The Pakistan government’s peace negotiations with the TTP appear to be an exercise in futility as the group and its allies are anti-democratic, fighting to overthrow the system. This is further complicated by the government’s confusing and over-simplistic approach and the disconnect between the government and the military leadership.
By Abdul Basit
After coming to power in Pakistan in a landslide victory in the May 2013 general election, the incumbent Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) government made the decision to initiate a peace dialogue with the Pakistani Taliban to tackle issues of extremism, militancy and terrorism. On 9 September 2013, the government convened an All Parties Conference (APC) that consensually approved the government’s strategy of negotiating with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the umbrella group of the Pakistani Taliban.
Since then, the government has been engaged in a series of peace talks with the TTP, albeit without making any major breakthrough. So far, the best outcome of this eight-month long peace process has been a 40-day ceasefire from 1 March to 10 April 2014. The TTP, however, did not extend the ceasefire further, stating that the government was insincere and not serious in their efforts to secure peace. The government in turn blamed the TTP for being inflexible and deceitful.
Why Negotiate with TTP?
Notwithstanding the widespread local, regional and international opposition to negotiations with the TTP, the Pakistani government is compelled to engage them in a peace process due to the pledges made to the masses during its election campaign. During the election campaign, the PML-N party vowed to find a peaceful solution to issues of militancy and terrorism. The fundamental justification driving this approach was the limitations and failures of the heavily militarized measures over the last decade.
The government argues that the current wave of terrorism and
extremism befell on Pakistan when it willy-nilly became part of the US-led war on terrorism. It blames the then military regime of General (Retired) Pervez Musharraf (2002-2007) of not only bringing the US war inside Pakistan’s borders, but also of sending Pakistani army troops to fight under US command in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Thus, for the Pakistani government, the starting point of finding a long-term solution to
militancy and terrorism in Pakistan involves disengaging from the US-led war and looking for local political solutions.
The government leadership is convinced that the US military campaign in Afghanistan and the Pakistani army’s military operations in FATA have neither achieved a strategic victory over the Afghan or Pakistani Taliban, nor a reduction in the rising tide of extremism. On the contrary, the government believes that the overly militarized approach to tackling terrorism and extremism has been counter-productive, and that it has subdued the possible political avenues in overcoming these challenges. The present government of Pakistan considers military operations to be only one component of a wider, less expensive and more sustainable political strategy to combat terrorism and extremism.
The biggest challenge to secure peace is the fact that the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) are wedded to Al Qaeda’s ideology comprising of transnational jihad and the Islamic caliphate system. They have no stakes in the existing nation-state system of Pakistan. Ideologically, the TTP is fighting the very system which the government is trying to secure by engaging in talks with the Pakistani Taliban. Despite accepting the government’s peace offer, TTP has given no indication that they are willing to compromise on their central demand of the implementation of Shariah (Islamic law) in Pakistan. For TTP, a democratic system is non- Islamic and unacceptable. In fact, TTP appears to be skillfully exploiting the present government’s diplomatic stance to propagate their ideological and political propaganda through extensive media activity.
The Pakistani government’s policy to seek a country-specific, home-grown solution to terrorism also does not stand the test of empirical scrutiny: no solution to terrorism and extremism in Pakistan is sustainable if it is not part of a regional strategy which engages the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Thus, the government’s political moves at the tactical level appear cursory, and its broader strategy fails to appreciate the complex ideological and political underpinnings of religious extremism and terrorism in Pakistan.
The ‘Talk-and-Fight’ Paradox
A major challenge to peace talks between the government and the TPP has been the ‘talk-and-fight’ paradox – they have been talking and fighting at the same time, except for the duration of the recent 40-day ceasefire agreement. This demonstrates that the government’s approach to peace has not been successful, and that it is seemingly divorced from the complex dynamics of the conflict on the ground. The government’s insistence on continuing with peace negotiations has made it look politically naïve and weak, and over-simplistic in its counterterrorism strategy. The obstinate position of the TTP has also put the government in a tight spot politically. Critics are questioning the sagacity of the Pakistani government’s insistence on more dialogue since this has not gained any substantial concessions from the TTP. Some believe that the government’s peace overtures are meant to appease the TTP. This was evident from the statement of Pakistan’s Interior Minister
Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan on the floor of the national assembly on 7 March 2014 when he referred to the Pakistani Taliban as patriotic
Pakistani citizens. He said that “A clear majority of the [Pakistani] Taliban are not enemies of Pakistan. Taliban had complaints of excess by the government of former military ruler General (Retired) Pervez Musharraf, but they were not anti-Pakistan.”
The government’s ‘no-strings-attached’ approach has made it difficult to obtain compromises from the TTP, and thus it is now apparently bending backwards to extract even a meaningless concession from the TTP to justify continuing with peace talks. The loose criterion for initiating dialogue has turned the peace process into an open-ended series of moots and parleys between the government and the TTP representatives.
Disconnect between the Civilian and Military Leadership
The disconnect between the civilian and military leadership in Pakistan is another key impediment hampering the peace process.
The top brass in the Pakistani military is uncomfortable with the way the government has pursued peace talks with the TTP. Although in principle they support a political approach, they oppose the unilateral concessions granted to the TTP, such as the release of TTP prisoners in March and April this year. The military leadership finds it difficult to talk with those responsible for the deaths of over 50,000 Pakistani civilians and 5,000 military personnel since 2001, and believes that political concessions for the Pakistani Taliban, if any, should be on a reciprocal basis.
After a spate of terrorist incidents across Pakistan in January 2014, there was pressure from all quarters on the political leadership to initiate a crackdown against the TTP in North Waziristan Agency (NWA), which borders Afghanistan. In a meeting convened on 28 January 2014 to discuss the deteriorating internal security situation, the majority of parliamentarians supported initiation of a military operation. There was a general consensus that the audacious TTP attacks have effectively put an end to the government’s offer for peace. All the preparations for a major military offensive were undertaken accordingly. The military was only waiting for a positive nod from the political leadership, which was expected during Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s speech in the parliament on 29 January 2014. However, the Prime Minister had a last-minute change of heart; declaring instead that his government will give peace a final chance. Ever since this political somersault, the Pakistani military has shown its open reservations to the government’s dealings with the TTP.
Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen
Too many stakeholders in the peace initiatives have also become a great obstacle for the Sharif Government. A plethora of religious- political groups as well as left-leaning liberal political circles have been involved in lobbying in favour or against the peace talks with the TTP. One major reason for the PML-N-led government to push ahead with the peace talks has been to compete with the cricketer- turned politician Imran Khan, PML-N’s biggest political opponent, whose Tehrik -e-Insaf party (PTI/ Justice Party) is the staunchest proponent of peace talks with the Pakistani Taliban. Also, it is difficult for PML-N to initiate a military operation in FATA without the consent of the PTI-dominated provincial government of the north-western Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province which is adjacent to FATA, as the KP province will be directly affected in the event of a military operation.
PTI’s arch rival in KP is the Jamiat-e-Ulam-e-Islam (JUI-F) led by notable politician and religious leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman. Although Maulana Fazal is an ally of the PML-N party and supports peace talks with the TTP, he disagrees with the PML-N-led government’s strategy in engaging with the TTP for the same. He has proposed to reach out to the TTP through a tribal jirga (council of tribal elders) instead of national negotiation committees, as the Pakistani government’s direct engagement with the TTP would constitute (premature) acceptance of TTP as a stakeholder in Pakistan’s political system. On its part, the government has requested Maulana Sami-ul-Haq, an influential religious cleric considered the ‘Father of the Taliban’ with close ties to Mullah Mohammed Omar and head of the Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam Sami group, to help the government in its negotiations with the TTP. Sami ul Haq is a staunch political opponent of Maulana Fazal. It is interesting to explore why the government sought support of Sami-ul-Haq instead of Maulana Fazal, its political ally. It could possibly be due to the rivalry of Maulana Fazal with Imran Khan – whose support the government seeks in pursuing peace talks with the TTP.
Conversely, political parties such as Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), Mutahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and Awami National Party (ANP) believe that a military offensive is the only manner of ending violent extremism and terrorism. At every step of the floundering peace process, these parties have questioned its intentions and political wisdom and have demanded outcomes from the PML-N-led government’s eight-month long engagement with the TTP.
The presence of US forces in Afghanistan and the US-led drone campaign in Pakistan’s tribal areas further complicate the political dynamics within Pakistan. The US views the TTP in the Pakistani- Afghan border areas as a regional challenge. The US also opposes peace talks with the TTP, and asserts that the TTP was only buying time to reorganize and recuperate, until they were ready to launch their summer offensive staring in June of 2014. The failure of all the previous peace agreements between the Pakistani government and the TTP has also hardened this stance. However, due to its own plan to withdraw much of its troops from Afghanistan later this year, the US has become cautious in its criticism of the Pakistani government’s dealings with the TTP.
The Afghan government views the peace talks between the Pakistani government and TTP as an effort to divert the militancy from Pakistan to Afghanistan. Many in Afghanistan believe that these talks are part of Pakistan’s strategy to manage Afghanistan after the US and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) leave the country. There is a perception that a joint effort by the Pakistani government and TTP is underway to wage a concerted armed insurgency in Afghanistan in the coming years. According to the Afghan government, the peace talks between the Pakistani government and the TTP have actually resulted in a spike in violence and cross-border militancy in Afghanistan.
Terrorist Threat to Pakistan is not Monolithic
Another difficulty of pursuing peace talks with the TTP is the fact that it is not a monolithic entity. More than 56 militant groups, big and small, operate under the TTP banner. The leadership of the TTP central shura (leadership/ advisory council) hardly exercises any influence over the various militant groups operating in different areas.
While the government has been engaged in a peace dialogue with TTP, other groups have splintered from the movement and have announced their outright opposition to peace talks with the government. They have vowed to continue the so-called jihad to overthrow the current political system and bring the Islamic caliphate system to Pakistan. The formation of TTP’s splinter group Ahrar-ul-Hind (“Freedom Fighters of India”), which believes in an armed struggle against the Pakistani state, is a case in point. Thus, a peace settlement with ‘TTP central’ alone would not have an impact on the militant activities of other Taliban groups in FATA. At the same time, entering into individual peace agreements with over 50 groups is neither politically pragmatic nor viable.
Moreover, TTP is not the sole driver of the extremist and terrorist threat in Pakistan. For example, there is a visible threat from sectarian militancy by anti-Shia (Sunni) militant organizations like Jandulla and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). Also, a host of Baloch militant organizations are waging a war of separatism in Pakistan’s largest and mineral-rich Balochistan province in the south-west. Over the last few years, the Baloch insurgency has evolved from a small-scale tribal group engaged in guerilla warfare to a sophisticated, urban terrorist movement.
Conclusion
In assessing the impact of peace talks with the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), it is crucial to bear in mind that the group is not likely to compromise on the demand for the enforcement of its own version of Shariah in Pakistan, as that would result in TTP losing its authority as a jihadist and ideological movement. The TTPisalsoapartoftheAl Qaeda-inspired global militant Islamist movement committed to establishing an Islamic caliphate. Members of the TTP kill and get killed for this. They also do not accept the Pakistani constitution or its internationally- recognized national borders.
During its negotiations with the TTP over the past eight months, the Pakistani government has made it clear that the country’s constitution is non- negotiable. Equally, the TTP has been unequivocal in the demand that whether it is “war or peace, Shariah is the ultimate objective.” Thus, the fundamental conflict between the Pakistani government and the TTP is ideological, and this will ultimately determine the final outcome of the on-going peace talks.
Continuing militant violence by the TTP, such as the recent attack on the Jinnah International Airport in Karachi on 9 June 2014, is likely also to increase pressure on the government to take decisive military action on the group. Moreover, given the diversity and complexity of the militant and terrorist landscape in Pakistan, pacification of the TTP-specific threat will only partially reduce the violence in the country. What Pakistan requires is a solution which can address all its political challenges simultaneously.
About the author:
Abdul Basit is a Senior Analyst with ICPVTR.
Source:
This article was published in the RSIS journal Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, VOLUME 6, ISSUE 5 JUNE 2014, pages 4-9, which may be accessed here (PDF).
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