India’s ‘China Policy’ Formulations- Imperatives of Pragmatism and ‘Realpoloitik’

By Dr. Subhash Kapila 

Dated 09-Jun-2014 

India’s ‘China Policy’ formulations call for imperatives of hard-nosed pragmatism and ‘realpolitik’ and not be carried away by misplaced Indian euphoria generated by China’s rhetoric attending Chinese Foreign Minister’s ongoing visit to India.

So as the Chinese Foreign Minister calls on the Prime Minister and has meetings with the Indian Foreign Minister and the National Security Adviser, one needs to undertake a brief strategic reality check so that India-China existing state of relationship is contextualised and India does not fall into the Chinese trap of “China stands by you on your side in reforms and development.”

Economics and development cannot be the bedrock of relationships between two powerful Asian nations with competing strategic interests. It is the degree of “Strategic Trust” existent that will determine the future course of India-China relations.

Will China publicly ever affirm like some other major powers have done that China will assist India to emerge as a key global player?

Also, the Chinese Foreign Minister is reported to have stated to the effect that there is more strategic consensus between China and India than strategic differences. I would like to assert that “There are more strategic differences and distrust in China-India relations than strategic consensus,”

Strategic reality check of China-India relations would reveal the following stark realities:

China and India stand locked since 1962 and will continue as such in an adversarial and conflictual relationship.

“Strategic Distrust” lurks deeply in China-India relationship as China has not carried out any mid-course corrections in its policy formulations on India.

China’s “Strategic Distrust” of India incorporates India’s strategic partnerships with United States, Japan and India’s Look East Policy. More significantly Tibet hovers ominously over China-India relations.

The Tibetan Plateau under Chinese military occupation is highly militarised and threatening to Indian security. Associated with this are the water issues of rivers originating from the Tibetan Plateau.

China unabatedly continues with its strategy of creating/adding strategic pressure points against India in multiple comprehensive thrusts especially in the Indian Sub-Continent and its peripheries.

China has signed multiple Border Defence and Border Tranquillity Agreements with India without honouring each one of them and in the process multiplying the “Strategic Distrust” with India.

China in view of the foregoing, therefore, cannot be expected to ‘stand by India’ in any form. The reality is that China consistently adopts and stands against India and Indian national security interests.

China is a major neighbour of India and emerging as a powerful Asian power. Good relations would be welcome but not appeasement of China as India practised in the preceding ten years.

Recommended in one of my earlier Papers is that with India’s adversarial neighbours India needs to adopt the policy of “Congagement”. India’s containment of Chinese aggressive moves is India’ national security imperative and engagement with China needing to run in tandem is a diplomatic necessity that needs to be pursued.

China’s ongoing political outreach to the new Modi Government has been prompted by the creeping strategic isolation that China currently perceives as a result of its over-bearing and aggressive brinkmanship against Japan, Philippines, Vietnam and in the South China Sea and in the East China Sea.

As an emerging power, East Asia and South East Asia are critical regions significant for India’s diplomacy and national security interests. India therefore should not succumb to forsake these regions in the interests of any forward movement in China-India relations.

China’s attempts at regional domination as outlined above is only part of the overall picture whose strategic objective is to challenge the decades old United States domination in the Indo Pacific and what is ongoing is China’s concerted efforts to do just that. This aspect also throws up a challenge to India whether it is ready to jettison its decade-old US-India Strategic Partnership, presently jaded, in preference for forward movement in China-India relations.

The Chinese Foreign Minister is in New Delhi as Special Envoy of the Chinese President to “Establish contact with the new Government in India” and nothing more needs to be read into it by the Indian media and the Indian strategic community.

Indian media and policy analysts’ euphoria and raised expectations that this is a ‘new beginning’ and that ‘new momentum’ would be added to forward movement of India-China relations is not supported nor substantiated by prevailing strategic realities or China’s military actions on India’s Northern border with Tibet.

There can be no ‘new beginnings’ in China-India relations as “Strategic Distrust” existing pre-determines that the threads have to be picked up and resumed from the continuum that pervades.

Chinese Foreign Minister’s ongoing visit to India is pure and simple business visit to India and is nothing more than a probing visit to gain first hand exposure to the Modi Government and in the course of his meetings/calls with the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and the National Security Adviser discern for the Chinese President where India is headed n its foreign policy formulations under the new Prime Minister noted for his boldness.

China is currently making lot of advocacy to celebrate the 60th Anniversary of the signing of the Panchsheel Agreement in a high-voltage manner and wants India to join-in substantially likewise.

India needs to avoid this Chinese trap as in Indian perceptions the Panchsheel Agreement was then Indian PM Nehru’s’ Himalayan blunder of placing implicit trust in China’s pledges. The Panchsheel Agreement exemplifies China’s extreme perfidy with India and is now a worthless scrap of paper best consigned to the dustbin of history.

Concluding, India under the bold and decisive leadership of PM Modi would stand connected with India-at-large, unlike the preceding Government’s record of ten years which devised policy formulations on China and Pakistan without reference to Indian public opinion. India expects that while no jingoism would be advisable but at the same time no appeasement of China is also warranted.

India’s ‘China Policy ‘concrete formulations’ should await after Prime Minister Modi has finished his interactions with major powers and more pointedly with other Asian nations on China’s periphery. Then only a realistic and viable template would be available to Prime Minister Modi to formulate a long range strategy India’s ‘China Policy’.