Date: 22/06/2014,
Maoists have dominated the security landscape in the country, be it for their declarations/statements, for their terror related actions and/or for the romanticist support they garner from a section of intelligentsia as ‘champions of Adivasi cause’. Whether the tribal side with Maoists or not, it is an established fact that these 84 million tribal, bulk of which inhabit Central India, are the most affected by ongoing conflict. While orders emanate from essentially a non-tribal leadership, hiding safely in their secure bases, it is the tribal foot soldiers that execute assigned tasks[1].
Involving and mobilising tribal in order to gain mass appeal has been a well thought out strategy of the non-tribal Maoist leadership that sought refuge in the forests of Dandakaranya in aftermath of mounting pressure in Andhra Pradesh in early 80s. Any armed operation to flush out the Maoist leadership will have tribal as the direct target, thus shielding the leadership. Further, as the ill-fated Salwa Judum campaign showed, any attack on tribal not only results in immense calamity for them, but it also helps increase Maoists support base. This vicious cycle has been planned very deliberately and is on for several decades.
In initial stages, after the Maoists fled from Andhra Pradesh and entered Dandakaranya, local tribal population was won over by organising them to realise their rights related to forest produce and land, which saw considerable tribal participation mainly due to the stakes involved. This was followed by eviction of state representatives, thus unshackling Maoist writ in 60,000 square kilometers of forest region of Dandakaranya. From 2001 onwards, Dandakaranya came to be administered by Dandakaranya Special Zone Committee with seven divisional committees under it; these in turn have range and village committees under them.[2] However, tribal representation in the governing committees is minimal or none[3]. Having entrenched in Dandakaranya, for more than quarter of a century, the question that merits pondering over is, ‘what have Maoists been able to accomplish in terms of tribal welfare?’
Much of tribal livelihood depends on collection of forest produce such as tendu leaves and bamboo culms, among other items. Since 1981, cost of a bundle of 50 tendu leaves has gone up from three paisa to one rupee. In case of bundle of bamboo culms, the increase has been from ten paisa to seven rupees. These figures were roughly corroborated by Kobad Ghandy, who reported that daily wages were raised by almost 75 percent from ten rupees[4]. This has been claimed as huge achievement for Maoists and a matter of satisfaction for tribal – made possible by Maoists negotiations with private contractors. Arundhati Roy also goes on to pat the Maoists for this increase, which was more than the government rates in Chhattisgarh[5].
Mere surpassing of highly exploitative wages announced by a particular state government does not by itself qualify as an ‘alternative development model’, that as per Gautam Navalakha, ‘others allegedly preach but Maoists have been practicing for last thirty years among millions of Indians’[6]. Achieving the minimum mark level by efforts of Maoists who promise highest degree of egalitarianism and economic empowerment for masses, stands nowhere in comparison to wages in other states. For agricultural labour, minimum wages typically vary between 60 to 80 rupees a day in the rest of the country. In a “high-wage” state like Kerala—perhaps one model the Maoists would wish to compete with—wages under the rural employment guarantee scheme range up to 150 rupees a day.
Also, on the flip side, having negotiated subsistence wages for tribal, Maoists themselves collect 120 rupees per bag of tendu leaves from the contractors, as ‘royalties’. In a season, from one big contractor, they make six lac rupees, i.e. ten percent of the profit made by the contractor. It is estimated that the tendu leaves business itself runs into hundreds of crores of rupees, seasonally. A similar story obtains from bamboo culms, tamarind etc. that generate royalties for the party and huge profits for contractors[7]. Thus goes the symbiotic nexus, with subsistent living of tribal on the sidelines.
A dismal picture emerges when we look at the health sector, which continues to be primitive. There is no mention of even a single health centre initiated by the Maoists in that vast area, in any of the travelogues authored by Arundhati Roy and likes. All we are told repeatedly is that people are advised to drink boiled water; apparently, this method reduced infant mortality by 50 percent[8] . Words like “famine” and “sub-Saharan condition” are frequently used by the authors, giving account of state of affairs. The words are of course uncompromisingly directed at the state. However, the area being discussed concerns the Maoists “with a history of more than two decades where the party has been able to create an alternative structure, virtually uncontested”[9].
There exists no evidence for construction of any new and regular school for tribal children in the vast area, apart from ‘mobile schools’, as mentioned by Ghandy[10]. The rare schools that exist are all provided for by the state. There has been no justification on part of either the spokespersons or the intellectual sympathisers to explain as to why the Maoists failed to introduce regular schools in the seven divisions under their control. Were they skeptical of an aware, educated and empowered populace, who wouldn’t have ‘blind followed’ them? In any case, the choice of curriculum for indoctrination also rested with them.
Given their vast area of command with undisputed writ, they could have conceived and executed real alternatives to ‘measly development’ that they initiated. However, it was decided to maintain critical threshold levels, primarily for two reasons; firstly it would have driven out the system of private contractors, resulting into massive loss of revenue and secondly it would have raised the conditions of tribal from threshold to a decent living – thus empowering them to move out of Maoist folds and disallowing their young ones from ‘foot-soldiering’ for Maoists.
Having suffered a setback in Andhra Pradesh, they decided to move out with the prime aim of building a standing army. Dandakaranya had all the attributes – difficult & thickly wooded terrain, negligible or no state presence and most importantly, vulnerable tribal population to be won over. In the process, they lured a large number of tribal children with assurances of food and clothing. These children have now grown into formidable militia and guerrilla forces. After committing atrocious crimes in the name of “revolutionary violence”, these youth brigades are now facing the mighty Indian state. It is reasonable to infer that millions of tribal continue to side with the Maoists largely because their children are with them.
Finally, due to their historical isolation and exploitation from outsiders, tribal traditions have been compelled to acquire considerable degree of militancy to defend themselves. Much before Maoists entered the scene, tribal in Bastar had a history of resistance against the British, landlords and moneylenders. Dandakaranya was virtually a ‘blank slate’ on which the Maoist decided to inscribe ‘Charu Majumdar’s’ and ‘Kanhai Chatterji’s’ vision[11]. Prevailing conditions have been utilised to advantage by non-tribal leadership, which now has increasingly symbiotic relationship with rapacious forest and PWD contractors and corrupt officialdom – with a portion of political class providing the crucial connect. A conflict resolution approach will have to distinguish Adivasi aspirations from Maoists intentions. The former need to be nurtured while the latter defeated[12].
The author is a Senior Fellow at CLAWS. Views expressed are personal.
[1] Mukherji Nirmalangshu, Examining The Myth of Maoist Concern for Tribal Welfare, Countercurrents.org, 2010.
[2] Sundar Nandini, Subalterns and Sovereigns, An Anthropological History of Bastar (1854-2006), OUP 2007.
[3] A serious charge against the Maoists is that, out of 22 or so central committee members of the CPI(Maoist) who chart out the party’s course, not one is said to be a tribal, or a woman. The number of dalits in the top positions is also limited. With 60% of their cadres being women and around 70% of their supporters being tribals, it is incongruous that these sections are not represented in the central committee or the politburo.
[4] Ghandy,K, Interview with Suvojit Bagchi, BBC South Asia, 23 September, 2008.
[5] Roy Arundhati, Walking with the Comrades, Outlook, 2010.
[6] Navlakha, Gautam, Days and Nights in the Heartland of Rebellion, Penguin Books India, 2012.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Guruswamy, Mohan, The Heart of Our Darkness, Kanwal, Gurmeet, Katoch, Dhruv (ed), Naxal Violence The Threat Within, KW Publishers, 2012.
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