Hindustan Aeronautics Limited has not been able to meet the IAF’s requirements. Its lack of initiative and flip-flop over the modalities for producing a new generation trainer aircraft indigenously left the Air Force without a basic trainer for some time, forcing the IAF to look elsewhere
Air Marshal Dhiraj Kukreja (Retd)
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20140508/edit.htm
Marshal of the Air Force, Arjan Singh, reviews a combined graduation parade of flight cadets at the Air Force Academy, Dundigal. IAF flying training has often suffered because of the lack of suitable aircraft for different stages
A controversy stirred by a recent article on the Air Force being at war with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and wanting to import rather than build an indigenous a trainer, was discussed in the print and visual media for a few days, but seems to have lost the public interest. The pot, however, has been kept boiling through some well-timed 'plants'. During this writer's two tenures, one as Commandant, Air Force Academy (AFA) and the subsequently as Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief (AOC-in-C), Training Command, the writer had an experience of the aircraft in question — HAL built basic trainer aircraft, HPT—32. Hence, it was felt necessary to set the record right, even though it may mean plunging headlong in to an ongoing controversy.
The genesis lies in the repeated engine failures, many of them fatal, on the HPT—32, and HAL's failure to resolve the cause and provide a lasting solution. Since its induction in 1988, there have been more than 120 engine failures resulting in 13 accidents, killing 19 experienced and a few under-training pilots. That the number of fatalities is low speaks highly of the professionalism of the Indian Air Force. A fatal accident that killed two experienced instructors at the AFA in May 2009, led to a decision that enough was enough and to stop flying the aircraft — ground the aircraft in a flier's parlance — even though it meant that the IAF would be without a basic trainer for some time to come. The lack of a basic trainer aircraft created a crisis-situation, but it goes to the credit of the entire training and maintenance branches of the air force to have risen to the occasion and overcome it. Air Headquarters rendered Training Command and the basic training was transferred to the HJT—16 Kiran aircraft, even though this particular type was also on its last legs. This also entailed the closure of the much popular Surya Kiran aerobatic team, as training had to be given the due priority.
Simultaneously, the critical void thus created was recognised by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and approval was granted in September 2009 to acquire 181 basic trainer aircraft, of which 75 were to be from the global market and the balance 106 to be supplied by HAL through indigenous production. To give the devil its due, it is pertinent to mention that HAL, on its own, had suggested a replacement for the HPT—32 as far back as October 2003. The proposal, however, did not suggest any major upgradation of technology. In addition, the residual life of a decade plus of the HPT—32 aircraft would have seen the IAF through, before a new aircraft would be required. The proposal, therefore, was considered premature.
HAL took no initiative thereafter. Considering the long gestation period in aviation acquisitions, it was Air HQs that finally submitted fresh requirements and held meetings with HAL from 2007 onwards. After a series of meetings, in March 2009, the Preliminary Staff Qualitative Requirements (PSQR 06/09) were finalised and ratified by the appropriate departments at Air HQs and the MoD. The finalised PSQR was then forwarded to HAL for it to study and submit a Detailed Project Report (DPR). While awaiting the DPR, Air HQs, in May 2009, circulated a proposal for procurement of 181 aircraft as 'Make' by HAL. The nomenclature of the aircraft was HTT—40, being the one being developed by HAL as per the given PSQRs. The aircraft was to be totally indigenous as it has always been the endeavour of the IAF to encourage the local aerospace industry. Meanwhile, engine failures on the HPT—32 aircraft were occurring with worrying regularity and the entire fleet was finally grounded in that very month itself.
Considering the new urgency created by the lack of a basic trainer aircraft, Air HQs proposed a change from 'Make' by HAL, to 'Buy' globally the initial critical numbers, while the balance order still remained with HAL. Air HQs also approved the proposal that the PSQRs be maintained for the HAL HTT—40, and a fresh Air Staff Qualitative Requirement (ASQR) be issued for 'Buy' (Global) after receiving the responses to the Request for Information (RFI). The appropriate departments ratified the fresh ASQR and a case for the procurement of 90 aircraft was processed, with the balance 90 to be made by HAL as a separate proposal. The project for HTT—40 was still not cancelled. The Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), chaired by the Raksha Mantri, reduced the initial acquisition to 75. The Council, however, added a clause to its decision that should HAL not fly the first aircraft (HTT—40) by the time the first aircraft of 'Buy (Global) type' arrives, then the option clause would be invoked and the numbers to be made by HAL would be reviewed. The PSQRs for the HTT—40, were later realigned with the ASQR for the new aircraft and issued to HAL in December 2009. HAL, with the issue of its first project report, confirmed its acceptance in September 2010.
The Ministry of Defence accorded its approval to the project report in June 2011 and at the same time instructed HAL to process a case for the sanction of funds. HAL, for whatever reasons, chose to submit a revised project report in January 2012 with an enhancement of costs. This obviously was not acceptable to the MoD. The revised report was referred back to HAL, which then resubmitted it in May 2012 with reduced costs.
It was now that Air HQs, on review of the revised project report as submitted by HAL, recommended foreclosure of the HTT—40 project. It also added that should HAL be interested in obtaining the technology from Pilatus, the Swiss manufacturer whose trainer aircraft had been selected in the ensuing period, IAF would consider the balance numbers to be procured from HAL rather than from the original manufacturer.
All actions as stipulated in the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) had been followed under close scrutiny of the MoD. Any deviation in the ASQR, as has been alleged in some media reports, would have been immediately detected and the project would not have been cleared by the Ministry. That the project cost, as submitted by HAL, was high and rejected by the Ministry, and subsequently reduced to within acceptable limits, has been conveniently missed out by the media. Having been at the receiving end of HAL's poor production and maintenance record and sheer ineptness and clumsiness, at times it so seems that the case has been projected at the behest of HAL to shroud its poor performance record. The thinking of HAL has always been that it has a 'captive customer' in the IAF and the aviation arms of the other two Services and hence, could not be bothered much about competitive costs and quality. The hype of the Air Force not encouraging indigenisation is just that — hype. About 60 per cent of the components, including the engine, were to be imported for the HAL product.
The Air Force has often been at the receiving end for not encouraging indigenisation. Till date, anything and everything associated with aviation in India, more so defence aviation, had the HAL stamp on it. The reader needs to be apprised that maintaining a war machine of varied technology and origin is not an easy task. The maintenance branch of the Air Force, however, has always been encouraging small and medium enterprises to produce equipment for ensuring serviceability of the varied inventory, which otherwise is a nightmare and at the total mercy of the original manufacturers. Suffice to say, that the industry has responded and shown that it has the capability and desire, notwithstanding the high standards that are demanded in the realm of aviation and aerospace.
HAL, by its own admission, has developed more that 2,000 tier—3 suppliers, but not any in the tier—1 or tier—2 categories. It has about 30-licence produced and a few indigenous aircraft to its credit. Nonetheless, it has not been able to meet the requirements of the IAF or why else would the Air Force go shopping abroad.
The reputation of HAL is now at stake because the IAF, with the nod of the MoD, is wanting to break away from the stranglehold of the HAL. It has not issued a request for proposal for the replacement of the Avro aircraft, which the 'holier than thou' HAL has considered as a slight. (A project since then stalled by MoD allegedly at the behest of an outgoing Minister).
HAL can still hope to salvage its battered reputation if it progresses well on the jet trainer and other projects, and delivers them as per stated schedule and costs. In aviation, initial teething problems of any new product are always present. Even the US-built Boeing 787 Dreamliner has had its fair share of initial problems. The IAF, being the professional force that it is, well understands it. This time, however, the IAF has put its foot down and will not be taken for granted anymore. HAL, for its own good should recognise the fact before it slowly but surely looses out to the private sector.
The writer is a former Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Training Command and had been closely associated with HAL and its trainer aircraft
Turbulent Flight
MoD approved buying basic trainers from the global market to fill the critical void created by grounding the HPT--32
HAL had suggested a replacement for the HPT--32 in 2003, but did not include upgradation of technology. Also, considering HPT--32’s residual life, the proposal was considered premature
In 2009, IAF takes up case with HAL to develop a new trainer, HTT--40, but project review finds it expensive
In view of the critical situation, IAF issued fresh requirements to procure trainers from the global market
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