft with a pilotless or remote alternative is currently impractical for a host of reasons. Alongside the rise of any new weapon comes the rise of a countermeasure, and for UCAVs, electronic warfare systems and offensive cyber weapons are making it much less probable that these aircraft will be able to operate without interference, especially when pitted against a technologically advanced enemy. Likewise, the prospect of hunter UAVs specifically tasked with eradicating the airspace of enemy counterparts is now a distinct possibility, if indeed basic manned air-to-air combat fighters are not already enough.
UCAVs may therefore be an area that the US and its allies are perfectly right to lower down the priority list for military spending. This strategy does not however imply that funding will dry up altogether. Indeed, the unmanned system continues to provide invaluable influence in smaller COIN campaigns, and in a support role for both national and partnered forces. The revolt in Libya, the ongoing struggle in Nigeria, and the fight against the illicit drug trade in Latin America are just a few examples in which unmanned systems have been proving their worth outside of conventional warfare in recent years.
Weaponising these platforms is an optional step – and it is in the advantage of UCAVs to provide an option that could appeal to funding decision-makers. In addition, those nations with long-running unmanned programmes possess the irreplaceable benefits of skilled operators and trainers, practiced technicians and veteran tacticians. Commanders will not want these advantages to be allowed to simply evaporate.
The future is uncertain. Even with the predictions and projections of seasoned analysts, there is no guarantee that the UCAV will not return to a pivotal role in the near future. Based on recent lessons, strategists and politicians are likely to do all they can to cover all possible eventualities.
Senior UCAV programme managers, officers and industry professionals will be convening in London, UK on July 30-31 at the UCAV conference.
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