By JACOB HEILBRUNN
In his efforts to save Iraq, President Obama is right to demand more power-sharing and other political reforms from Iraqi leaders before the United States offers more military assistance. But Obama should not think he can hold off offering such assistance until he secures those reforms—not if he wants to prevent the bloody breakup of the country and a wider regional war. As sensible as a conditional approach seems, the president simply doesn’t have that option open to him.
That’s because Obama doesn’t have the time. The crisis created by the Sunni terrorist group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL, continues unabated, and Iraq is now on the verge of full-blown civil war. Over the weekend, ISIL seized several more towns in the western, Sunni-dominated province of Anbar, including border crossings that will allow the militants to bring in more fighters and weapons from Syria and possibly Jordan. Meanwhile thousands of Shia fighters loyal to renegade cleric Moqtada al-Sadr began mobilizing in parts of Baghdad. The president himself, in an interview with CBS, warned that ISIL was “destabilizing the country” in a growing state of chaos “that could spill over into some of our allies like Jordan.”
As a result, the Obama administration faces a difficult conundrum—one that presents the president with only two very poor policy approaches. Obama can either pursue an incremental, conditional approach that will satisfy his desire to put maximum pressure on Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and minimize America’s return to Iraq—but will likely fail to address the severity of the crisis. Or Obama can set aside his understandable caution and provide more robust military assistance before he can be confident of getting the political changes that are needed to turn any Iraqi government military gains into strategic successes.
Obama was wise to send 300 U.S. military advisers to Iraq, and he is correct to think that, without political changes, the Iraqi state will struggle to overcome its current security challenges given that it will be unable to win the support of either the Sunnis or the Kurds. But the political outcome that will bring all Iraqis back into a power-sharing government has become much more complicated just in the last week.
And every moment that the president waits, the more complicated it becomes as new realities consolidate on the ground.
As ISIL advances, it is benefiting from the support of other Sunni groups alienated from the Iraqi government, and it is amassing huge caches of money—as much as $2 billion, by one newspaper’s account. With considerable resources at its disposal and some element of public acquiescence, ISIL may prove more sophisticated than al Qaeda in Iraq and provide services and governance, further consolidating its hold on Iraqi territory.
The Kurds, meanwhile, have gained control of disputed areas they have long sought to incorporate into the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and see as critical to an independent state; they are not going to relinquish these grounds nor once again pledge to be part of Iraq without fundamental changes to the political compact. They will likely push for a confederation on the basis of new internal borders as a condition for staying inside Iraq. They may ultimately be willing to settle for less, but will not be willing to return to the pre-ISIS political arrangements. Kurdish leverage is further heightened by the reality that enlisting Kurdish forces, known as the peshmerga, into the fight is one of a small number of factors that could help produce a decisive shift on the battlefield.
By ELLIOTT ABRAMS
Sunni political groups will also be reluctant to settle for a return to the post-2003 political status quo. It was too open to abuse and allowed one person, the prime minister, to consolidate power and alienate Sunnis and other groups. The Sunnis are likely to desire further delegation of Baghdad’s powers to the provinces, term limits on any prime minister’s tenure, and a more even distribution of power between the country’s top officials and institutions, including the presidency and parliament.
And then there is the huge challenge of easing Maliki from the political scene. Although Maliki played a critical and positive role for Iraq when its territorial integrity was threatened in 2006 and 2007, the Iraqi political elite, most of the region, and the United States no longer have any confidence that Iraq can stabilize under his leadership. The politicization of the military which contributed to the collapse of dozens of battalions, is only one demonstration of how Iraq’s institutions have suffered on his watch.
Bringing forward alternative leadership, however, will be difficult. U.S. military assistance, agreement from Iran on the need for Maliki to retire, a possible American shift toward the KRG over Baghdad and quiet pressure from Iraq’s Shia clerical establishment could provide some leverage over Maliki. But incentives will also be needed: Maliki should be offered assurances from Iraqi leaders and, if necessary, regional actors, that he will be respected in a post-Maliki Iraq and will not be subject to prosecution or intimidation.
Getting to such a political agreement may no longer be possible. But if it is—and it must be tried—it will take time and the concerted action and attention of Iraqi, American and regional leaders.
The question is how Obama should sequence his policy now. If he holds off on providing more military assistance while he waits for the Iraqis to negotiate such a political compact, the centrifugal forces that are already tearing Iraq apart will gain in strength. If on the other hand, Obama provides military assistance without fundamental political reform, he may only strengthen Maliki and reinforce a dangerous perception that the United States is siding with Shia over Sunni in a sectarian battle that has regional proportions.
Certainly, the incremental option will appear to many as the preferred one—and the easier road to choose. Considering what Maliki’s government has already done to alienate the Sunnis and Kurds, it’s hard to challenge the logic that political reform is needed for military gains to be meaningful. Moreover, the slower option allows Washington to place failure squarely on the shoulders of Iraqi leaders by pointing out their political failings. This cautious approach would also not require rejecting and recasting any of the assumptions that have underpinned Obama’s strategy toward the Middle East. Two of those most fundamental assumptions are that 1) U.S. intervention in the region rarely affects the trajectory of the Middle East and 2) leaving Iraqis (and others) to be responsible for the situations they create provides a major incentive for them to do the “right” thing.
Nevertheless, President Obama and his team should opt for the more difficult path and decide to supply more military assistance without waiting to see political reforms fully enacted. Waiting for fundamental political change before committing more military assistance is, in fact, a non-choice that only threatens regional stability and U.S. interests. Past experience suggests that, without further U.S. involvement, the Iraqis will be unable to craft the sort of political compact needed to rejuvenate the idea and the reality of a united Iraq—and the Kurds will continue to move toward de facto or de jure independence. And without sending greater military support, the United States will likely find it difficult to exert the sort of leverage it needs over Maliki—or to convince the Kurds to put their military might behind Iraq, rather than hold it in reserve for their own purposes down the road. Washington also will be unable to make the case to the Iraqi government that it need not rely on Iranian military support, and U.S. officials will struggle to counter Iran at the negotiating table.
Obama can mitigate the risks associated with providing greater military assistance before political reforms are complete. The formation of a transitional government including Maliki may be achievable in a short time frame, and would be a strong indication of political change to come. The United States might also consider coupling action in Iraq with more visible action to support Sunni moderates in Syria; not only would this put further pressure on ISIL, but it would help dilute the impression that America is intervening on the Shia’s behalf.
If Obama takes the more cautious, conditional approach, the most likely scenario is that Iraq will both fragment and become engulfed in prolonged sectarian violence that brings regional actors fully into the fray. The space in Syria in which ISIL can operate will be augmented by the large tracks of land in western and northern Iraq they already control, and the energy resources located in those boundaries. ISIL might consolidate its control and provide a form of governance to these areas—or these territories will remain largely ungoverned; either outcome can pose serious threats to the region and the world.
But if the president finds the prospects of a regional war more manageable than providing military assistance without the extensive political Iraqi reforms he understandably desires, changes in U.S. strategy will still be needed. In particular, the United States will need begin positioning itself and its friends in the region for the fragmentation of Iraq and, most likely, other states in the region. This too will require hard choices and the testing and possible rejection of past policy assumptions. Either way, the task before the Obama administration is difficult, the stakes are extremely high and time is running out.
Meghan L. O’Sullivan is the Jeane Kirkpatrick professor of the practice of international affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy School. She was deputy national security adviser for Iraq and Afghanistan from 2005-2007.
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