Ramzy Mardini is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council based in Amman, Jordan. JUNE 2014Source Link
The bold Sunni militant offensive is the latest inflection point in the long-term unraveling of post-Saddam Iraq. Nevertheless, despite all the international concern it has produced, Iraq’s revived insurgency isn’t a problem with a clear and corresponding solution. Indeed, while President Obama says “I don't rule out anything,” Washington is in no position to change facts on the ground and alter the conditions that are driving the country’s renewed insurgency.
The reality is that violence and asymmetric warfare will remain a symptom of the new Iraq for the foreseeable future. This isn’t due to an alleged shortage of military capabilities, but rather a reflection of what Iraq essentially is: an unreconciled, broken state, plagued by deep ethno-sectarian cleavages, weak institutions and a political system prone to relapse toward an authoritarian order.
Violence and asymmetric warfare will remain a symptom of the new Iraq for the foreseeable future.
The Obama administration has placed counterterrorism at the forefront of its foreign policy toward the Middle East. Unfortunately, far too much emphasis has been placed on hard power as the primary prescription to combat terrorism in the region. Indeed, it was the U.S. invasion and occupation that unleashed the problem of Sunni and Shiite militancy in Iraq. Thus, any U.S. approach against terrorism that is defined by military power ends up misdiagnosing the problem: insurgencies and terrorism are not causally derived from an absence of security; they are rather manifested from deep social, political and economic ills.
Armed intervention by external actors into ongoing conflicts in the Middle East will likely add fuel to the fire. In combating the increase of violence in Iraq, Washington and Baghdad have expanded a security-centric partnership. But Iraq is not a democratic, representative state; nor does its government behave as a central and credible arbiter between factions. Instead, Iraq is becoming ruled by a regime, which behaves as a political organism whose core purpose is to survive and thrive at the expense of other political factions.
The rise of violence in Iraq is due to a confluence of centrifugal dynamics – internal and external – that have built up during and after the U.S. invasion and occupation. Neither the civil war in neighboring Syria, nor the belligerent and authoritarian behavior of Iraq's prime minister can solely explain the resurgence of Sunni and Shiite militancy, the failure of the political system or the shortfalls of Iraq’s million-man security apparatus.
To effectively contain the militant threat spilling over from Syria will require the cooperation of various parts of the state and society in Iraq — from national, provincial and local to political, religious and tribal. But how can the U.S. fix a problem in which it has a fraction of a fraction of influencing the solution? For example, to stabilize Iraq will require stabilizing Syria; to stabilize Syria will require a regional settlement, among other things. The United States cannot force the Iraqis to come to terms with one another and cooperate. Washington is often perceived as supporting one political faction over another, especially through security-assistance to the regime.
The Iraq war exposed the limitations of translating hard military power to political influence on the ground. Unfortunately, that same thinking persists in Washington. A military response to a political problem tends to conflate the problem, while compounding its complexity. The White House would be wise to tread softly on the usage of military power in Iraq, and pursue financial incentives for Sunni tribal leaders to cooperate and coordinate against a threat in their own backyard.
The reality is that violence and asymmetric warfare will remain a symptom of the new Iraq for the foreseeable future. This isn’t due to an alleged shortage of military capabilities, but rather a reflection of what Iraq essentially is: an unreconciled, broken state, plagued by deep ethno-sectarian cleavages, weak institutions and a political system prone to relapse toward an authoritarian order.
Violence and asymmetric warfare will remain a symptom of the new Iraq for the foreseeable future.
The Obama administration has placed counterterrorism at the forefront of its foreign policy toward the Middle East. Unfortunately, far too much emphasis has been placed on hard power as the primary prescription to combat terrorism in the region. Indeed, it was the U.S. invasion and occupation that unleashed the problem of Sunni and Shiite militancy in Iraq. Thus, any U.S. approach against terrorism that is defined by military power ends up misdiagnosing the problem: insurgencies and terrorism are not causally derived from an absence of security; they are rather manifested from deep social, political and economic ills.
Armed intervention by external actors into ongoing conflicts in the Middle East will likely add fuel to the fire. In combating the increase of violence in Iraq, Washington and Baghdad have expanded a security-centric partnership. But Iraq is not a democratic, representative state; nor does its government behave as a central and credible arbiter between factions. Instead, Iraq is becoming ruled by a regime, which behaves as a political organism whose core purpose is to survive and thrive at the expense of other political factions.
The rise of violence in Iraq is due to a confluence of centrifugal dynamics – internal and external – that have built up during and after the U.S. invasion and occupation. Neither the civil war in neighboring Syria, nor the belligerent and authoritarian behavior of Iraq's prime minister can solely explain the resurgence of Sunni and Shiite militancy, the failure of the political system or the shortfalls of Iraq’s million-man security apparatus.
To effectively contain the militant threat spilling over from Syria will require the cooperation of various parts of the state and society in Iraq — from national, provincial and local to political, religious and tribal. But how can the U.S. fix a problem in which it has a fraction of a fraction of influencing the solution? For example, to stabilize Iraq will require stabilizing Syria; to stabilize Syria will require a regional settlement, among other things. The United States cannot force the Iraqis to come to terms with one another and cooperate. Washington is often perceived as supporting one political faction over another, especially through security-assistance to the regime.
The Iraq war exposed the limitations of translating hard military power to political influence on the ground. Unfortunately, that same thinking persists in Washington. A military response to a political problem tends to conflate the problem, while compounding its complexity. The White House would be wise to tread softly on the usage of military power in Iraq, and pursue financial incentives for Sunni tribal leaders to cooperate and coordinate against a threat in their own backyard.
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