CHINESE GENERAL: U.S. MAKING ‘IMPORTANT’ MISTAKES; TREAT CHINA AS AN ENEMY – AND IT WILL BECOME ONE
by Fortuna's Corner
in China, CIA, DIA, Intelligence Community, Japan, military history,national security, North Korea, South Korea, US Military May 2014
In a clear sign that Chinese officials don’t trust the U.S.’s motives, Gen. Zhu told The Wall Street Journal that the “Chinese are not so stupid” as to believe that Washington wants to work with China, or that the U.S. government is truly neutral when it comes to territorial disputes between China and American allies.
“Their actions don’t match their words; that’s the problem,” he said. “If you look at what the U.S. is doing on China’s periphery-things such as reconnaissance, exercises, massive deployments, strengthening military alliances, taking sides on territorial disputes-these things are not good at all.”
U.S. Making ‘Important’ Mistakes, Chinese General Says
Treat China as an Enemy and It Will Become One, Warns Maj. Gen. Zhu Chenghu
By TREFOR MOSS And JULIAN BARNES
May 2014
http://online.wsj.com/articles/u-s-making-important-mistakes-chinese-general-says-1401526934#printMode
U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel listening to Lt. Gen. Wang Guanzhong, deputy chief of China’s General Staff, at the start of their meeting Saturday. Associated Press
SINGAPORE-Chinese defense officials reacted furiously to U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel’s assertion that China has undertaken destabilizing actions as it pursues its territorial ambitions in the South China Sea.
Rebutting Mr. Hagel’s remarks, offered in a speech Saturday at the Shangri-La Dialogue, a regional security summit in Singapore, Maj. Gen. Zhu Chenghu told The Wall Street Journal that the charges are “groundless” and that “the Americans are making very, very important strategic mistakes right now” in their approach to China.
Gen. Zhu, who is a professor at China’s National Defense University, accused Mr. Hagel of hypocrisy in his assessment of the region’s security landscape, suggesting that in his view “whatever the Chinese do is illegal, and whatever the Americans do is right.”
Shangri-La Dialogue
•U.S. Commander: China on Wrong Path
•U.S., Japan Blast China Over Asia Security
•Chinese Diplomat Slams Abe
•Ministers Dismayed Over China
•Japan Reaches Out to Asean
Rather than lecture and accuse China, Gen. Zhu said that the U.S. “should treat China as an equal partner, instead of as an enemy.”
“If you take China as an enemy, China will absolutely become the enemy of the U.S.,” he warned. “If the Americans take China as an enemy, we Chinese have to take steps to make ourselves a qualified enemy of the U.S. But if the Americans take China as a friend, China will be a very loyal friend; and if they take China as a partner, China will be a very cooperative partner.”
As a two-star general-and a military academic-Gen. Zhu isn’t part of China’s senior military leadership. But his views reflect the deep sense of mistrust within some parts of the People’s Liberation Army toward the Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia, and America’s true intentions toward China. China didn’t send its top-level defense officials to the Shangri-La gathering, instead relying on a number of English-speaking academics and PLA officers to rebuff accusations against Beijing.
Gen. Zhu’s comments were echoed during a spirited question-and-answer session following Mr. Hagel’s speech. In the session, PLA Maj. Gen. Yao Yunzhu questioned America’s repeated claim that it doesn’t take sides in territorial disputes, asking how that can be true when the U.S. also claims the disputed islands in the East China Sea are covered by a U.S. treaty with Japan.
More broadly, she said the U.S. claims that its defense treaties cover disputed matters amount to a “threat of force, coercion or intimidation,” a charge similar to what the U.S. has lodged against China.
China has come under steady criticism from the U.S., Japan and others at the Shangri-La Dialogue for what Beijing’s critics call its aggressiveness in territorial disputes with Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan.
In his speech, Mr. Hagel said China was undermining Asia-Pacific rules-based order by taking provocative steps. In early May, China deployed an oil rig to waters claimed by Vietnam, upsetting Hanoi. China’s ties with the Philippines have been under severe strain since Chinese ships took control of Scarborough Shoal, a disputed area in the South China Sea, in 2012.
Despite his criticisms, Mr. Hagel stressed that the U.S. is “reaching out to China because we seek to expand prosperity and security for all nations of this region.” U.S. officials have repeatedly insisted that the Obama administration’s “pivot,” which is sending more military, diplomatic and economic assets to the Asian-Pacific region, isn’t meant to contain China, but rather to build confidence with Beijing and expand the U.S.-China partnership.
After Gen. Yao’s first questions, the host of the event, John Chipman of the International Institute for Security Studies, tried to cut her off. But the general plowed ahead, arguing with an additional question that China’s recent establishment of an air-defense identification zone in the East China Sea was proper.
“What international organization or what countries did the U.S. consult with before it set up” air defense identification zones? Gen. Yao asked. “What international law has China violated in setting up a ADIZ in the East China Sea?”
In response, Mr. Hagel repeated the U.S. criticism that China had taken “unilateral” steps to establish the zone. Other nations establishing such zones “consult with neighbors,” he said. “Its not unilateral. It’s a relationship they work through.”
More broadly, Mr. Hagel rejected Gen. Yao’s contention the U.S. is taking sides in the territorial disputes, and said China is trying to resolve them in the wrong way, through force. Any change in the administrative control of contested islands of the East China Sea, he said, should be carried out through “international norms.”
“These territorial disputes should be resolved through international law and international order,” Mr. Hagel said. “Not through intimidation or coercion.”
In a clear sign that Chinese officials don’t trust the U.S.’s motives, Gen. Zhu told The Wall Street Journal that the “Chinese are not so stupid” as to believe that Washington wants to work with China, or that the U.S. government is truly neutral when it comes to territorial disputes between China and American allies.
“Their actions don’t match their words; that’s the problem,” he said. “If you look at what the U.S. is doing on China’s periphery-things such as reconnaissance, exercises, massive deployments, strengthening military alliances, taking sides on territorial disputes-these things are not good at all.”
EIGHT WAYS IN WHICH THE U.S. ARMY IS STRATEGICALLY UNIQUE
May 2014
In a clear sign that Chinese officials don’t trust the U.S.’s motives, Gen. Zhu told The Wall Street Journal that the “Chinese are not so stupid” as to believe that Washington wants to work with China, or that the U.S. government is truly neutral when it comes to territorial disputes between China and American allies.
“Their actions don’t match their words; that’s the problem,” he said. “If you look at what the U.S. is doing on China’s periphery-things such as reconnaissance, exercises, massive deployments, strengthening military alliances, taking sides on territorial disputes-these things are not good at all.”
U.S. Making ‘Important’ Mistakes, Chinese General Says
Treat China as an Enemy and It Will Become One, Warns Maj. Gen. Zhu Chenghu
By TREFOR MOSS And JULIAN BARNES
May 2014
http://online.wsj.com/articles/u-s-making-important-mistakes-chinese-general-says-1401526934#printMode
U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel listening to Lt. Gen. Wang Guanzhong, deputy chief of China’s General Staff, at the start of their meeting Saturday. Associated Press
SINGAPORE-Chinese defense officials reacted furiously to U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel’s assertion that China has undertaken destabilizing actions as it pursues its territorial ambitions in the South China Sea.
Rebutting Mr. Hagel’s remarks, offered in a speech Saturday at the Shangri-La Dialogue, a regional security summit in Singapore, Maj. Gen. Zhu Chenghu told The Wall Street Journal that the charges are “groundless” and that “the Americans are making very, very important strategic mistakes right now” in their approach to China.
Gen. Zhu, who is a professor at China’s National Defense University, accused Mr. Hagel of hypocrisy in his assessment of the region’s security landscape, suggesting that in his view “whatever the Chinese do is illegal, and whatever the Americans do is right.”
Shangri-La Dialogue
•U.S. Commander: China on Wrong Path
•U.S., Japan Blast China Over Asia Security
•Chinese Diplomat Slams Abe
•Ministers Dismayed Over China
•Japan Reaches Out to Asean
Rather than lecture and accuse China, Gen. Zhu said that the U.S. “should treat China as an equal partner, instead of as an enemy.”
“If you take China as an enemy, China will absolutely become the enemy of the U.S.,” he warned. “If the Americans take China as an enemy, we Chinese have to take steps to make ourselves a qualified enemy of the U.S. But if the Americans take China as a friend, China will be a very loyal friend; and if they take China as a partner, China will be a very cooperative partner.”
As a two-star general-and a military academic-Gen. Zhu isn’t part of China’s senior military leadership. But his views reflect the deep sense of mistrust within some parts of the People’s Liberation Army toward the Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia, and America’s true intentions toward China. China didn’t send its top-level defense officials to the Shangri-La gathering, instead relying on a number of English-speaking academics and PLA officers to rebuff accusations against Beijing.
Gen. Zhu’s comments were echoed during a spirited question-and-answer session following Mr. Hagel’s speech. In the session, PLA Maj. Gen. Yao Yunzhu questioned America’s repeated claim that it doesn’t take sides in territorial disputes, asking how that can be true when the U.S. also claims the disputed islands in the East China Sea are covered by a U.S. treaty with Japan.
More broadly, she said the U.S. claims that its defense treaties cover disputed matters amount to a “threat of force, coercion or intimidation,” a charge similar to what the U.S. has lodged against China.
China has come under steady criticism from the U.S., Japan and others at the Shangri-La Dialogue for what Beijing’s critics call its aggressiveness in territorial disputes with Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan.
In his speech, Mr. Hagel said China was undermining Asia-Pacific rules-based order by taking provocative steps. In early May, China deployed an oil rig to waters claimed by Vietnam, upsetting Hanoi. China’s ties with the Philippines have been under severe strain since Chinese ships took control of Scarborough Shoal, a disputed area in the South China Sea, in 2012.
Despite his criticisms, Mr. Hagel stressed that the U.S. is “reaching out to China because we seek to expand prosperity and security for all nations of this region.” U.S. officials have repeatedly insisted that the Obama administration’s “pivot,” which is sending more military, diplomatic and economic assets to the Asian-Pacific region, isn’t meant to contain China, but rather to build confidence with Beijing and expand the U.S.-China partnership.
After Gen. Yao’s first questions, the host of the event, John Chipman of the International Institute for Security Studies, tried to cut her off. But the general plowed ahead, arguing with an additional question that China’s recent establishment of an air-defense identification zone in the East China Sea was proper.
“What international organization or what countries did the U.S. consult with before it set up” air defense identification zones? Gen. Yao asked. “What international law has China violated in setting up a ADIZ in the East China Sea?”
In response, Mr. Hagel repeated the U.S. criticism that China had taken “unilateral” steps to establish the zone. Other nations establishing such zones “consult with neighbors,” he said. “Its not unilateral. It’s a relationship they work through.”
More broadly, Mr. Hagel rejected Gen. Yao’s contention the U.S. is taking sides in the territorial disputes, and said China is trying to resolve them in the wrong way, through force. Any change in the administrative control of contested islands of the East China Sea, he said, should be carried out through “international norms.”
“These territorial disputes should be resolved through international law and international order,” Mr. Hagel said. “Not through intimidation or coercion.”
In a clear sign that Chinese officials don’t trust the U.S.’s motives, Gen. Zhu told The Wall Street Journal that the “Chinese are not so stupid” as to believe that Washington wants to work with China, or that the U.S. government is truly neutral when it comes to territorial disputes between China and American allies.
“Their actions don’t match their words; that’s the problem,” he said. “If you look at what the U.S. is doing on China’s periphery-things such as reconnaissance, exercises, massive deployments, strengthening military alliances, taking sides on territorial disputes-these things are not good at all.”
EIGHT WAYS IN WHICH THE U.S. ARMY IS STRATEGICALLY UNIQUE
May 2014
by Fortuna's Corner · in Army, DIA, Intelligence Community, military history, national security,US Military · Leave a comment
Eight Ways In Which The US Army Is Strategically Unique
Comment Now Follow Comments
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ lorenthompson/2014/05/30/ eight-ways-in-which-the-army- is-strategically-unique/
Loren Thompson
I write about national security, especially its business dimensions.
full bio →
Eight Ways In Which The US Army Is Strategically Unique
Comment Now Follow Comments
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ lorenthompson/2014/05/30/ eight-ways-in-which-the-army- is-strategically-unique/
Loren Thompson
I write about national security, especially its business dimensions.
full bio →
When President Obama addressed the graduating class at West Point on May 28, he was speaking to the future leadership of a military service that is having a hard time defining its place in national strategy. There was no need to dwell on that question for a dozen years after the 9-11 attacks – over two-thirds of the casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan were soldiers – but now those wars are nearly ended, the White House is shifting its strategic focus to the Pacific, and the President says non-military options are the preferred way of dealing with security challenges. Ground forces will still have a role to play in this emerging landscape, but the political culture looks more favorably disposed to the light footprint and fleeting presence of the Marine Corps.
Army efforts to articulate a compelling vision of its future are hampered by two obstacles. First, many politicians and policymakers don’t want to know the truth about what the future may hold for the joint force. Just as Washington avoids talking about the inevitability of nuclear deterrence one day failing, so it doesn’t want to discuss the possibility that tomorrow’s worst nightmares might find sanctuary in the back alleys of Cairo or Karachi – where we will have to go and root them out. Second, the Army has an inferiority complex about talking to policy elites hailing from Harvard, so it tries to dress up military imperatives in pretentious jargon that undercuts their urgency.
Thus the Army message is a bit muddled, and as a result it is taking disproportionate cuts in Washington’s budget wars just as it took disproportionate casualties in overseas contingencies. Most of its major modernization initiatives for replacing Reagan-era combat systems have died, its active-duty force structure is shrinking fast, and Chief of Staff Ray Odierno recently told Congress his service is less ready to fight today than it was on the eve of 9-11. Clearly, the Army needs to do a better job of explaining what the consequences of demobilization might be. With that in mind, I’d like to offer a partial list of ways in which the Army is strategically unique – in other words, a compendium of essential missions that only the Army can perform in support of national strategy. If the Army is allowed to wither, these are the capabilities America will lose.
1. The ability to seize and secure extensive areas for indefinite periods. You can’t control a place by flying planes over it or shelling it from offshore. To secure land you have to put boots on the ground. And if it’s a lot of land that needs to be secured for a long time, only the U.S. Army has the requisite resources. This isn’t just about size – the Army is about five times the size of the Marine Corps when you count their respective reserve components – but also about skills and culture. A Marine officer returning from overseas deployment told me he wasn’t all that concerned about getting trucks with better protection against improvised explosive devices, because he figured his unit would be in and out of a country before IED’s became a problem. People in the Army don’t think like that.
2. The ability to sustain the rest of the joint force through continuous ground presence. Because the Army has the staying power to occupy vast tracts of territory over prolonged periods, it is postured to provide support for the other services that they cannot provide themselves. This support includes basing infrastructure, surface communications, logistical networks, force protection, liaison with civil authorities, and the full panoply of other services associated with an ongoing presence. Naval forces by definition are postured to operate from the sea and air forces often operate from remote locations, but when extended presence in some hostile place is required, the Army has the capacity to sustain the entire joint force.
There are some vital military missions that only the Army can perform effectively — like seizing and securing large areas for long periods. (Retrieved from Wikimedia)
3. The ability to conduct protracted counter-insurgency operations. Effective counter-insurgency operations typically require placing warfighters in the immediate vicinity of local populations to pacify villages, protect noncombatants, and gradually win “hearts and minds.” Such operations are unpopular with the U.S. electorate, but lacking the ability to successfully prosecute them is an invitation to our enemies to wage “asymmetric” warfare. The Marine Corps has many of the same skills the Army does for this kind of combat, but it often takes years to defeat irregular forces rooted in local culture, and a sizable campaign would inevitably degrade Marine performance of other missions. Soldiers are better suited to conducting such campaigns.
4. The ability to root out adversaries entrenched in large urban centers. Many developing nations are witnessing massive migrations of rural populations into cities, creating huge urban centers. It is inevitable that terrorists and insurgents will increasingly seek sanctuary in these sprawling built-up areas, just as they previously hid in jungles. The only way to defeat them is to go into the cities and root them out – without causing mass civilian casualties that might stoke support for their cause. Urban warfare is a labor-intensive, arduous activity for which the Army is far better suited than the other services. The Marine Corps acquitted itself well in the two battles of Fallujah, but that city’s population was barely 200,000 – a city like Karachi, with 13 million inhabitants, is simply beyond the capacity of any service other than the Army to occupy and control.
5. The ability to train foreign security forces in all facets of land warfare. The Obama Administration has from its inception placed emphasis on equipping overseas partners and allies with the means to provide for their own security, rather than depending on the U.S. For countries such as Afghanistan, Egypt and Nigeria, training is at least as important as getting the latest military technology. The Army has the most experience with doing such training, and because it is postured for operations across the full spectrum of conflict, it can tailor training to conditions that specific countries face. The Marine Corps is focused mainly on amphibious warfare and expeditionary operations, whereas most recipients of U.S. training are focused on internal defense and protection against aggressive neighbors.
6. The ability to support civil authorities in coping with disruptions. The Army is firmly rooted in the fifty states through the National Guard. As a result, it is often the first military service that is called on to help states and localities cope with major disruptions. Normally this involves the aftermath of natural disasters, but it can also mean dealing with civil disturbances such as the riots that occurred following the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. In addition to having a much bigger domestic footprint away from the coasts than the sea services, the types of equipment the Army operates and the kinds of skills it sustains for conducting land warfare are better suited to mounting large-scale civil support operations than those of the other services.
7. The ability to limit escalation by providing proportional military options. The Army isn’t responsible for nuclear forces the way the Air Force and Navy are, but it still plays an important role in global deterrence by providing proportional military options across the spectrum of conflict that reduce the pressure for escalation. For instance, if Russia’s recent aggression in Ukraine had led to threats against European NATO countries such as Poland, the U.S. had a wide array of conventional military options that it could have exercised without being forced to make the awful choice between use of nuclear weapons or local defeat. Like China, Russia is mainly a land power, so having a substantial land-warfare capability is crucial to dealing with potential provocations from Moscow without having to escalate to use of weapons of mass destruction – an intrinsically destabilizing action.
8. The ability to deter through forward presence that conveys resolve. America’s forward military presence sends a signal of resolve to potential aggressors, but some kinds of presence are more convincing than others. Aircraft over-flights or warships sitting offshore just don’t convey the level of commitment that troops on the ground do. In the case of Korea, that visible commitment of ground forces has persisted for six decades. The Army is the only U.S. military service with sufficient manpower and resources to sustain such a commitment, and thus it plays a vital deterrent role in places like Northeast Asia. The relief of U.S. allies in Eastern Europe when relatively modest contingents of soldiers were dispatched to their countries during the Ukraine crisis speaks volumes about the deterrent effect of U.S. “boots on the ground.”
This is only a partial list of the kinds of roles and missions that the Army is uniquely well suited to perform. Air power, sea power, and amphibious warfare are vitally important facets of the joint force’s warfighting portfolio, but there are some things that only a big, well trained and equipped Army can do. It would be exceedingly irresponsible to let America’s Army lose its edge in the current fiscal and political environment. As Edward Gibbon observed of the Roman Legions in his monumental history of the ancient world’s greatest empire, “They preserved peace by a constant preparation for war.”
COULD COMBAT DRONES BE A TURNING POINT FOR BOEING’S DEFENSE BUSINESS?
June 1, 2014 · by Fortuna's Corner · in Air Force, Defense Industrial Base, Drones, military history, national security, Robots In War, technology & innovation, Unmanned aerial systems, US Military · 2 Comments
Could Combat Drones Be a Turning Point for The Boeing Company’s Defense Business?
By Daniel Ferry
May 31, 2014
Boeing (NYSE: BA ) is the world’s largest aerospace company, a market leader in commercial jetliners as well as military aircraft. While the company’s commercial sales have grown rapidly, military sales have not kept pace. Constrained by the lower spending habits of U.S. and allied militaries, and fiercer competition for fewer dollars, Boeing’s defense, space, and security business has seen flat revenue and earnings over the past five years. However, there’s one massive growth market ahead for Boeing: combat drones. Despite its leading position in the aerospace and defense markets, Boeing has only a small presence in the combat drone market. With our current combat drones nearing obsolescence, and the competition heating up for a new generation of combat-capable UAVs, all that could be about to change.
Boeing’s Futuristic Phantom Ray Combat Drone. Photo credit: Boeing
Eyes In The Sky
Today, Boeing’s UAV offerings come primarily from the company’s subsidiary Insitu, which it acquired outright in 2008 for about $100 million after partnering with the younger company to develop and market the ScanEagle drone. The ScanEagle is popular with the military, though it’s no hunter-killer: at under 50 pounds loaded, and under five feet long, it’s too small to pack a punch. It’s size combined with its ability to be launched and recovered in the field with special equipment has allowed the ScanEagle to carve out a place as a premier low-flying, low-cost, portable tactical reconnaissance solution. Boeing doesn’t break out revenue for Insitu or the ScanEagle separately, but the system has won some major military contracts, including a three-year, $300 million Special Operations Command contract that it was awarded last September.
Insitu is building out its offerings with the RQ-21 Blackjack, a slightly larger, more capable UAV with a wider and more flexible array of intelligence-gathering tools. Though small, unarmed, and more useful in tactical rather than strategic capacities, these platforms should continue to be an increasingly important part of modern combat.
Boeing is also hard at work on a secretive project it calls Phantom Eye, a program in the experimental stage being funded by the Air Force. The Phantom Eye is a successor of the experimental Boeing Condor, a UAV that in 1989 broke an altitude record for piston-powered aircraft by ascending to 67,000 feet, a record that still stands. Boeing envisions Phantom Eye as a liquid hydrogen-fueled surveillance drone capable of observing targets from extremely high altitudes and hovering for as long as seven to 10 days. This platform would compete directly with other high-altitude, long endurance UAVs, most notably the RQ-4 Global Hawk, which has already been a $10 billion program for manufacturer Northrop Grumman (NYSE: NOC ) over the past decade, almost singlehandedly allowing Northrop Grumman to become one of the world’s largest UAV providers. If the Phantom Eye can deliver on the ability to stay aloft for 10 days, it will have a dramatic advantage over the Global Hawk’s 28-hour dwell time.
Hunter-killers
While intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance will continue to important revenue drivers for the UAV market, Boeing is also eying a growth market in armed combat drones equipped to carry out tactical strikes in contested airspace. At least $15 billion have been spent on the General Atomics Predator and Reaper drones, the only UAVs commonly outfitted with offensive weaponry, yet these drones are not suitable for combat against any but the most rudimentary opponents. To maintain the ability to strike targets in even thinly defended enemy airspace, radically improved drones are needed: which is part of the reason the market is expected to grow so dramatically, perhaps to as much as $19 billion annually over the next five years.
And while Boeing hasn’t been very visible in the combat drone arena, that doesn’t mean it’s been idle. In 2002, Boeing began work on an unmanned combat system incorporating stealth technology and networked operations called the X-45. By 2005, the X-45 was executing precision weapon drops demonstrating an incredible degree of autonomy in navigation and operation, allowing a single operator to control multiple aircraft. Boeing seemed ready to rule the future of unmanned combat aerial vehicles, but in 2006, the Air Force decided to withdraw support from the program.
The full history behind the cancellation of the X-45 is as fascinating as it is secretive, but for all intents and purposes, the X-45 was already dead. Battlefields would get clunky, converted reconnaissance UAVs as combat drones, and the futuristic X-45 would be forgotten… everywhere but at Boeing. Secretly, Boeing continued work on the UAV technology demonstrator that had been the X-45. Boeing unveiled the UAV, now called the Phantom Ray, in 2010, promoting the UAV as offering not only intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, but advanced capabilities like suppression of air defenses and electronic attack.
Because Boeing has developed the Phantom Ray using its own funding and resources, rather than as part of a military contract, it maintains full control over the program. While currently without a customer, if the UAV performs to Boeing’s expectations, Boeing could submit the Phantom Ray or a variant for virtually any next-generation stealth combat drone program, perhaps as soon as this year for the Navy’s Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike program. Capturing an early contract might not be worth much initially, especially considering the resources Boeing already sunk into the Phantom Ray, but over time a strong foothold in a growing, multibillion-dollar market could be boost Boeing’s defense business needs.
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CHINA’S CYBER GENERALS ARE REINVENTING THE ART OF WAR
June 2, 2014 · by Fortuna's Corner · in China, CIA, cloud computing, Cyber War, Cybersecurity, DIA, espionage, spying, Intelligence Community, Internet, military history, national security, NSA, U.S. Cyber Command, US Military · Leave a comment
China’s Cyber-Generals Are Reinventing The Art Of War
Dear Sun Tzu, the new Art of War is digital, postmodern and non-linear
Washington Post Online, May 31 | Dominic Basulto
The conventional wisdom is that the future of war will involve private robot armies, predator drones carrying out precision strikes, and maybe even the militarization of space. All of this assumes, however, that the fundamental nature of war does not change, only the technological sophistication with which we wage this war. And, contrary to just about any military text dating back to the era of Sun Tzu, it also assumes that we always know who our enemies are.
That’s why the current high-profile tussle over Chinese cyber attacks is so fascinating. The White House’s recent condemnation of Chinese cyber spying is just the clearest signal to date that we have entered a new era of warfare. Instead of tallying costs in terms of dead and wounded, we now measure them in purely economic terms. Instead of a known enemy, we now have a shadowy assailant who, on the surface, is still our friend. For every claim by the United States that the Chinese have gone beyond mere spying for national security to include ruthless appropriation of commercial secrets, there is a counterclaim by China that the United States has been using the NSA as its own kind of global surveillance state.
Yes, nations still fight wars, but it’s in a totally new and different way.
When the new paradigm for the world is economic power rather than military power, it means that we will find ways to fight without destroying our economic relationships. Traditional warfare is very expensive, requiring massive buildups and drains on the state treasury for military campaigns in far-flung locales. The new warfare will be cheap, low-intensity and most likely, waged primarily in cyberspace. Attacks will occur against economic targets rather than military targets. Taking down a stock market or a currency has greater tactical value than taking out a hardened military target.
You can blame many factors for this. The relentless pace of globalization has created interconnections between all economies of the world and blurred the line between “national” and “multinational” companies. The reach of the global Internet means that digital targets (say, a nation’s grid) are now just as important as physical targets. And, in an increasingly multi-polar world, there are no longer two clear sides, good vs. evil. It’s a global free-for-all. It’s not so much ideology that matters as the ability to reassure investors about the viability of your financial markets.
For better or worse, cyber warfare represents a new form of warfare, in which our ostensible friends — such as the Chinese — are also our shadow enemies. For every economic deal we sign with them, they may be busy undermining the very companies that make these deals possible. For every company that goes public on our stock market, there is a shadowy cyber outpost like 61398 searching for ways to bring that stock market to its knees.
And it’s not just the Chinese and Americans who are recognizing this new future of warfare. In a recent article for Foreign Policy, Peter Pomerantsev highlighted what he called a new theory of “non-linear war” being tested by Russia as it searches for an advantage in the post-Cold War era. Pointing to a recent fictional story written under a pseudonym by one of Vladimir Putin’s close advisors (just as George Kennan’s famous 1947 “Containment” article was written under a pseudonym), Pomerantsev lays out exactly how such a non-linear war works. Alliances shift in mid-battle. War is only part of a broader process that nobody truly understands.
The only question that remains, of course, is how the high-level thinkers at West Point or the Naval Academy or the Pentagon propose to fight this war. We’ve seen the first round of response from the Justice Department, in the form of indictments against five members of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. We’ve heard President Obama outline his vision of a world where more effort must be taken to counter asymmetric threats from terrorist groups. It’s hard to imagine that the U.S. Army Cyber Command will sit around at their computers, especially since we keep hearing about a massive buildup of America’s cyber capabilities.
But if you’re expecting something along the lines of a conventional war, with a clear beginning and end, think again. The future of war is all about low-grade, low-intensity attacks in cyberspace, all easily disavowed. Instead of one big cyber Pearl Harbor, maybe it’s just a lot of tiny little Pearl Harbors. It is the ultimate asymmetric war in which we do not even know who to attack, or how or when. A group of hackers with nicknames like “Ugly Gorilla” and “KandyGoo” now have the ability to inflict hundreds of millions dollars of damage using just their computers. Who can doubt that shadowy non-states also are searching for the ability to bring superpowers to their knees not militarily, but economically?
It almost sounds like something out of a science fiction novel — nations locked in a state of perpetual war, fought by shadowy assailants in cyberspace who may or may not be allied with a particular state, using weapons that are virtually undetectable, with the ability to take down a nation with a single keystroke from a remote location. Yes, the mounting cyber war with China is nothing less than the future of war. The new war has no official start, no official end, and no official enemy. There are only “evolving threats.” War is everywhere, and yet nowhere because it is completely digital, existing only in the ether.
U.S. LAUNCHES SECRET GLOBAL STRIKE: ‘KILLS’ 2 MALICIOUS WEB VIRUSES
June 3, 2014 · by Fortuna's Corner · in CIA, cloud computing, Cyber War, Cybersecurity, DIA, espionage, spying,FBI, foreign policy, Intelligence Community, Internet, military history, national security, NSA, U.S. Cyber Command, US Military · 1 Comment
THE NEW YORK TIMES
Secret Global Strike Kills 2 Malicious Web Viruses
Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell, at podium, announces criminal charges and a coordinated strike against two global cyberfraud operations.
GARY CAMERON / REUTERS
By MATT APUZZO
June 2014
WASHINGTON — Federal agents over the weekend secretly seized control of two computer networks that hackers used to steal millions of dollars from unsuspecting victims. In doing so, the Justice Department disrupted the circulation of two of the world’s most pernicious viruses and turned a 30-year-old Russian computer hacker into a most-wanted fugitive.
The strike, coordinated with the European authorities, was aimed at malware called GameOver Zeus, which is known to steal bank information and send it to overseas hackers, and CryptoLocker, which burrows into computers and encrypts personal data. The hackers then demand a ransom to unlock the files.
“By the time the victims learned that their computers had been infected, it was far too late,” Leslie R. Caldwell, the assistant attorney general in charge of the criminal division, said Monday.
Together, the Justice Department estimates, the two malicious programs have infected between 500,000 and a million computers and cost people more than $100 million in direct and indirect losses.
Authorities had been investigating the two viruses separately, but along the way, they realized that GameOver Zeus was the main vehicle by which CryptoLocker was spread, the Justice Department said.
They also determined that the operations were run by the same man, whom the Justice Department identified as Evgeniy M. Bogachev, of Anapa, Russia. Investigators were hunting for him even before they knew his name. Inside the F.B.I., he has long been one of the government’s most sought-after individual cybercriminals, through his screen name, Lucky12345.
While both pieces of software are distributed through spam emails, they accomplish different things, each highly damaging.
Once inside a computer, GameOver Zeus quietly tracks each keystroke. When the software detects someone logging into a bank account, it records the password. Armed with that information, hackers log in and drain the account. Often they stole more than $1 million from businesses, prosecutors said, with at least one theft exceeding $6 million.
CryptoLocker spreads through emails that look like they are from legitimate businesses, including fake tracking notices from FedEx and U.P.S. Once inside a network, such as a company’s computer system, the virus can spread from one computer to the next. As it spreads, the software locks up computer files behind unbreakable encryption, then demands hundreds of dollars in exchange for the code that unlocks it.
Investigators say many people and organizations, including the police department in Swansea, Mass., have paid to recover their files. Those who refused saw their files permanently erased. Such so-called ransomware is a growing security threat.
Investigators have targeted large malicious software networks, known as botnets, before. In 2011, the F.B.I. hijacked a command-and-control server that ran the similarly harmful Coreflood network. It then sent a shutdown command to every infected computer, effectively killing the virus in one stroke.
This weekend’s takedown, which was months in the making, was far more difficult. While CryptoLocker used a command-and-control server, GameOver Zeus did not. Instead, it relied on a decentralized structure, and it did not have a simple shutdown command.
In meetings late last year, F.B.I. agents and private security experts devised a plan to outsmart the hackers. The best chance the F.B.I. had to wrest control of the network, it was decided, was by seizing all the servers that transmitted the malicious code and rerouting their traffic to a safe, government-controlled computer.
In theory, every time an infected computer asked for instructions to carry out its malicious mission, it would instead find itself harmlessly talking to the United States government.
But the GameOver Zeus servers were spread across the world. If the agents missed one infected server, the hackers could use it to restart the network and continue spreading the code.
“You don’t want to have any loose ends,” said Shawn Henry, a former top F.B.I. cyber investigator and president of CrowdStrike Services, one of several security firms that worked with government on the case. “You want it to be swift. You want it to be complete.”
Early last Friday, authorities in Canada, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Ukraine and the United Kingdom physically took over the servers that served as the backbone for GameOver Zeus and CryptoLocker, Ms. Caldwell said. All Internet traffic was then rerouted, under a court order, to the government’s safe computer.
All weekend, the agents waited and watched for signs of success. Investigators worked from command centers at F.B.I. headquarters in Washington, Europol headquarters at The Hague in the Netherlands and at the National Cyber-Forensics & Training Alliance in Pittsburgh.
One by one, computers across the world contacted the government’s safe computer, signifying that America, not the hackers, was in control of the network. With each electronic ping, the government collected the Internet addresses of the infected systems, providing a map of the worldwide infection.
By Sunday, officials said they were confident they had dismantled the network and collected enough data to help security firms and technology companies clean infected computers.
“More than 300,000 victim computers were freed from the botnet,” Ms. Caldwell said. “We expect that number to increase as additional computers are powered on and connect to the Internet this week.”
CryptoLocker similarly came under United States control, Ms. Caldwell said.
On Monday, the government unsealed court documents charging Mr. Bogachev with bank, computer and wire fraud. The F.B.I. placed Mr. Bogachev on its list of most-wanted cybercriminals.
Mr. Bogachev remains free and the United States has asked Russian authorities to turn him over. Those discussions are continuing, the Justice Department said.
IISS STRATEGIC COMMENTS: UKRAINE, RISKS TO ECONOMIC STABILIZATION
June 2014 ·
by Fortuna's Corner · in CIA, DIA, espionage, spying, Europe, foreign policy, Intelligence Community, military history, national security, NATO, Russia, US Military
Ukraine: Risks To Economic Stabilization
Ukraine faces an economic crisis even as it endures political turbulence following the removal of the government of Viktor Yanukovich in February 2014, as well as separatist uprisings in eastern and southern regions. The economy is in recession, the budget deficit is widening and the currency has weakened as money has fled the country. Long-standing economic weakness has been exacerbated by corruption and policy mis-steps under the Yanukovich regime, now compounded by a loss of investor confidence. Prospects for a turnaround centre on an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that sets out far-reaching reforms in return for a $17.1 billion loan program. However, implementation of the reforms will be extremely challenging.
Economic mismanagement
This is Ukraine’s second major economic crisis in six years. The country was one of the hardest-hit by the 2008 global financial crisis, with the economy contracting by 15% in 2009. The government failed to undertake reforms, and subsequent growth has been poor. The economy grew by just 0.3% in 2012 and flat-lined in 2013.
The worsening of the business climate under the Yanukovich regime deterred investment. Meanwhile, the authorities’ determination to maintain an overvalued exchange rate despite weaker prices for Ukraine’s key metals exports led to a large current-account deficit and declining foreign-exchange reserves. In February, the authorities abandoned the currency peg and the hryvnia fell sharply. By mid-May 2014, it had lost almost 50% of its value against the US dollar since the start of January.
Currency depreciation, political uncertainty and capital flight have placed considerable pressure on the banking sector, which in any case had remained weak following the 2008 crisis. Ukraine’s commercial banks posted combined losses in the first quarter of 2014 of around UAH2bn ($172 million). During that period they lost 10% of hryvnia deposits and 14% of foreign-currency holdings.
The fiscal situation is also dire. Large pension and wage increases, along with high energy subsidies, led to the budget deficit widening to almost 5% of GDP by 2013. This was compounded by a high level of corruption under the Yanukovich administration. For example, 30% of the public-procurement budget, or UAH15bn ($1.3bn), was reportedly siphoned off, and members of Yanukovich’s family rapidly amassed considerable wealth. Turmoil in eastern and southern regions, combined with worsened economic performance, has now hit revenues. The IMF estimates that without corrective measures the overall budget deficit could reach 12% of GDP this year.
The energy sector is a persistent drain on the public finances, in particular the need to prop up the state-owned gas monopoly, Naftogaz. Prices for gas and for household heating are the lowest in Europe – just 11–25% of levels in other European gas-importing countries, and well below levels even in Russia. This price gap, as well as poor management, pushed Naftogaz’s operating deficit to 1.9% of GDP by 2013. Low prices for end-users have also meant that Ukraine is one of the least energy-efficient countries in Europe; use of energy per unit of GDP is ten times the OECD average. The IMF notes that without adjustment, Naftogaz’s deficit could double in 2014, owing to exchange-rate depreciation and the need to replenish depleted gas storage.
Against this backdrop, the economy has returned to recession. Real GDP fell by 1.1% year on year in the first quarter of 2014, with industrial production down by 5%. Retail trade remains fairly strong owing to recent wage rises, but is slowing. Inflation is starting to rise from low levels, to 3.4% in March, as the impact of currency devaluation feeds through.
IMF agreement
Ukraine’s economic weakness meant that by the end of 2013 the country was on the brink of default. A $3bn financing from Russia – the first tranche of a now-aborted $15bn bond-purchase program – was swiftly exhausted. At the end of April 2014, following the installation of the interim government, the IMF agreed a two-year standby loan of $17.1bn. The first tranche of $3.2bn was disbursed immediately. The IMF estimates that Ukraine will require a total of $27bn in external financing over the next two years. IMF funding will be supplemented by other donors, mainly the European Union and World Bank, as well as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank and others. Amounts pledged currently total $11bn over 2014–15.
The IMF program has five main pillars:
Monetary policy: Exchange-rate flexibility will be preserved, and the Ukrainian central bank will move to inflation-targeting in 2015.
The financial system: Measures will be taken to strengthen banks’ balance sheets and the financial infrastructure.
Fiscal policy: Gradual fiscal adjustment is envisaged, with the main burden on expenditure cuts. Planned wage and pension increases will be cancelled. An amended public-procurement law should create savings by reducing corruption. Budget revenues are intended to be stabilized in part by breaking prolific tax-evasion schemes – two such schemes have already been uncovered. A planned cut in value-added tax (VAT) has been cancelled, and a reduced VAT rate will be introduced on hitherto-exempt medical products.
The energy sector: The IMF program seeks to break Ukraine’s addiction to cheap energy, with gas and heating prices due to be raised by 56% and 40% respectively in 2014, and by 20–40% in 2015–17. This will push up energy bills from 3–7% of household budgets to 5–11%. Because of the large impact that these measures will have, the government has introduced a subsidy to compensate the most vulnerable 25–30% of households. Nevertheless, the increases will require significant political will. Together with moves to strengthen payment discipline and reduce Naftogaz’s costs, the aim is to eliminate Naftogaz’s deficit by 2018.
Structural reforms: The Ukrainian authorities have committed to address governance issues in state-owned companies; strengthen transparency of public procurement; improve anti-money-laundering and anti-corruption measures; seek to recover stolen assets; and enhance the effectiveness of the judiciary and tax administration.
Under the program, the IMF projects that Ukraine’s real GDP will contract by 5% in 2014, rebound by 2% in 2015, and grow by 4–4.5% annually in the medium term. Inflation will rise to 16.2% at end-2014, before falling back to 7.4% by end-2015. Public debt will peak at 62% of GDP in 2015 and external debt at just below 100% of GDP – both high, but manageable for an economy at Ukraine’s stage of development.
Risk Factors
However, there are considerable risks to economic stabilization. Tensions with Russia loom large. Around one-quarter of Ukraine’s exports go to Russia (equivalent to around 10% of GDP): mainly metals and machinery, and mostly exempt from duty under Commonwealth of Independent States treaties. Prolonged disruption of this trade would cause a major economic shock – and Russia’s economic slowdown will in any case weaken exports.
The new government plans to conclude a ‘deep and comprehensive free-trade agreement’ with the EU, but as the IMF notes, this ‘will support exports, but is not a substitute for maintaining established trade relations with Russia’. It was Yanukovich’s rejection of the EU deal in November 2013 that triggered the protests that eventually overthrew his regime. Over the medium term, closer economic integration with the EU arguably offers more benefits for Ukraine’s economy than Russia’s rival Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan, which Russian President Vladimir Putin had pressed Ukraine to join. However, there will be considerable short-term costs – especially for eastern Ukraine – if trade with Russia is disrupted as a result.
Disputes over gas supply and pricing also pose serious risks. Ukraine consumes about 55bn cubic metres (bcm) per year, of which it produces about 20bcm, importing the balance from Russia. Cheap end-user prices have created little incentive to curb consumption. They have also rendered Ukraine dependent on continuing to obtain low prices from Russia. That era came to a close with the conclusion of a ten-year supply contract in January 2009 that provided for market pricing of Russian gas supplies. However, Yanukovich was able to obtain two discounts, which have now been cancelled. In April, Russia’s Gazprom ended a discount of about $120 per thousand cubic metres provided under a December 2013 agreement, raising the price for Ukraine’s gas imports to $385.5/tcm. Russia has also cancelled a previous $100/tcm discount granted under a 2010 agreement that extended Russia’s lease on its naval base in Sevastopol. This raises the price to $485/tcm, which is the current applicable level according to the terms of the 2009 contract. The Ukrainian government disputes the latter cancellation.
The IMF estimates that pricing at $485/tcm would cost Ukraine an additional $1.5–2bn a year, although modest savings could be obtained from importing limited amounts from central European countries.
There is also the issue of arrears run up by Naftogaz for past deliveries that went unpaid. Naftogaz stopped paying in full for gas imports in the fourth quarter of 2013, and since then has run up arrears of $3.5bn. This prompted Gazprom in May to invoke the terms of the 2009 agreement that stipulate Ukraine must pre-pay for gas in case of non-payment. Russia also has other financial claims it could put forward. The 2009 agreement committed Ukraine to set volumes of gas imports annually under ‘take or pay’ clauses. Owing to economic underperformance, Ukraine’s imports have been far lower than expected. Putin said in April that Ukraine owes at least $18.4bn for under-consumption of gas in recent years. Russia has not pursued the matter but might do so now.
Russia has threatened that unless $2.2bn of Naftogaz’s arrears is now repaid, it will shut off gas supplies to Ukraine, as it did in 2006 and 2009. This would probably impact the transit of Russian gas to EU countries via Ukraine, which account for 12–15% of EU gas consumption. Countries in southeastern Europe – particularly Moldova, Bulgaria and Macedonia – are most vulnerable, although less so than in 2009 because the winter heating season is over. There is less risk for north European countries because Russian export capacity via the Baltic Sea and Belarus has increased, and there are more pipeline connections between EU states.
Territorial tensions within Ukraine also endanger economic stabilization. The economic impact of Crimea’s secession is low: it accounts for only 3.7% of Ukraine’s GDP; the exposure of Ukrainian banks is limited; and the budget impact will be broadly neutral. But eastern Ukraine, the country’s industrial heartland, is more significant. Prolonged instability there would hurt the central budget as well as the trade balance. The IMF has said that should the central government lose effective control over the east, Ukraine’s program will need to be re-designed – probably implying worsened short-term economic outcomes and increased financing needs.
More broadly, continued serious tensions with Russia and instability in eastern Ukraine would weigh on investor confidence. Overall, there is a risk of a deeper and longer recession, and a further depreciation of the exchange rate, which would hurt the financial sector.
Even if tensions in the east decline, there is a considerable risk that the economy’s performance will be worse than expected, given its weak position. Although there is some upside potential, for example from a pick-up in the global economy boosting exports, overall risks are heavily on the downside. The EBRD, for example, forecast in May that Ukraine’s real GDP would contract by 7% in 2014 and not grow in 2015. The exchange rate is a particular area of ambiguity. Significantly, the IMF’s analysis reveals considerable uncertainty about the future exchange rate, and it estimates that if the hryvnia settles near the bottom of an expected range against the dollar, the country’s largest 22 banks would require a capital injection totaling up to 5% of GDP.
There are also considerable risks surrounding the authorities’ capacity to comply with the IMF program. Ukraine has a poor record in this regard. The new authorities may be more committed to reforms, and the interim government has already shown itself willing to undertake decisive measures. However, it remains to be seen whether president-elect Petro Poroshenko will be as bold, even though he declared his support for the IMF program in the run-up to the 25 May election. The planned spending cuts, cancellation of wage and pension rises, and structural reforms will be highly unpopular, at a time when the economy will remain weak and the new government will need to consolidate its support. Gas-price rises in particular will be highly contentious, and it will be important that the new subsidy scheme proves effective in offsetting the impact on poorer households.
Ukraine’s oligarchs could also oppose reforms because their businesses could be threatened by liberalization. Those who rose rapidly under Yanukovich are likely to suffer under the new regime. But the government may need to accommodate other oligarchs in order to restore effective control in eastern Ukraine. A sign of this came with its appointment in March of Serhiy Taruta and Ihor Kolomoysky to govern the eastern Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk regions, respectively.
The outlook is, therefore, highly uncertain. The IMF program offers sizeable external support and a path to transforming Ukraine’s economy and business climate. However, it remains to be seen whether the new government will be willing and able to stick to the conditions of the program, and also whether developments in eastern Ukraine and tensions with Russia will further set back attempts to stabilize the economy.
June 2014
OUR ARMY IS HEADED FOR COLLAPSE: HERE’S HOW TO FIX IT
June 3, 2014
Ukraine: Risks To Economic Stabilization
Ukraine faces an economic crisis even as it endures political turbulence following the removal of the government of Viktor Yanukovich in February 2014, as well as separatist uprisings in eastern and southern regions. The economy is in recession, the budget deficit is widening and the currency has weakened as money has fled the country. Long-standing economic weakness has been exacerbated by corruption and policy mis-steps under the Yanukovich regime, now compounded by a loss of investor confidence. Prospects for a turnaround centre on an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that sets out far-reaching reforms in return for a $17.1 billion loan program. However, implementation of the reforms will be extremely challenging.
Economic mismanagement
This is Ukraine’s second major economic crisis in six years. The country was one of the hardest-hit by the 2008 global financial crisis, with the economy contracting by 15% in 2009. The government failed to undertake reforms, and subsequent growth has been poor. The economy grew by just 0.3% in 2012 and flat-lined in 2013.
The worsening of the business climate under the Yanukovich regime deterred investment. Meanwhile, the authorities’ determination to maintain an overvalued exchange rate despite weaker prices for Ukraine’s key metals exports led to a large current-account deficit and declining foreign-exchange reserves. In February, the authorities abandoned the currency peg and the hryvnia fell sharply. By mid-May 2014, it had lost almost 50% of its value against the US dollar since the start of January.
Currency depreciation, political uncertainty and capital flight have placed considerable pressure on the banking sector, which in any case had remained weak following the 2008 crisis. Ukraine’s commercial banks posted combined losses in the first quarter of 2014 of around UAH2bn ($172 million). During that period they lost 10% of hryvnia deposits and 14% of foreign-currency holdings.
The fiscal situation is also dire. Large pension and wage increases, along with high energy subsidies, led to the budget deficit widening to almost 5% of GDP by 2013. This was compounded by a high level of corruption under the Yanukovich administration. For example, 30% of the public-procurement budget, or UAH15bn ($1.3bn), was reportedly siphoned off, and members of Yanukovich’s family rapidly amassed considerable wealth. Turmoil in eastern and southern regions, combined with worsened economic performance, has now hit revenues. The IMF estimates that without corrective measures the overall budget deficit could reach 12% of GDP this year.
The energy sector is a persistent drain on the public finances, in particular the need to prop up the state-owned gas monopoly, Naftogaz. Prices for gas and for household heating are the lowest in Europe – just 11–25% of levels in other European gas-importing countries, and well below levels even in Russia. This price gap, as well as poor management, pushed Naftogaz’s operating deficit to 1.9% of GDP by 2013. Low prices for end-users have also meant that Ukraine is one of the least energy-efficient countries in Europe; use of energy per unit of GDP is ten times the OECD average. The IMF notes that without adjustment, Naftogaz’s deficit could double in 2014, owing to exchange-rate depreciation and the need to replenish depleted gas storage.
Against this backdrop, the economy has returned to recession. Real GDP fell by 1.1% year on year in the first quarter of 2014, with industrial production down by 5%. Retail trade remains fairly strong owing to recent wage rises, but is slowing. Inflation is starting to rise from low levels, to 3.4% in March, as the impact of currency devaluation feeds through.
IMF agreement
Ukraine’s economic weakness meant that by the end of 2013 the country was on the brink of default. A $3bn financing from Russia – the first tranche of a now-aborted $15bn bond-purchase program – was swiftly exhausted. At the end of April 2014, following the installation of the interim government, the IMF agreed a two-year standby loan of $17.1bn. The first tranche of $3.2bn was disbursed immediately. The IMF estimates that Ukraine will require a total of $27bn in external financing over the next two years. IMF funding will be supplemented by other donors, mainly the European Union and World Bank, as well as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank and others. Amounts pledged currently total $11bn over 2014–15.
The IMF program has five main pillars:
Monetary policy: Exchange-rate flexibility will be preserved, and the Ukrainian central bank will move to inflation-targeting in 2015.
The financial system: Measures will be taken to strengthen banks’ balance sheets and the financial infrastructure.
Fiscal policy: Gradual fiscal adjustment is envisaged, with the main burden on expenditure cuts. Planned wage and pension increases will be cancelled. An amended public-procurement law should create savings by reducing corruption. Budget revenues are intended to be stabilized in part by breaking prolific tax-evasion schemes – two such schemes have already been uncovered. A planned cut in value-added tax (VAT) has been cancelled, and a reduced VAT rate will be introduced on hitherto-exempt medical products.
The energy sector: The IMF program seeks to break Ukraine’s addiction to cheap energy, with gas and heating prices due to be raised by 56% and 40% respectively in 2014, and by 20–40% in 2015–17. This will push up energy bills from 3–7% of household budgets to 5–11%. Because of the large impact that these measures will have, the government has introduced a subsidy to compensate the most vulnerable 25–30% of households. Nevertheless, the increases will require significant political will. Together with moves to strengthen payment discipline and reduce Naftogaz’s costs, the aim is to eliminate Naftogaz’s deficit by 2018.
Structural reforms: The Ukrainian authorities have committed to address governance issues in state-owned companies; strengthen transparency of public procurement; improve anti-money-laundering and anti-corruption measures; seek to recover stolen assets; and enhance the effectiveness of the judiciary and tax administration.
Under the program, the IMF projects that Ukraine’s real GDP will contract by 5% in 2014, rebound by 2% in 2015, and grow by 4–4.5% annually in the medium term. Inflation will rise to 16.2% at end-2014, before falling back to 7.4% by end-2015. Public debt will peak at 62% of GDP in 2015 and external debt at just below 100% of GDP – both high, but manageable for an economy at Ukraine’s stage of development.
Risk Factors
However, there are considerable risks to economic stabilization. Tensions with Russia loom large. Around one-quarter of Ukraine’s exports go to Russia (equivalent to around 10% of GDP): mainly metals and machinery, and mostly exempt from duty under Commonwealth of Independent States treaties. Prolonged disruption of this trade would cause a major economic shock – and Russia’s economic slowdown will in any case weaken exports.
The new government plans to conclude a ‘deep and comprehensive free-trade agreement’ with the EU, but as the IMF notes, this ‘will support exports, but is not a substitute for maintaining established trade relations with Russia’. It was Yanukovich’s rejection of the EU deal in November 2013 that triggered the protests that eventually overthrew his regime. Over the medium term, closer economic integration with the EU arguably offers more benefits for Ukraine’s economy than Russia’s rival Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan, which Russian President Vladimir Putin had pressed Ukraine to join. However, there will be considerable short-term costs – especially for eastern Ukraine – if trade with Russia is disrupted as a result.
Disputes over gas supply and pricing also pose serious risks. Ukraine consumes about 55bn cubic metres (bcm) per year, of which it produces about 20bcm, importing the balance from Russia. Cheap end-user prices have created little incentive to curb consumption. They have also rendered Ukraine dependent on continuing to obtain low prices from Russia. That era came to a close with the conclusion of a ten-year supply contract in January 2009 that provided for market pricing of Russian gas supplies. However, Yanukovich was able to obtain two discounts, which have now been cancelled. In April, Russia’s Gazprom ended a discount of about $120 per thousand cubic metres provided under a December 2013 agreement, raising the price for Ukraine’s gas imports to $385.5/tcm. Russia has also cancelled a previous $100/tcm discount granted under a 2010 agreement that extended Russia’s lease on its naval base in Sevastopol. This raises the price to $485/tcm, which is the current applicable level according to the terms of the 2009 contract. The Ukrainian government disputes the latter cancellation.
The IMF estimates that pricing at $485/tcm would cost Ukraine an additional $1.5–2bn a year, although modest savings could be obtained from importing limited amounts from central European countries.
There is also the issue of arrears run up by Naftogaz for past deliveries that went unpaid. Naftogaz stopped paying in full for gas imports in the fourth quarter of 2013, and since then has run up arrears of $3.5bn. This prompted Gazprom in May to invoke the terms of the 2009 agreement that stipulate Ukraine must pre-pay for gas in case of non-payment. Russia also has other financial claims it could put forward. The 2009 agreement committed Ukraine to set volumes of gas imports annually under ‘take or pay’ clauses. Owing to economic underperformance, Ukraine’s imports have been far lower than expected. Putin said in April that Ukraine owes at least $18.4bn for under-consumption of gas in recent years. Russia has not pursued the matter but might do so now.
Russia has threatened that unless $2.2bn of Naftogaz’s arrears is now repaid, it will shut off gas supplies to Ukraine, as it did in 2006 and 2009. This would probably impact the transit of Russian gas to EU countries via Ukraine, which account for 12–15% of EU gas consumption. Countries in southeastern Europe – particularly Moldova, Bulgaria and Macedonia – are most vulnerable, although less so than in 2009 because the winter heating season is over. There is less risk for north European countries because Russian export capacity via the Baltic Sea and Belarus has increased, and there are more pipeline connections between EU states.
Territorial tensions within Ukraine also endanger economic stabilization. The economic impact of Crimea’s secession is low: it accounts for only 3.7% of Ukraine’s GDP; the exposure of Ukrainian banks is limited; and the budget impact will be broadly neutral. But eastern Ukraine, the country’s industrial heartland, is more significant. Prolonged instability there would hurt the central budget as well as the trade balance. The IMF has said that should the central government lose effective control over the east, Ukraine’s program will need to be re-designed – probably implying worsened short-term economic outcomes and increased financing needs.
More broadly, continued serious tensions with Russia and instability in eastern Ukraine would weigh on investor confidence. Overall, there is a risk of a deeper and longer recession, and a further depreciation of the exchange rate, which would hurt the financial sector.
Even if tensions in the east decline, there is a considerable risk that the economy’s performance will be worse than expected, given its weak position. Although there is some upside potential, for example from a pick-up in the global economy boosting exports, overall risks are heavily on the downside. The EBRD, for example, forecast in May that Ukraine’s real GDP would contract by 7% in 2014 and not grow in 2015. The exchange rate is a particular area of ambiguity. Significantly, the IMF’s analysis reveals considerable uncertainty about the future exchange rate, and it estimates that if the hryvnia settles near the bottom of an expected range against the dollar, the country’s largest 22 banks would require a capital injection totaling up to 5% of GDP.
There are also considerable risks surrounding the authorities’ capacity to comply with the IMF program. Ukraine has a poor record in this regard. The new authorities may be more committed to reforms, and the interim government has already shown itself willing to undertake decisive measures. However, it remains to be seen whether president-elect Petro Poroshenko will be as bold, even though he declared his support for the IMF program in the run-up to the 25 May election. The planned spending cuts, cancellation of wage and pension rises, and structural reforms will be highly unpopular, at a time when the economy will remain weak and the new government will need to consolidate its support. Gas-price rises in particular will be highly contentious, and it will be important that the new subsidy scheme proves effective in offsetting the impact on poorer households.
Ukraine’s oligarchs could also oppose reforms because their businesses could be threatened by liberalization. Those who rose rapidly under Yanukovich are likely to suffer under the new regime. But the government may need to accommodate other oligarchs in order to restore effective control in eastern Ukraine. A sign of this came with its appointment in March of Serhiy Taruta and Ihor Kolomoysky to govern the eastern Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk regions, respectively.
The outlook is, therefore, highly uncertain. The IMF program offers sizeable external support and a path to transforming Ukraine’s economy and business climate. However, it remains to be seen whether the new government will be willing and able to stick to the conditions of the program, and also whether developments in eastern Ukraine and tensions with Russia will further set back attempts to stabilize the economy.
June 2014
OUR ARMY IS HEADED FOR COLLAPSE: HERE’S HOW TO FIX IT
June 3, 2014
by Fortuna's Corner · in Army, budget deficit, debt, DIA, Intelligence Community, military history,national security, US Military
Douglas MacGregor’s conclusion:
Such an Army would also be aligned with air and sea transport for rapid response to the unexpected: a Korea-like emergency; a Sarajevo-like event; or deployments to support allies already engaged in fighting, not counterinsurgency or nation building. Events in Ukraine and the Western Pacific point to future wars that will not resemble the interventions in Iraq or Afghanistan. Instead, they will involve conflicts as lethal as Korea or World War II, fights for regional power and influence that overlap with interstate competitions for energy, water, food, mineral resources and the wealth they create.
The Army four stars, active and retired, will collectively groan, “It’s too hard and will take too long to change the Army.” Well, it is true that building combat power takes time. But it’s useful to remember that only eight months after Gen. George C. Marshall received the executive order in March 1942 empowering him to reorganize the War Department, he was able to land a brand new Army on the shores of North Africa.
The point is simple: The U.S. Army is unraveling. As Peter Drucker told businessmen in the 1990s, “If you want something new, stop doing something old.” Congress must act. There is no need to fill Arlington Cemetery to capacity.
Our Army’s Headed for Collapse
Here’s how to fix it.
By DOUGLAS MACGREGOR
June 2014
Read more: http://www.politico.com/ magazine/story/2014/06/how-to- fix-the-us-military-107337. html#ixzz33Zutyq4Y
http://www.politico.com/ magazine/story/2014/06/how-to- fix-the-us-military-107337_ full.html?print#.U42-GGRDt38
When markets crash, when economic indicators fall by double digits, investors panic, stocks drop like rocks and governments teeter on the brink of collapse. Unable to understand the sudden break in prosperity, the public asks what happened; politicians hold hearings, financial institutions are investigated and, eventually, “too-big-to jail” financial wizards go to prison. At least, that’s what happened in the years after the 1929 crash.
Similar conditions emerge when the United States Armed Forces are defeated in ways that the government and the media cannot conceal. In the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, captains and majors like Matthew Ridgway, James Gavin and Mark Clark-men who would have otherwise ended their careers in obscurity-were promoted, eventually rising to flag rank in time to command the men who came ashore at Normandy in June 1944, 70 years ago this week.
Yet, in most cases, markets don’t suddenly collapse and neither do armies. Instead, armies, like markets, decline gradually. The public seldom notices until it’s too late.
In October 2013, Army Chief of Staff General Ray Odierno claimed that cuts in the Army’s total annual budget of $125.2 billion, including $37.8 billion for readiness, made it impossible for an active Army of 550,000 troops to provide more than two brigades ready to fight. In March 2014, when 80,000 Russian armored combat forces were poised to invade Ukraine, the U.S. Army was incapable of deploying an effective combat maneuver force to Europe or anywhere else.
How did this happen? How could an Army of 550,000 with 32,000 troops in Afghanistan’s forward operating bases fail to provide more than two combat-ready brigades, roughly 8,000 men under arms, to deploy and fight?
The answer is deceptively simple: It’s by design.
In 1950, before the outbreak of the Korean War, the U.S. Army had 593,167 soldiers on active duty. Despite the impressive numbers, Army divisions contained hollow brigades and regiments, units with only two-thirds of their combat power. Armor was almost non-existent and artillery was sparse. Task Force Smith, a force of riflemen with light, towed artillery from the Army’s 24th Infantry Division, was quickly defeated and overrun by 90,000 attacking North Korean troops with 300 T-34/T-85 tanks in July 1950.
But the architects of the defeat were not President Harry Truman, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson or the U.S. Congress. In 1950, the architects of defeat were the four-star generals who wanted an Army designed to provide jobs for generals, not to fight. To cope with the crisis the hollow Army created, Truman added 400,000 soldiers to the Army, including thousands of World War II veterans.
Fast forward to the contemporary Army and it bears a discomfiting resemblance to the Army that deployed to fight in Korea. Today’s Army, with an annual base budget, in fiscal year 2014, of $129.7 billion and a force of 550,000, is incapable of fighting a 21st century opponent with armies, air forces, air defenses and missile forces. And yet, when you include the estimated $30-40 billion for “overseas contingency operations,” today’s Army easily outspends the Army that by 1953 totaled 1 million men and fielded 201,000 soldiers in Korea.
Today, given the structure of the contemporary Army, it’s doubtful that $134 billion-the budget of the 1953 Army, in 2014 dollars-would buy that same level of force. Consider that during World War II, 11 million American soldiers were commanded by just 4 four-star generals. Today, the Army of 550,000 has 11 active-duty four stars, each of which comes with massive amounts of overhead. This makes no sense. If the Army were a rowboat with nine passengers, four would steer, three would call cadence and two would man the oars.
The solution is obvious: Reorganize and reform the U.S. Army to provide more ready, deployable combat power. Consolidate more combat power under fewer headquarters. Flatten the command structure and reduce the overhead. It’s not rocket science. The Japanese Self Defense Force has already done it.
While the U.S. Army’s overhead absorbs 31 percent of its officer and soldier strength, the Japanese general officer overhead consumes only 6 percent. With a budget and manpower roughly a third the size of the U.S. Army’s, the Japanese ground force’s combat formations of 6-7,000 field more ready deployable combat power than the U.S. Army does.
Russia’s Army has moved in similar directions. Today, the country that fielded more divisions than any other nation in history has disbanded its divisions. Instead, it fields 80 5-6,000 man combat formations under generals. By 2019, the number is expected to rise to 200! These formations report directly to a three-star corps commander who is expected to command joint operations.
Here’s the lesson: Shrinking the U.S. Army to fewer divisions and brigade combat teams, without any commensurate increase in fighting power or cost savings, is the wrong answer. Realigning brigades with the 10 divisions of the 1990s Cold War Army is a step backward, not forward. Congress must intervene in the process and compel fundamental change or face another Task Force Smith in the not-too-distant future. Fortunately, the blueprint for action already exists.
As outlined in Breaking the Phalanx and Transformation under Fire, my two books on military transformation, an Army consisting of capability-based expeditionary fighting formations would contain 51 combat formations of 5-6,000 troops under brigadier generals. Organized around the critical functions of Maneuver, Strike, ISR ( intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) and Sustainment (logistics), these combat formations would be designed to operate autonomously on land like warships at sea, all within the ISR-Strike framework of aerospace and naval power under joint command.
Inside an Army of 420,000 soldiers, the resulting fighting force would consist of four corps equivalents of 55,000 men each, each corps equivalent ready to surge in part or in total from a joint rotational readiness base, not from a Cold War-era, “tiered” readiness posture as they are today. The reorganized Army’s overhead would be reduced from 31 percent to 8 percent of the force.
Such an Army would also be aligned with air and sea transport for rapid response to the unexpected: a Korea-like emergency; a Sarajevo-like event; or deployments to support allies already engaged in fighting, not counterinsurgency or nation building. Events in Ukraine and the Western Pacific point to future wars that will not resemble the interventions in Iraq or Afghanistan. Instead, they will involve conflicts as lethal as Korea or World War II, fights for regional power and influence that overlap with interstate competitions for energy, water, food, mineral resources and the wealth they create.
The Army four stars, active and retired, will collectively groan, “It’s too hard and will take too long to change the Army.” Well, it is true that building combat power takes time. But it’s useful to remember that only eight months after Gen. George C. Marshall received the executive order in March 1942 empowering him to reorganize the War Department, he was able to land a brand new Army on the shores of North Africa.
The point is simple: The U.S. Army is unraveling. As Peter Drucker told businessmen in the 1990s, “If you want something new, stop doing something old.” Congress must act. There is no need to fill Arlington Cemetery to capacity.
Retired colonel Douglas Macgregor is a decorated combat veteran, a Ph.D. and the author of five books on military affairs. His newest book, Margin of Victory: Why Some Nations Win and Others Lose Wars, will be out next year.
Read more: http://www.politico.com/ magazine/story/2014/06/how-to- fix-the-us-military-107337. html#ixzz33Zuj9nMu
THE REAL NSA SCANDAL IS OVERSEAS
June 2014
Douglas MacGregor’s conclusion:
Such an Army would also be aligned with air and sea transport for rapid response to the unexpected: a Korea-like emergency; a Sarajevo-like event; or deployments to support allies already engaged in fighting, not counterinsurgency or nation building. Events in Ukraine and the Western Pacific point to future wars that will not resemble the interventions in Iraq or Afghanistan. Instead, they will involve conflicts as lethal as Korea or World War II, fights for regional power and influence that overlap with interstate competitions for energy, water, food, mineral resources and the wealth they create.
The Army four stars, active and retired, will collectively groan, “It’s too hard and will take too long to change the Army.” Well, it is true that building combat power takes time. But it’s useful to remember that only eight months after Gen. George C. Marshall received the executive order in March 1942 empowering him to reorganize the War Department, he was able to land a brand new Army on the shores of North Africa.
The point is simple: The U.S. Army is unraveling. As Peter Drucker told businessmen in the 1990s, “If you want something new, stop doing something old.” Congress must act. There is no need to fill Arlington Cemetery to capacity.
Our Army’s Headed for Collapse
Here’s how to fix it.
By DOUGLAS MACGREGOR
June 2014
Read more: http://www.politico.com/ magazine/story/2014/06/how-to- fix-the-us-military-107337. html#ixzz33Zutyq4Y
http://www.politico.com/ magazine/story/2014/06/how-to- fix-the-us-military-107337_ full.html?print#.U42-GGRDt38
When markets crash, when economic indicators fall by double digits, investors panic, stocks drop like rocks and governments teeter on the brink of collapse. Unable to understand the sudden break in prosperity, the public asks what happened; politicians hold hearings, financial institutions are investigated and, eventually, “too-big-to jail” financial wizards go to prison. At least, that’s what happened in the years after the 1929 crash.
Similar conditions emerge when the United States Armed Forces are defeated in ways that the government and the media cannot conceal. In the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, captains and majors like Matthew Ridgway, James Gavin and Mark Clark-men who would have otherwise ended their careers in obscurity-were promoted, eventually rising to flag rank in time to command the men who came ashore at Normandy in June 1944, 70 years ago this week.
Yet, in most cases, markets don’t suddenly collapse and neither do armies. Instead, armies, like markets, decline gradually. The public seldom notices until it’s too late.
In October 2013, Army Chief of Staff General Ray Odierno claimed that cuts in the Army’s total annual budget of $125.2 billion, including $37.8 billion for readiness, made it impossible for an active Army of 550,000 troops to provide more than two brigades ready to fight. In March 2014, when 80,000 Russian armored combat forces were poised to invade Ukraine, the U.S. Army was incapable of deploying an effective combat maneuver force to Europe or anywhere else.
How did this happen? How could an Army of 550,000 with 32,000 troops in Afghanistan’s forward operating bases fail to provide more than two combat-ready brigades, roughly 8,000 men under arms, to deploy and fight?
The answer is deceptively simple: It’s by design.
In 1950, before the outbreak of the Korean War, the U.S. Army had 593,167 soldiers on active duty. Despite the impressive numbers, Army divisions contained hollow brigades and regiments, units with only two-thirds of their combat power. Armor was almost non-existent and artillery was sparse. Task Force Smith, a force of riflemen with light, towed artillery from the Army’s 24th Infantry Division, was quickly defeated and overrun by 90,000 attacking North Korean troops with 300 T-34/T-85 tanks in July 1950.
But the architects of the defeat were not President Harry Truman, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson or the U.S. Congress. In 1950, the architects of defeat were the four-star generals who wanted an Army designed to provide jobs for generals, not to fight. To cope with the crisis the hollow Army created, Truman added 400,000 soldiers to the Army, including thousands of World War II veterans.
Fast forward to the contemporary Army and it bears a discomfiting resemblance to the Army that deployed to fight in Korea. Today’s Army, with an annual base budget, in fiscal year 2014, of $129.7 billion and a force of 550,000, is incapable of fighting a 21st century opponent with armies, air forces, air defenses and missile forces. And yet, when you include the estimated $30-40 billion for “overseas contingency operations,” today’s Army easily outspends the Army that by 1953 totaled 1 million men and fielded 201,000 soldiers in Korea.
Today, given the structure of the contemporary Army, it’s doubtful that $134 billion-the budget of the 1953 Army, in 2014 dollars-would buy that same level of force. Consider that during World War II, 11 million American soldiers were commanded by just 4 four-star generals. Today, the Army of 550,000 has 11 active-duty four stars, each of which comes with massive amounts of overhead. This makes no sense. If the Army were a rowboat with nine passengers, four would steer, three would call cadence and two would man the oars.
The solution is obvious: Reorganize and reform the U.S. Army to provide more ready, deployable combat power. Consolidate more combat power under fewer headquarters. Flatten the command structure and reduce the overhead. It’s not rocket science. The Japanese Self Defense Force has already done it.
While the U.S. Army’s overhead absorbs 31 percent of its officer and soldier strength, the Japanese general officer overhead consumes only 6 percent. With a budget and manpower roughly a third the size of the U.S. Army’s, the Japanese ground force’s combat formations of 6-7,000 field more ready deployable combat power than the U.S. Army does.
Russia’s Army has moved in similar directions. Today, the country that fielded more divisions than any other nation in history has disbanded its divisions. Instead, it fields 80 5-6,000 man combat formations under generals. By 2019, the number is expected to rise to 200! These formations report directly to a three-star corps commander who is expected to command joint operations.
Here’s the lesson: Shrinking the U.S. Army to fewer divisions and brigade combat teams, without any commensurate increase in fighting power or cost savings, is the wrong answer. Realigning brigades with the 10 divisions of the 1990s Cold War Army is a step backward, not forward. Congress must intervene in the process and compel fundamental change or face another Task Force Smith in the not-too-distant future. Fortunately, the blueprint for action already exists.
As outlined in Breaking the Phalanx and Transformation under Fire, my two books on military transformation, an Army consisting of capability-based expeditionary fighting formations would contain 51 combat formations of 5-6,000 troops under brigadier generals. Organized around the critical functions of Maneuver, Strike, ISR ( intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) and Sustainment (logistics), these combat formations would be designed to operate autonomously on land like warships at sea, all within the ISR-Strike framework of aerospace and naval power under joint command.
Inside an Army of 420,000 soldiers, the resulting fighting force would consist of four corps equivalents of 55,000 men each, each corps equivalent ready to surge in part or in total from a joint rotational readiness base, not from a Cold War-era, “tiered” readiness posture as they are today. The reorganized Army’s overhead would be reduced from 31 percent to 8 percent of the force.
Such an Army would also be aligned with air and sea transport for rapid response to the unexpected: a Korea-like emergency; a Sarajevo-like event; or deployments to support allies already engaged in fighting, not counterinsurgency or nation building. Events in Ukraine and the Western Pacific point to future wars that will not resemble the interventions in Iraq or Afghanistan. Instead, they will involve conflicts as lethal as Korea or World War II, fights for regional power and influence that overlap with interstate competitions for energy, water, food, mineral resources and the wealth they create.
The Army four stars, active and retired, will collectively groan, “It’s too hard and will take too long to change the Army.” Well, it is true that building combat power takes time. But it’s useful to remember that only eight months after Gen. George C. Marshall received the executive order in March 1942 empowering him to reorganize the War Department, he was able to land a brand new Army on the shores of North Africa.
The point is simple: The U.S. Army is unraveling. As Peter Drucker told businessmen in the 1990s, “If you want something new, stop doing something old.” Congress must act. There is no need to fill Arlington Cemetery to capacity.
Retired colonel Douglas Macgregor is a decorated combat veteran, a Ph.D. and the author of five books on military affairs. His newest book, Margin of Victory: Why Some Nations Win and Others Lose Wars, will be out next year.
Read more: http://www.politico.com/ magazine/story/2014/06/how-to- fix-the-us-military-107337. html#ixzz33Zuj9nMu
THE REAL NSA SCANDAL IS OVERSEAS
June 2014
by Fortuna's Corner · in CIA, Cyber War, DIA, espionage, spying, FBI, foreign policy, Intelligence Community, military history, national security, NSA, Russia, U.S. Cyber Command, US Military
Excerpt:
In his NBC interview, Snowden complained that NSA employees were being unfairly demonized – and he has a point.
“Blame,” says Thomas Rid, a professor of security studies at King’s College, “is being applied to the NSA, when it should be applied to public officials for failing to put proper restrictions on what the NSA was doing.” It’s a bit like heaping all the criticism for the Iraq War on the U.S. Army rather than the civilian leaders who sent them there in the first place.
“American political elites feel very empowered to criticize the American intelligence community for not doing enough when they feel in danger,” Hayden noted in a recent Frontline special looking at the NSA. “And as soon as we’ve made them feel safe again, they feel equally empowered to complain that we’re doing too much.” The comment may appear self-serving, but it’s not necessarily wrong.
The reality, says Wittes, is that “in almost every respect, the lesson from the Snowden leaks is that we have the intelligence community we’ve asked for.”
The Real NSA Scandal Is Overseas
By Michael Cohen 3 hours agoYahoo Newshttp://news.yahoo.com/the- real-nsa-scandal–spying- overseas-210655092.html
In this image taken from video provided by NBC News on Tuesday, May 27, 2014, Edward Snowden, a former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor, speaks to NBC News anchor Brian Williams during an NBC Exclusive interview. Snowden told Williams that he worked undercover and overseas for the CIA and the NSA. (AP Photo/NBC News)
In this image taken from video provided by NBC News on Tuesday, May 27, 2014, Edward Snowden, a former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor, speaks to NBC News anchor Brian Williams during an NBC Exclusive interview. Snowden told Williams that he worked undercover and overseas for the CIA and the NSA. (AP Photo/NBC News)
Excerpt:
In his NBC interview, Snowden complained that NSA employees were being unfairly demonized – and he has a point.
“Blame,” says Thomas Rid, a professor of security studies at King’s College, “is being applied to the NSA, when it should be applied to public officials for failing to put proper restrictions on what the NSA was doing.” It’s a bit like heaping all the criticism for the Iraq War on the U.S. Army rather than the civilian leaders who sent them there in the first place.
“American political elites feel very empowered to criticize the American intelligence community for not doing enough when they feel in danger,” Hayden noted in a recent Frontline special looking at the NSA. “And as soon as we’ve made them feel safe again, they feel equally empowered to complain that we’re doing too much.” The comment may appear self-serving, but it’s not necessarily wrong.
The reality, says Wittes, is that “in almost every respect, the lesson from the Snowden leaks is that we have the intelligence community we’ve asked for.”
The Real NSA Scandal Is Overseas
By Michael Cohen 3 hours agoYahoo Newshttp://news.yahoo.com/the- real-nsa-scandal–spying- overseas-210655092.html
In this image taken from video provided by NBC News on Tuesday, May 27, 2014, Edward Snowden, a former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor, speaks to NBC News anchor Brian Williams during an NBC Exclusive interview. Snowden told Williams that he worked undercover and overseas for the CIA and the NSA. (AP Photo/NBC News)
In this image taken from video provided by NBC News on Tuesday, May 27, 2014, Edward Snowden, a former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor, speaks to NBC News anchor Brian Williams during an NBC Exclusive interview. Snowden told Williams that he worked undercover and overseas for the CIA and the NSA. (AP Photo/NBC News)
Last week Edward Snowden popped up from his exile in Moscow for an exclusive interview with NBC News anchor Brian Williams. Like much of the public narrative that has emerged since Snowden absconded with reams of classified documents from the National Security Agency, the interview further muddied the waters about what his historic leaks have revealed.
Snowden claimed, for example, that “the Constitution of the United States has been violated on a massive scale” and that “the Fourth Amendment as it was written – no longer exists.” That’s simply not true.
He said the “government” had “gone too far and overreached.” That is true, but not in the way Snowden means. He described how metadata could be used to get a clear picture of someone’s life while failing to provide evidence that the U.S. government is compiling such comprehensive profiles of American citizens without legal permission.
Finally, he asked: If the U.S. government “can’t show a single individual who’s been harmed in any way by this reporting, is it really so grave?”
This was one of the interview’s most unintentionally revealing moments because, while the agency’s domestic data gathering raises serious privacy concerns, Snowden’s question can be turned back on him. Can he point to a single American who’s been harmed by the NSA’s actions?
One of the more striking takeaways from a year of stories about the NSA is that they have turned up no evidence to suggest that Americans’ privacy rights are being systematically violated or that NSA-collected metadata is being used to target political enemies. None.
Even Glenn Greenwald, the lead reporter for the Guardian newspaper on the NSA leaks story, has acknowledged as much, noting in a recent NPR interview that there is no evidence that the NSA used “online activities to blackmail people or ruin their reputations, or otherwise coerce and threaten them.”
It is “a scandal in search of a victim,” says Joshua Rovner, a political scientist at Southern Methodist University.
This is one of the great paradoxes of the Snowden story. Public attention has been focused, by and large, on a domestic data-gathering program that is legal, well-regulated and constrained by judicial oversight. While there are legitimate and very real concerns about the potential for NSA abuse, what we’ve learned so far is that no actual abuse is occurring. If anything, the system, by and large, has been shown to work. “What impresses me is that when nobody was watching, the NSA caught big mistakes, reported them and had a significant dialogue with the FISA [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act] Court on fixing them. The process is not perfect, but it has integrity,” says Benjamin Wittes, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.
But as new safeguards and reforms of domestic data gathering are being debated in Congress, there has been far less conversation about the NSA’s ever-expanding global footprint. By law, the NSA is mandated to gather foreign intelligence, and much of what has been revealed is consistent with the agency’s mission (which is detailed on the NSA’s website).
What is disconcerting, however, is how far the NSA has pushed the envelope. The agency remains an essential tool for protecting U.S. national security, but the disclosures of the past year also suggest that its zeal in pursuing its mandate risks undermining the same interests it is seeking to protect. In an era of rising privacy concerns, more frequent and larger leaks of classified material, and diminishing confidence in public institutions, the NSA and its political overseers must do a better job of weighing the need for security versus the growing perceptions of a surveillance state out of control. In short, the agency and its political bosses must do something that hasn’t been done enough since 9/11 – think not only of the benefits of stopping the next terrorist attack but also of the costs.
When it comes to gathering domestic intelligence, the NSA must follow a very clear set of rules and legal mandates. But internationally, it can and does operate with far fewer legal constraints and virtually no significant congressional or judicial oversight. In the spying game, any piece of intelligence is considered fair game – and that’s been the agency’s modus operandi.
This has translated into an astounding set of operational capabilities. In the last year we’ve seen revelations about NSA activities that fall into the realm of traditional intelligence gathering, like tapping phones, spying on foreign intelligence services and collaborating with other governments to collect data. But there are also activities that have raised eyebrows, like the NSA’s efforts to break widely-used Internet encryption standards; plant devices, backdoors and malware from afar on target computers; and develop a broad and sophisticated set of tools that allow it to obtain information from computers, phones and gaming systems.
Some of what we’ve learned is simply mind-boggling. Recent revelations indicate that the NSA is recording all the phone records from the Caribbean island of the Bahamas. That it can collect and store so much data is amazing. What is downright shocking is that it can reportedly download the content of every phone call made on the island and store it for 30 days.
None of this is illegal under U.S. law, but it is demonstrative of the ardor – even brazenness -with which the NSA does its job. In the post-9/11 world, the NSA has adopted a maximalist position and sought to get its hands on as much data as possible.
In a 2007 speech, then-director of the CIA (and former head of the NSA) General Michael Hayden boasted that he “had a duty to play aggressively – ‘right up to’ the line. … I made it clear I would always play in fair territory, but that there would be chalk dust on my cleats.”
Hayden’s words were an indication of how serious many inside the intelligence community perceive threats to the United States to be. But bureaucratic politics figures in here as well. If there is another major terrorist attack, fingers will again be pointed at the intelligence community. Where was the incentive to be anything but as aggressive as possible?
According to Spencer Ackerman, who shared in the Pulitzer Prize won by the Guardian for its coverage of the Snowden leaks, you had a situation post-9/11 in which there is this “enormous bureaucracy, which has long been accessing mainly phone communications, and now all of a sudden there is a broad vista of digital information available to them.” Since “you don’t know what you need, you think ‘let’s get our hands on everything’” and the result is the most “powerful technology-advanced bureaucracy” in the U.S. government with a broad directive to stop the next attack. “I don’t buy nefarious explanations for what the NSA has done. There is no mustache-twirling villain [a popular phrase on Team Snowden]. The problems are much more institutional than they are purposeful,” says Ackerman.
This mandate appears to have seeped into everything being done by the NSA – an organization that already had a culture of developing capabilities because it can, not necessarily because they are needed. The challenge of seeing how the NSA could manipulate the latest digital technology for its own purposes seems to have, in some cases, superseded questions of efficacy.
To be clear, this does not mean that the NSA is an agency that is completely out of control. The lion’s share of Snowden’s revelations describes legitimate intelligence-gathering activities. Moreover, the publication of the specifics of these programs has done significant damage to U.S. national security interests. There is, “not a single region of the world where U.S. operational capabilities in intelligence gathering have been unaffected,” says a former administration official who is familiar with the leak damage assessments done by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. “The impact is off the charts.” The intelligence community is even seeing specific incidents where terrorists have been heard telling each other “we must stop communicating like this,” one senior government official told me.
But at the same time, the leaks have also identified specific examples of an agency that is overreaching and demonstrating a lack of political judgment. We can see this in stories related to U.S. spying on key allies and their leaders (such as Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel), surveillance of foreign companies (like Brazil’s Petrobas and China’s Huawei) and, above all, weakening Internet encryption standards – something that allows the NSA to get information from everywhere but in the long run may put ordinary citizens at greater risk of having their online communication purloined. This has undermined cooperation between the NSA and the private tech industry and has done serious near-term damage to U.S. relationships with key allies. Public trust in the U.S. government has also been significantly affected, which is driving the push for reform of the NSA at home and harming America’s reputation overseas.
It begs the question: Were the benefits of, for example, tapping Angela Merkel’s phone or weakening the encryption standards in ways that could potentially be used by “bad guys” really worth the costs? Did the NSA put its many legitimate intelligence-gathering programs at risk by too great a willingness to get chalk dust on its cleats? Were politically accountable leaders in the White House – whose job it is to think about the potential implications of exposure – asking these questions? Or rather were they concerned about the intelligence they were receiving and indifferent to how the sausage was being made?
In the wake of the Chelsea Manning leaks and now the Snowden leaks, the intelligence community simply must operate with an assumption that everything they are doing could one day be splashed across the front page – and respond accordingly. But that sort of guidance must come from their civilian overseers; otherwise, the NSA will continue to push the issue.
In his NBC interview, Snowden complained that NSA employees were being unfairly demonized – and he has a point.
“Blame,” says Thomas Rid, a professor of security studies at King’s College, “is being applied to the NSA, when it should be applied to public officials for failing to put proper restrictions on what the NSA was doing.” It’s a bit like heaping all the criticism for the Iraq War on the U.S. Army rather than the civilian leaders who sent them there in the first place.
“American political elites feel very empowered to criticize the American intelligence community for not doing enough when they feel in danger,” Hayden noted in a recent Frontline special looking at the NSA. “And as soon as we’ve made them feel safe again, they feel equally empowered to complain that we’re doing too much.” The comment may appear self-serving, but it’s not necessarily wrong.
The reality, says Wittes, is that “in almost every respect, the lesson from the Snowden leaks is that we have the intelligence community we’ve asked for.”
More than 12 years after 9/11, the United States continues to have a foreign policy mindset that demands zero tolerance on terrorism and treats even minor threats like existential challenges. In the pursuit of perfect security and in meeting the demands of a hugely expansive view of American power, the U.S. has failed to consider the ultimate consequences and potential political fallout – both at home and abroad – of what achieving that goal means. And that’s a challenge that goes far beyond the NSA.
Cohen is a fellow at the Century Foundation and a former columnist for the Guardian.
JUNE 6, 1944: THE ALLIED INVASION OF NORMANDY; AND THE BEGINING OF THE END FOR HITLER, AND THE THIRD REICH
June 2014 · by Fortuna's Corner · in DIA, Europe, foreign policy, Intelligence Community, military history,national security, Russia, US Military · 1 Comment
June 6, 1944: The Allied Invasion Of Normandy; And The Beginning Of The End For Hitler, And The Third Reich
http://www.fortunascorner.wordpress.com/
Less than 24rs. from now, some 70yrs, ago, everyone from Presidents and Heads of State, to the lowest private — were anxious and reflective in the waning hours before D-Day. June 6, 1944, and the Allied invasion of France/Normandy coastline — known by the codename — Operation Overlord, marked the beginning of the end of Hitler’s Third Reich.
I am concentrating on Omaha Beach in this note; and, it is not intended to diminish in anyway, those who fought and died on the other four beaches that were part of the Normandy campaign.
Military Battles That Were Turning Points In History
There are battles in history which have some significance; and, then there are battles that were turning points in history: The Last Stand of the 300 Spartans [and a few thousand Greeks)] at Thermopylae in 480 B.C. Although King Leonidas and his 300 Spartans were defeated after three days of intense fighting against King Xerxes and his Persian Army, he and his 300 Spartans became the stuff of legend; later inspiring Alexander The Great of Macedon to conquer the Persian Empire and spread the seeds of democracy and freedom. Or, the Battle of Tours France, also referred to as the Battle of Poitiers in 732 A.D., and the victory of Charles Martel over Abdul Rahman al Ghafiqi — the later attempting to bring Islam to Europe. The battle is widely recognized as preserving Christianity in Europe.
Some might include the Battle of Hastings in 1066 A.D. which is the first documented battle that demonstrated the effectiveness of a combined arms strategy: cavalry, infantry, and archers. Or, perhaps, the Battle of Agincourt, in 1415, the best know battle of Europe’s ‘Hundred Years War,’ and one of the greatest victory’s of England’s Army, led by none other that Henry V and use of the English Longbow. Shakespeare would later immortalize a statement that may, or may not have been made by Henry V as he sought to inspire his army to victory over Charles VI of France. “Once more unto the breach,” is from ‘Cry God For Harry, England, and Saint George Speech,’ in Shakespeare’s Henry V, Act III, in 1598. Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo by Wellington; and, perhaps our own George Washington and his victory over British General Cornwallis at Yorktown; and/or, General Grant’s victory over Robert E. Lee at Appomattox Courthouse could also be included. They were all battles that changed the course of history.
The Allied battle at Normandy, seventy years ago this Friday, June 6, 1944, changed the course of World War II in Europe. As the 70th anniversary of the Normandy landing approaches, it behooves all of us to reflect on how meaningful that battle turned out to be — ultimately leading to the defeat of Hitler and the Third Reich, the preservation of the values of freedom and liberty in the West; and, the ascendancy of the United States to global, superpower status.
Denial And Deception On Where The Allied Invasion Would Strike
The German high-command knew how significant and important it was to stop the West from establishing a beachhead on the shores of France/Western Europe; and, they spent a fortune of money, time, and resources in an attempt to find out where the likely landing would be — and, posture to “kill it before it got started.” That is one of the reasons that the denial and deception campaign — Operation Fortitude, and The Man Who Never Was, played an important role in the ultimate success of Operation Overlord. I cannot write about that very critical aspect of the battle; as, this article may be too long for some of you already. I apologize in advance; and, I hope I can do justice for those who fought and died for freedom, liberty, and against fascism.
Allied Deception Operations Convinced The German High-Command That Pas de Calais — And Not Normandy — Would Be The Likely Allied Landing
By the eve of the Normandy landing on June 6, 1944, Hitler, and nearly all of his high-command were convinced that the Allied invasion would not be at Normandy; but, instead, near the shores of Pas-de-Calais — the closest point (shortest route) between Britain and France — and, about 150 miles from Omaha Beach. Indeed, Sir Winston Churchill, remarking after the war — in one of his many profound observations — that, “In Wartime, The Truth Is So Precious, That She Must Be Protected By A Bodyguard Of Lies.”
There was disagreement within the German high-command on where, and how best to repel an expected Allied invasion — draw back from the beaches and save your artillery; and allow the allies to extend themselves logistically, and with long supply lines; or, make a stand at the coastline and deter/prevent the allies from coming ashore in any significant degree.
The Desert Fox, German Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, favored the latter strategy, fearing that if the allies successfully established a beachhead along Western Europe’s coast, — things may not go Germany’s way. While Germany built up its defenses and fortifications around Pas de Calias, Field Marshall Rommel had been given the job of fortifying and protecting possible Allied invasion landings along France’s coastline. Upon visiting Normandy in the months prior to D-Day, Rommel surveyed the beaches and was struck by the similar terrain to another/previous successful — Allied landing — the beaches of Salerno, Italy in 1943. Rommel had an uncomfortable feeling as he looked over Normandy’s beaches — even though a majority of the General Staff believed Pas de Calais was the more likely landing point.
Rommel was so worried about a potential Allied landing at Normandy, that he asked in vain for more fortifications and lethal weaponry. Denied, he made due with what he could muster, timber, steel, barbed wire, defensive obstacles (including 17K land-mines); and, 20,000 troops. “Our only possible chance will be at the beaches,” he said. “If the invaders come to Normandy, we will stop them there.” Rommel expected Allied forces to come in at high tide — and, he intended to impale them at water’s edge,” according to Rick Atkinson, the great American historian who wrote a WWII trilogy, including, Guns At Last Light: D-Day, And The Liberation Of Europe.”
Omaha Beach was but 1000 yards wide (a little over three football fields) that had a gentile, upward slope; and, some 7,000 yards long at low-tide. If an invading force actually got to the beach — in addition to the obstacles noted above — troops would have to fight their way past 5, MG-42 German machine guns posted at the top of the 150 foot bluff overlooking the beach. The MG-42 was the fastest firing machine-gun in the world at that time; and, could fire 1500 bullets per minute/ 25 bullets per second. The bullets were fired so fast, the troops nicknamed the MG-42 “Hitler’s Zipper.” The Germans troops had another name for it — “Hitler’s Saw, and/or, “Hitler’s Bonesaw.” Additionally, the Germans had 30 anti-tank weapons, 17 heavy mortars, 20 field guns and numerous snipers.
If the Allied invasion did indeed come to Normandy, Rommel was going to make sure that attacking troops were going to have to overcome a gauntlet of obstacles and weaponry — all the while navigating forward on an exposed beach. In some ways, reading accounts of the battle reminded me of “Picketts Charge,” for the Confederacy at Gettysburg.
Why Normandy?
According to U.S. Army historical documents that can be accessed at Army.mil and elsewhere, “the Normandy beaches were chosen for the Allied invasion — because, they lay within range of air cover, and were less heavily defended than the obvious objective of the Pas de Calais. Airborne drops at both ends of the beachheads were to protect the flanks, as well as open up roadways to the interior. Six divisions were to land on the first day, three U.S., two British, and one Canadian. Two more British, and an additional U.S. division were to follow up — after the assault on June 6, 1944, cleared the way through the beach defenses. Operation Overlord was the largest and most ambitious seaborne/amphibious military operation that had ever been attempted — at the time — and, it remains so to this day.
General Eisenhower Frets On The Eve Of D-Day; “Fears Of Another “Little Bighorn”
Rick Atkinson in the Guns At Last Light: D-Day, And The Liberation Of Europe,” writes that “on the night of June 5, 1944, the prospect of “another Little Bighorn” gnawed at General Eisenhower in these final hours. “After watching British troops board their naval craft from South Parade Pier, in Portsmouth, — he [Eisenhower] sat down to compose a contrite note of responsibility” — writes Mr. Atkinson — “just in case,” the Normandy invasion failed. “Our landings in the Cherbourg-Harve area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold; and, I have withdrawn the troops,” he wrote. “If any blame, or fault attaches to the attempt — it is mine alone.” As Mr. Atkinson adds, “misdating the paper July 5, — symptomatic of exhaustion and anxiety — he slipped it into his wallet, for use as needed. When he returned to the manor house at his headquarters, in a royal preserve outside London,” Mr. Atkinson wrote, “Eisenhower climbed the roof to get a final glimpse at his men. “The light of battle was in their eyes,” he would write to George Marshall, the U.S. Army Chief Of Staff. “I hope to God, I know what I am doing.” And, as it turned out, Eisenhower knew what he was doing; and, June 6, 1944 was indeed the longest day.
Operation Overlord Commences: The Invasion Begins
The allied invasion on the coast of France 70 years ago; and, the assault on the five beaches along Normandy’s coastline: — an operation that had been in the planning stages for over two years — began just after midnight, Tuesday morning, June 6, 1944. The five beaches are now immortalized in military history: Juno, Gold, Omaha, Utah, and Sword — and, the liberation of Western Europe was underway.
The Normandy invasion began with overnight parachute (20K) and glider landings, massive air attacks and naval bombardments. As Rick Atkinson wrote in “Guns At Last Light: D-Day, And The Liberation Of Europe,” on the night of June 5, 1944, “thousands of glider troops and paratroopers rubbed charcoal and cocoa on their faces — before the short flight across the English Channel.” “Men [were] slipping on the vomit-slick floor of their airplanes; and onboard their landing craft; or, drowning in the muddy water of flooded fields as their “flimsy, muddy gliders disintegrated upon landing.
Mr. Atkinson writes that “on the assault/landing craft, men were being tossed around like toys when their flimsy, muddy gliders disintegrated upon landing.” “Then comes sunrise,” Mr. Atkinson writes, ” on June 6, 1944, “as a French boy wakes up to the see the largest amphibious landing ever attempted (“more ships than sea,” the boy recalled) — some 200K seamen and merchant mariners, crewing 59 convoys, carrying 130K soldiers, 2K tanks (most of which never made it to shore), and 12,000 vehicles. Seasick soldiers jumped from landing craft into churning green water. “They waded toward beaches defended by a murderous mix of mines, machine-guns, barbed wire, and artillery,” wrote Mr. Atkinson. No one landed where they were supposed to. Disorganization, confusion, and incomplete, or faulty implementation of the plans — after the shooting started — characterized the initial phases of the landings.
In the early minutes of the attack, just after midnight, June 6, 1944, things were already going badly for the allies. Four hundred forty-six U.S and Allied bombers had been tasked with taking out the German heavy guns perched at the tops of the 150ft high bluffs overlooking Omaha Beach. Before the operation, USAF officers had boasted that their bombing was so precise, “they could hit a pickle-barrel from 10K feet.” But, in the wee hours of the morning, before daylight, there was cloud cover and overcast. Navy commanders feared that the Air Force could mistakenly hit their vessels as they approached the beaches. So, the bombers were instructed to wait precious seconds (after they believed they should) before dropping their bombs — in order to prevent fratricide. Thirteen-thousand tons of bombs were dropped that morning; but, not a single bomb hit its target — the biggest failure on D-Day and a bad omen for those in the initial assault.
To add insult to injury, only a small portion of the Allied tanks and vehicles made it to land on the initial assault, as the rough weather and 6 feet to10 feet high seas caused them to sink before ever reaching shore. As the landing craft lowered their ramps, the German machine gunners immediately opened fire and the MG-42′s began to inflict heavy casualties. Many soldiers jumped off the sides of the landing craft to avoid the torrent of bullets — only to drown, weighed down by their gear.
The surviving troops emerged onto a beach that was already drenched in blood and a literal killing field, with minds and shrapnel exploding — cutting many men down in mid stride. German snipers targeted the U.S. officers and others that seemed to take charge — in an attempt to further demoralize those who had survived the initial landing.
Those troops “lucky” enough to make it to the beach, learned an inconvenient truth — despite a massive air bombardment campaign of German coastal defenses prior to the landings — most of these defenses remained undamaged and intact. Land mines covered the only entry points to the bluffs, and the four ravines that led to heavily-mined roads.
Two hours into the assault, defeat seemed inevitable. The survivors began to gather on a small section of the beach, as the rising tide forced them into a smaller, constricting area. Three hours into the attack, the surviving Allied troops were squeezed into a section of Omaha Beach that was barely ten yards wide.
Independent Ranger Battalions had 60 rocket-powered grappling hooks that were designed to assist their quick climb up the 150 feet bluffs and take out the German guns and artillery. But, the heavy seas upon landing soaked many of the ropes for the grappling hooks. By the time they landed, only 19 of the 60 rocket-propelled grappling hooks remained functional.
Everything, it seemed, pointed to impending defeat for America and her allies. Body-parts strewn the beach, chaos and confusion reigned, men cried out for their mothers; and, desperation and fear were rampant. Into this cauldron stepped U.S. Army Major General Norman ‘Dutch’ Cota. Watching the carnage unfold from a few hundred yards offshore; MG. Cota knew the Allied D-Day landing was going badly; and, defeat was a real possibility. The success of Operation Overlord hung in the balance.
In one of those twists of fate, where America had the right man in the right place, at the right time, MG Cota made a decision that was the defining moment of his career and life. In a move reminiscent of Union officer Joshua Lawrence Chamberlin at Gettysburg’s Little Round Top, MG. Cota — knowing that the remaining U.S. and Allied troops badly needed leadership and inspiration — MG. Cota waded ashore with an unlit cigar and began to rally and inspire the survivors. In a now famous quote, he yelled, “Gentlemen, we are being killed on the beaches. Let us go inland and be killed.” MG. Coda inspired his men with his courage and leadership; and, it was a critical turning point on D-Day. I hesitate to think how things might have turned out — without his courage and leadership that day. After four hours of intense fighting, the tide of battle began to turn in the Allies favor.
One other crucial act of bravery and courage — sealed the deal, as they say. On the morning of the invasion, U.S. Naval destroyers had been ordered not to assist in the landing; and instead, were to stay offshore and protect incoming troops and supplies. But, after witnessing the ongoing carnage for several hours, Naval commanders began to demand to come to the aide of their Army and Allied comrades under great duress on the beach, Captain Harry Sanders of the USS Frankford moved his ship so close to the shore that her hull was scrapping the seabed, according to some of the survivors of the battle. Captain Saunders began to shell the German positions on the bluffs — further bolstering the morale that MG Coda had inspired. According to the U.S. Navy Department Library, “Destroyers At Normandy: Naval Gunfire Support At Omaha Beach,” the Frankford was soon joined by the other seventeen destroyers in bombarding German positions.
After some six hours after the initial landing at Normandy, the tide of battle had swung to America and her allies. The liberation of Western Europe — had officially begun.
German Field Marshall Erwin Rommel: “This Will Be The Longest Day!”
On June 5, 1944, General Rommel was so convinced that the allied invasion was not imminent, he decided to take a short vacation to visit his family and celebrate his wife’s birthday on June 6, 1944 — before a planned meeting later (that same day) on June 6, 1944 with Hitler, at his lair — in Berchtesgarden, Germany.
Upon receiving a phone call from his military aide that the Allied invasion had begun (while visiting with his wife and family), Rommel replied. “Normandy, how stupid of me! How stupid! Believe me, gentlemen, the first twenty-four hours of this invasion will be decisive! It will become for the allies, as well as for the Germans, the longest day — the longest day.” Rommel knew if the allies were successful in establishing a beachhead on the coast of France, Germany would likely be caught in a pincer move — with the Western allies on one flank; and, Russia on its East.
Cornelius Ryan would go on to write the 1959 WWII classic, “The Longest Day,” on the Normandy invasion — and, the title of his book was based on Rommel’s quote. In 1962, Ryan’s book would be made into a Hollywood movie by the same title, with many of Hollywood’s biggest stars: John Wayne, Robert Mitchum, Richard Burton, Sean Connery, Henry Fonda, Rod Steiger, etc.
Great Loss Of Life; But, The Liberation Of Western Europe Had Begun
The “stars,” of The Longest Day,” were not in Hollywood. They were those brave souls of “The Greatest Generation,” who gave their last full measure of devotion in defense of freedom and liberty — and, against Fascism. It was French leader Charles de Gaulle who — when overlooking the windswept graveyards near the beaches and coastline of Normandy said, “the graveyards of the world are full of indispensable men.” Operation Overlord was the largest and most ambitious seaborne/amphibious military operation that had ever been attempted — at the time — and, it remains so to this day.
Over 10,000 U.S. and Allied forces lost their lives on June 6, 1944. General Theodore Roosevelt Jr., son of the former U.S. President, who helped lead the landings at Utah Beach — earning the Medal of Honor. A week after D-Day, he suffered a heart attack during battle — and, was later buried at Normandy.
Within days afterward the initial landing 200K more U.S. and Allied troops and 3M tons of supplies landed at Normandy; the largest military logistical feat accomplished in military history — and, it remains so to this day. The determined push toward Nazi Germany was well underway.
“We Cannot Choose Our Battlefields, God Does That For Us; But, We Can Plant A Standard, Where A Standard Never Flew”
So, when we honor those who fought and died seventy years ago this Friday, June 6, 1944 — we might remember a quote from an unknown author. The quote is believed to be about the Standard Bearers of the Civil War, who disproportionately suffered the highest mortality rate of any other units in the Civil War.
The quote goes as follows, “We Cannot Choose Our Battlefields,” God Does That For Us; But, We Can Plant A Standard Where A Standard Never Flew.”
For the boys of Point du Hoc, the U.S. Army V and VII Corps, the British 1st and XXX Corps, the British 6th Airborne Division; the Canadian 3rd Infantry Division, and 2nd Armored Brigade, and others, U.S. Eighth Air Forces, U.S. Navy/Marines, British, Canadians, Free French Army and French Resistance, the OSS, etc., they all —
“Planted A Standard, Where A Standard Never Flew.” V/R, RCP
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