By Ömer Faruk Topal
Tribes have always occupied a very important role in Iraqi society and they enjoyed several privileges under Saddam Hussein’s regime. After the American invasion, with the rise of Shiite power in the political system and the Kurds’ rising autonomy and prosperity, Sunni tribes have lost their influence and power to the some extent.
In the post-2003 era, Sunnis realized that they could not regain their privilege and concentrated their attention on political representation through federalism. A strong government in Baghdad will obviously be under Shiite control because of the population gap between Sunni Arabs and Shiites. Therefore, Sunnis focused their efforts on the transformation of Iraq as a federal state whose provinces enjoy more powerful autonomy. They also figured that if they had a majority in critical state institutions, such as the military and intelligence, then they could balance the Shiite power and secure Sunni interests. However, they could not achieve these goals. Along with the Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s centrist and exclusionist policies, the struggle for power among tribes, sub-tribes and families has also prevented them from creating common and efficient policies.
Al-Anbar province, which constitutes the western part of Iraq along much of the Syrian border, is one of the places where tribal traditions have been quite strong. Fallujah, the biggest city of the province, has a tribal society with the tribe playing an important role in the decision-making process of the individuals and it works as a bloc vote. This sociological aspect of tribalism has played a crucial role in the balance of politics and security in the city. It enables the Maliki regime to forge political and security alliances with influential sections of the society in Fallujah, splitting them into pro and anti ISIS quarrelling factions. The Tribal Military Councils are a new set of actors who were created by Al-Anbar’s anti-Maliki tribes and are posed to shake the whole of Iraq.
Tribal Revolutionary Military Councils
The Tribal Revolutionary Military Councils were established in several Sunni provinces as a reaction to the Maliki government’s violent break up of the widespread demonstrations. Many members of these groups often blame Maliki’s suppression of these protests as a reason for their decision to go a more militant route. Their members are generally resistance groups of the American invasion, or ex-bureaucrats and military officers of the Baath era. One of the most active military councils was founded in Al-Anbar province during the unrest in the beginning of 2014 under the name of the Military Council of Anbar Tribal Revolutionaries (MCATR).
The MCATR demanded Iraqi Security Forces to withdraw from Al-Anbar and consign their weapons to tribal rebels. They threatened all pro-Maliki groups in the province and called for Sahwa forces to serve their tribes, not Maliki. They also requested politicians to withdraw from the political process, which they described as criminal and illegal.
One of the most influential and powerful organization of this type is the General Military Council for Iraqi Revolutionaries, whose stronghold is Mosul. The group is associated with the Muslim Scholars’ Association a group that consists of Sunni scholars and is led by Sheikh Harith Sulayman al-Dhari, a prominent Sunni scholar who is accused of terrorism by the Maliki government. He said to Al Jazeera that [1] “Iraq’s Sunnis feel marginalized because [of] policies in Iraq… He [Maliki] adopted a policy of marginalization and exclusion and used all forms of cruelty at his disposal against the Sunnis.” The Association rejects sectarianism and terrorism, has organized joint Sunni-Shiite prayers and was fiercely against the American invasion.
Several Sunni insurgent groups such as the Jihad and Reform Front, the Asaib Iraq al-Jihadiyya, the Mujahideen Army and the Army of Ahmad bin Hanbal declared Harith Sulayman al-Dhari as their official representative in the international arena and all other platforms. In the Mosul crisis, the Association played a critical role. On June 9, 2014, the Association released a statement [2] which claimed that “A new task will be added to this victory, is of another kind, must be assumed by revolutionaries, which is maintaining security and stability all over the province of Nineveh, and keeping the safety of the residents of all the ingredients and the spectra and hardwork to mitigate on the civilians and provide all the basic needs as they could, to the introduction of tranquility to hearts, also to protect the state institutions and public funds, and to maintain the logic of the amnesty rather than of revenge; for sake of the sanctity of innocent blood.”
After the assault in Mosul, several Shiite religious leaders, including Ali Sistani who is the most influential Shiite cleric in the country, issued fatwas to fight against ISIS and terrorists and to protect the country and holy places against the ISIS threat.
The Association of Muslim Scholars responded to these calls and demanded from Shia marjas in Iraq to reconsider the recent fatwa, claiming that the government and militias “are using this fatwa to commit the sectarian crimes against unarmed civilians” once they failed in the face of the revolutionaries. [3] They declared that they totally denounce ISIS’s threats to attack Najaf and Karbala. The Association accused the government of implementing an Iranian agenda and of provoking civil war in the country.
After the crisis, Sheikh Mohammed Bashar al-Faidhi, spokesman of the Association of Muslim Scholars, described the situation in Iraq as a “popular revolution against the policy of oppression, marginalization and exclusion pursued by successive governments under the brutal occupation, including the current Maliki government.” [4] He claimed that the Maliki government has pursued oppressive and corrupt policies for years and has marginalized and excluded Sunnis.
The role of military councils in Mosul
Although much of the attention is focused on ISIS, one of the main dynamics behind the Mosul attacks and the uprising against the Maliki government is the Tribal Revolutionary Military Councils. If the central government cannot take control of Mosul, it can be said that there would be a new war between ISIS and the Tribal Revolutionary Military Councils. Spokesman for the General Military Council of the Iraqi Revolutionaries Muzhir al Qaisi told BBC that Mosul was too big a city for ISIS to have taken alone and that his council is stronger than ISIS. He also differentiates his council from ISIS as follows: “we are organized, we fight with rules, with the Geneva Convention, those are barbarians.”[5] Tribal revolutionaries also believe that they have to root out ISIS, but their first priority is the Maliki government.
On another note, Mosul is different from Fallujah. Maliki made several alliances with local tribes in Fallujah such as the Albu Fahd and Albu Bali tribes. In Mosul by contrast, the societal environment is modern, civilized and urbanized. Different from Fallujah, here the Arabic tribal lineage is held in high regard but plays a very limited role in the individuals’ way of life, political choices or inclinations. Hence, forging alliances and waging proxy wars is not an easy task for either Maliki or ISIS. Mosul and Ninowa province have pluralistic societies which include Christians, Yazidis, Shabaks and Mandeans who have coexisted for centuries. Although it is a very conservative society, the Islamist schools of thought and ideological models are not its choice for a political formula. ISIS has been accommodated, as any other Islamic group would have been, in playing a role under the extremely exceptional circumstances seen in the current crisis. This role is probably a short lived one and after the usual attitude of the society takes over, the visitor will need to check out. Furthermore, Mosul society is rife with pan Arab political factions and senior ex-army officers who want their share in the running of their city. Their discourse is non-sectarian/pan-sectarian and they tried to portray themselves as the nationalist and technocratic group that many Arabs have longed to see.
ISIS is definitely one of the winners of the Mosul attacks. It is a huge morale boost which enables ISIS to recruit more people; it gives ISIS the opportunity to access more money and ammunition and to attract people’s attention worldwide. However, global terrorism trends from Mali to Iraq show that these groups have realized that they are more successful in the areas where there is an authority gap or power vacuum. This is because of the fact that they fought in the northeastern part of Syria, where Assad forces had already withdrawn, and not in Damascus or other Assad strongholds. If tribal councils can fill this gap, Mosul might not be a safe place for ISIS.
[1] Harith al-Dari: Sunnis feel marginalized, Al Jazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2014/04/harith-al-dari-sunnis-feel-marginalised-201441811234497763.html
[2]Statement no. (996) Regarding the revolutionaries victories in Mosul, The Association of Muslim Scholars http://www.heyetnet.org/en/index.php/aciklamalar/item/871-statement-no-996-regarding-the-revolutionaries-victories-in-mosul
[3] Iraq crisis: AMS calls on Shia marja to show more wisdom, The Association of Muslim Scholars http://www.heyetnet.org/en/index.php/heyetamsi/item/883-iraq-crisis-ams-calls-on-shia-marja-to-show-more-wisdom
[4] Iraq witnessing a popular revolution, al-Faidhi says, The Association of Muslim Scholars
http://www.heyetnet.org/en/index.php/heyetamsi/item/881-iraq-witnessing-a-popular-revolution-against-oppression-and-marginalization-policies-al-faidhi-says
[5] Iraq conflict: ‘We are stronger than ISIS’, BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27853362
JTW - the Journal of Turkish Weekly - is a respected Turkish news source in English language on international politics. Established in 2004, JTW is published by Ankara-based Turkish think tank International Strategic Research Organization (USAK).
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