May 31, 2014 · by Fortuna's Corner
The Anatomy Of Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean Operation; A Case Study
Jolanta Darczewska, has an article in the Warsaw, Poland, May 2014 edition of The Center For Eastern Studies — Point of View Series #42. Her examination of this subject/issue is quite thorough; and, she traces the origins and history of Russian information warfare from WWII, to the present. I have provided a good portion of the key observations. For the entire study, go to the Center For Eastern Studies; Point Of View #42.
Ms. Darczewska begins her article by noting that, “the Crimean operation has served as an occasion for Russia demonstrate to the entire world — the capabilities and potential of information warfare. Its goal [Russia], is to use difficult to detect methods to subordinate the elites and societies in other countries — by making use of various kinds of secret and overt channels (secret services. diplomacy, and the media), psychological impact, and ideological and political sabotage. Russian politicians and journalists have argued that information battles are necessary,” she writes, for “the Russian/Eurasian civilization” to counteract “informational aggression from the Atlantic civilization — led by the United States.”
“All the federal television and radio channels, newspapers, and a multitude of online resources have been employed in the recent disinformation campaign, regarding the situation in Ukraine — which is being waged on an unprecedentedly large scale. The anti-Ukrainian information battles which had been seen for many years, entered a tough phase of information warfare, at the beginning of this year. They have been aimed primarily at destabilizing the situation in Ukraine; and, placing pressure on its government and citizens to adopt solutions regarding their country’s political system — as proposed by Russia — so that Ukraine could be controlled by Russia and remain within its sphere of influence. Another goal,” she contends, “was to ‘obscure’ public opinion at home and world-wide, using a multitude of information channels.”
“Public opinion outside Russia had to choose between “Russian dominance in the post-Soviet area;” or, a “global Maiden” (total chaos). The spin doctors at home,” she writes, “were asking whether Crimea should become another U.S. state, or an entity of the Russian Federation. In effect,’ she contends, “the Kremlin’s informational aggression affected the Russian public most strongly and “the world’s greatest divided people,” i.e., Russian-speaking citizens of states — which were set up following the disintegration of the USSR. Western public opinion turned out to be the most resistant to Russian propaganda, although it has resonated with some people here as well. Some Western media and politicians agree with parts of the arguments raised by Russian propaganda, including “Russia’s right to arrange the post-Soviet area” in line with its interests. Ms. Darczewska argues, “the Crimean operation perfectly shows the essence of information warfare: the victim of the aggression — as was the case with Crimea — does not resist it. This happened because Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine — who had undergone necessary psychological and informational treatment (intoxication) took part in the separatist coup and the annexation of Crimea by Russia.”
Ms. Darczewska’s Main Points
— Russia’s information warfare theory has been developed in opposition the new generation Western warfare concepts.
— The geopolitical doctrine treats information warfare as a dangerous weapon: it is cheap, it is a universal weapon, it has unlimited range, it is easily assessable; and, permeates all state borders without restrictions. The information network struggle, as well as its extreme forms, such as information-psychological warfare and net-wars, are the means the state uses to achieve its goals in international, regional, and domestic politics — as well as to gain geopolitical advantage.
— Geopolitics offers ideological grounds for information battles. In opposition to the ideology of liberalism, it promotes “a neo-conservative, post-liberal (…) power struggling for a just multi-polar world, which defends tradition, conservative values and true liberty.
— The information strategy of the rivalry between Russia and the West is a product of both information geopolitics, which has been developed since the late 1990s, and the consistently pursued policy for strengthening the state and building its research and scientific, organizational, media, diplomatic, and social bases, et cetera.
— Western public opinion is more resistant to Russian propaganda, although it has resonated with some people here as well. Moscow’s informational aggression is set to intensify: Russia has a sense of impunity on information battlefields. Furthermore, it is constantly modifying and perfecting its propaganda techniques, taking into account new media tools and introducing innovations, such as activity in social networking services, etc.
Conclusion
Ms. Darczewska concludes that “the incorporation of the Crimea and the information warfare that accompanied it — were an effect,’ she argues, “of the policy aimed at strengthening the state, reconstructing Russia’s spheres of influence and mobilizing the public; this has been consistently applied for years now. It has also been conducted in tandem with the policy outlined in the Information Security Doctrine in 2000, which lists among the key threats, “the spread of disinformation about Russia and the federal state authorities.” The presidential programs launched over the past few years, have also been used to neutralize ‘information warfare’ waged against the Russian Federation. These programs include “Building a positive image of the Russian Federation,” “Improving Russian information security” and “Building a single information space in Russia,” and have been employed by President Putin to serve the purposes of reinforcing the civil identity of the multi-ethnic population of the Russian Federation.”
“The external dimension of this policy is an effect of the Kremlin’s belief that attempts are being made to influence the processes taking place in Russia and the post-Soviet era. The ‘scientific’ grounds for this belief are provided by geopolitical doctrine which calls for informational aggression to be directed mainly against Russia’s geopolitical opponents (the West — above all, the USA and NATO).”
“This policy is also strongly influenced by the power elite whose careers started in secret services; they have adopted a strategy of rivalry with the external world. Manifestations of this strategy include: the act of non-governmental organizations funded by foreign entities, which must be registered in the register of “foreign agents,” 2012, the anti-gay act (2013), and above all the consistent building of the scientific and research base dealing with information warfare, as well as developing a base to ensure organizational, media, ideological, legislative, diplomatic, social, academic, and cultural ‘circles’ — along with other support.”
An Old Product In New Packaging
“The recently observed Russian information and network warfare should be viewed as a product of the traditional political technologies which have been in use for years and which were inherited from the USSR. The contemporary Russian informational geopolitics, which uses in its theoretical deliberations a kind of ‘ideological newspeak,’ clearly draws upon Soviet psychological warfare and Soviet mental stereotypes. It had to take into consideration new media tools (the Internet). However, these innovations primarily concern the organization of activity within the network. Propaganda remains the key instrument of information warfare . It’s distinctive features are language (the language of emotions and judgments, and not of facts), content (compliance with the Kremlin’s official propaganda) and function (discrediting the opponent). One might wonder whether this instrument could make it possible for Russia to launch a new ideological crusade in the West. The Russian propaganda message is rather incredible, and easy to verify in the era of new technologies. Furthermore, the propagated ideas are not appealing. However, the ideological newspeak, based on disinformation falls on fertile socio-cultural ground in the East.”
Russia’s Allies
“The Russian-speaking diaspora, who have maintained cultural and emotional bonds with Russia, was Russia’s main ally during the Crimean operation. The linguistic space where Russian is used was also one of the factors that contributed to the successful action. This is also a convenient information and media space, and one receptive to Russian propaganda. Furthermore, the post-Soviet area (including Ukraine) is also thoroughly reconnoitered and permeated with the aid of agents of influence originating from the multitude of the Russian diaspora organizations. The view-point of Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine facilitated Russia in the achievement of its goals during the Crimean operation. They have been won over as a consequence of long-lasting propaganda backed with sabotage actions in Crimea. However, Russia has resorted to military solutions, forcing those unconvinced into obedience, even here, where the public is receptive to its ideas.”
“The Western public is less receptive to Russian disinformation: they have not been convinced by Russian augmentation that the annexation has saved Crimea from the cruelty of “Banderivtsy and fascists from the Maiden.” They are fully aware that the ‘new’ project of ‘conservative revolution,’ i.e., de-Americanization of the world, including Europe, being promoted by Russia, is unattractive, nothing new and in fact means setting the partition lines between the spheres of influences.”
“It is however, worth noting,” she argues, “the fact that the message addressed to the West is modified, and spread via specialist media (The Voice of Russia and TV RT). The official websites of Russian institutions, for example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which interprets current affairs in a more sophisticated manner, are also targeted at the Western audience. Disinformation provided here has been. and will continue to be more difficult to decipher. In the case of the Voice of Russia radio station, and TV RT, disinformation is also spread by local opinion. Different wording is used here, but manipulation is also inherent in the wording (“Russians have the right to be patriots as well,” “the government wants Russia to be rich and free,” “the power of Putin and the Kremlin is based on the people’s choice”). This wording draws upon generally respected values. Russians also play on the various motivations of diverse social groups in the West (using pacifists’ fear of war, politicians’ fear of unpredictability, and entrepreneurs’ fear of losses; and, explaining to experts why Western models will not work (for example in Ukraine). Furthermore, public opinion is not aware of the fact that they are the object of a planned and coordinated information struggle.”
The Future Of Information Warfare
“Russian information warfare is set to continue since Putin’s new doctrine has crystallized. This doctrine is geopolitical, Eurasian, anti-liberal, and oriented towards rivalry with the West; and, Russia’s dominance in Eurasia. For this reason, the key tasks of rational public debate is, and will continue in the immediate future to set limits on the space available to Russian political myths; and, ideologized propaganda actions, and to explain the mechanisms and goals of such actions.”
This is something the U.S. used to do pretty well — Voice of American, Radio Free Europe, etc.; but, one we no longer do well. Perhaps the Internet and Social Media will change that deficiency. V/R, RCP
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