Ambiguity on China's 'no-first-use' policy
G. Parthasarathy
ON July 8, 1996, the World Court ruled that countries possessing nuclear weapons have not just a “need” but an “obligation” to commence negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament. Nearly two decades later, the ruling of the World Court remains an ever-receding mirage. Even today, a quarter of a century after the Cold War ended, the US deploys an estimated 150-200 tactical nuclear weapons in NATO allies -- Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Germany and Turkey. The US has held the position that it would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons for its security and to protect its NATO allies. The 1999 NATO Doctrine retained the option to use nuclear weapons against states for merely possessing chemical or biological weapons, even if they had signed the NPT. While the Soviet Union had declared that it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons, the Russian Federation adopted a “first-strike” doctrine in 1993, which was subsequently reaffirmed.
The Bush Administration was prepared to use nuclear weapons even against non-nuclear weapon states in regional conflicts. The 2002 Nuclear Policy Review called on the Pentagon to draft contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons against Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, Libya and Syria. In contrast, the 2010 review by the Obama Administration avers the US will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are signatories to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. It notes: “It is in the US interest and that of all other nations that the nearly 65 year record of nuclear non-use be extended forever”. India should move to get universal support for this reference of getting the “record of non-use extended forever”.
China adopted a “no-first-use” (NFU) policy in 1964, stating it would “not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances”. It reiterated this policy in 2005, 2008, 2009, and in 2011. But, some Chinese statements have cast doubts on whether their NFU pledge would apply to states like India possessing nuclear weapons which have not acceded to the NPT.
The Pentagon has noted that “there is some ambiguity on the conditions under which China’s NFU would apply”. China has offered to sign agreements on “no first use” of nuclear weapons with the other five NPT “recognised” nuclear weapon states. It signed such an agreement with Russia and concluded a “non-targeting” agreement with the Clinton Administration, immediately after our nuclear tests. New Delhi should seek and obtain a formal confirmation from China that their NFU pledge applies to India.
While Pakistan has not formally enunciated a nuclear doctrine, the former head of the Strategic Planning Division of its Nuclear Command Authority, Lieut-Gen Khalid Kidwai, told a team of physicists from Italy's Landau Network in 2002 that Pakistan's nuclear weapons were “aimed solely at India”. Kidwai added that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if India conquered a large part of Pakistan’s territory, or destroyed a large part of Pakistan’s land and air forces. Kidwai also held out the possibility of use of nuclear weapons, if India tried to “economically strangle” Pakistan, or pushed it to political destabilisation. This elucidation, by the man who was the de facto custodian of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal for over a decade and a POW in India in 1971-1973, was a precise formulation of Pakistan’s nuclear thresholds. It now appears that Pakistan’s military wants to also keep open the option of mounting further Mumbai-style terrorist attacks, by threatening to lower its nuclear threshold by the use of tactical nuclear weapons. India has no intention of either destroying Pakistan's armed forces, or conquering its territory. Pakistan cannot, however, forever assume, it would be free from an appropriate Indian response, to 26/11 style terrorist attacks.
The threats by Pakistan to use tactical nuclear weapons in a conflict against India arise for two reasons. First, Pakistan wants to warn India and the world that it will respond with tactical nuclear weapons if Indian forces cross the border following yet another 26/11 style terrorist attack. This is a crude resort to nuclear blackmail, to enable Pakistan to perpetuate cross-border terrorism.
Secondly, there is a cold calculation in this thinking. The Indian Nuclear Doctrine is premised on nuclear restraint. India has pledged “no first use” of nuclear weapons, while voicing a commitment to developing a “credible minimum deterrent” comprising a triad of land-based, air-launched and sea-based missiles. Realistically, India's nuclear deterrent will be credible only after the Agni 5 missile and the nuclear submarine Arihant become fully operational.
India’s doctrine also contains provisions of a massive response should Indian territory or Indian armed forces anywhere be subjected to attacks by nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Pakistan evidently believes, or purports to believe, that if it uses tactical nuclear weapons against concentrations of Indian forces attacking or poised for attacking it, India will not risk a massive retaliation, as this would lead to a full-fledged nuclear conflict and mutually assured destruction. Pakistan appears to have lobbied globally seeking understanding of this rationale.
In these circumstances, we need to review how we should signal to Pakistan and the world that we have the capability and willingness to inflict escalating and devastating damage on Pakistan's military if it chooses to be stupid enough to resort to the use of tactical nuclear weapons against our forces. General Kidwai has clearly spelt out Pakistan's thresholds. India really has no reason to cross these thresholds, while responding to a 26/11 type of terrorist strike emanating from territory under Pakistan's control. Thanks to liberal assistance from China, Pakistan has developed the capability to build a large arsenal of plutonium-based weapons — both strategic and tactical. This was not the case when our nuclear doctrine was formulated. There is, however, no need to change our basic commitment to “no first use” of nuclear weapons Uncertainties about our intentions, thresholds and policies, could lead to others seeking to resort to a pre-emptive first strike, with disastrous consequences.
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