Critics have condemned Nehru for failing to heed Patel’s advice. It has been alleged that he failed to perceive the new security challenges across the Himalayas and that the origins of the 1962 debacle lie in the blunders committed by Nehru in 1950. A dispassionate examination of the facts does not substantiate these charges
Chandrashekhar Dasgupta
FEW historical documents have generated as many myths as Sardar Patel’s famous letter to Jawaharlal Nehru on the Chinese threat. On November 7, 1950, Patel drew the Prime Minister’s attention to the implications of the PLA’s entry into Tibet. He warned that “for the first time, after centuries, India’s defence has to concentrate itself on two fronts simultaneously.” Patel called for a comprehensive policy response covering both border security and foreign policy. This included a military and intelligence assessment of the Chinese threat; re-deployment of Indian forces to guard access routes and “areas that are likely to be the subject of disputes”; improvement of communications in border areas; and an appraisal of required force levels and long-term defence needs.
Nehru, Gandhi and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel at the All-India Congress Committee meeting, Bombay, 1946.
Review of India’s advocacy
Turning to foreign policy, he proposed a review of India’s advocacy of Beijing’s entry into the United Nations in light of developments in Tibet and Korea. He concluded with the terse comment that “it is possible that a consideration of these matters may lead us into (the) wider question of our relationship with China, Russia, America, Britain and Burma”, hinting that his reservations regarding Nehru’s foreign policy were not confined narrowly to China but extended to wider questions of relations with the major power blocs.
Critics have condemned Nehru for failing to heed Patel’s advice. It has been alleged that he failed to perceive the new security challenges across the Himalayas and that the origins of the 1962 debacle lie in the blunders committed by Nehru in 1950.
A dispassionate examination of the facts does not substantiate these charges. It is not true that the prime minister failed to anticipate the PLA’s entry into Tibet and the resulting security challenges. More than a year before the event, Nehru wrote to finance minister John Mathai, alerting him that “recent developments in China and Tibet indicate that Chinese Communists are likely to invade Tibet sometime or other…it may well take place within a year…it seems to me essential from every point of view that these areas should have good communications.” Nehru asked the finance minister to provide funds for this purpose to the extent possible. It is another matter that actual implementation was – and continues to be – tardy. Nehru bears no greater responsibility for this failure than any of his successors.
Widely held belief disproved
Facts also disprove the widely held belief that Nehru failed to act on Patel’s proposals to strengthen border security. In fact, action was taken on these proposals with great speed. Within a week, the government set up the Himmatsinghji Committee to recommend measures for improving administration, defence and communications in the frontier areas. Another committee was tasked to examine locations for new Assam Rifles posts. Orders were issued to strengthen border check posts and equip these with wireless communications. Urgent steps were taken to extend administrative control in the North-East and in less than three months a firm presence was established in Tawang. There was no disagreement between the two leaders on these issues.
Their disagreement lay elsewhere – on defence priorities and on basic foreign policy issues. On November 19, Nehru circulated a note to his cabinet colleagues explaining his views on Tibet and defence priorities. Without directly referring to Patel’s letter, Nehru contested the view that India must concentrate on “two fronts simultaneously” and that the Army should be redeployed accordingly. He concurred on the need to take all necessary measures to prevent Chinese infiltration and occupation of areas across the McMahon line but pointed out that “our major possible enemy is Pakistan…If we begin to think and prepare for China’s aggression in the same way, we would weaken considerably on the Pakistan side… spreading out of our armies in distant frontiers would be bad from every military or strategic point of view.” Nehru did not ignore the China problem. He only called for establishing clear priorities at a time when, “at least for some years”, India could not afford to bear the financial burden of a full-fledged two-front strategy.
Fundamental differences
Nehru and Patel had fundamental differences on foreign policy. These arose from diverging assessments of the threat posed by international communism in the wake of the Telangana uprising. Unlike Nehru, Patel viewed the Communist powers as a permanently monolithic and expansionist bloc. This was evident in his attitude to China even before its takeover of Tibet. In 1949, he was in favour of delaying recognition of the new Communist regime in Beijing. After the Chinese moved into Tibet, Patel felt that India had “let down” the Tibetans but, as a realist, he did not propose military intervention.
Going beyond Patel’s position, some of Nehru’s present-day critics blame him for failing to physically intervene in support of the Tibetans. No responsible Indian leader advocated military intervention in 1950. In the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, General (later Field Marshal) Cariappa, the Indian Army could at most spare a battalion for Tibet and even this modest force could proceed no further than Yatung. Nehru’s position combined principle with realism. “We cannot save Tibet as we would have liked to do and our very attempt to save it might well bring greater trouble to it”, he explained in his note of November 19. He knew that China would react to foreign interference in Tibet with a stronger military occupation and by further degrading Tibet’s autonomy.
When the Korean War broke out in June 1950, India supported a UN resolution condemning communist North Korea as an aggressor but abstained on a second US-sponsored resolution recommending assistance to South Korea to repel the aggressor. India later explained its position in a statement accepting the recommendation, while reiterating India’s policy of staying aloof from the East-West confrontation. Patel was not pleased with the statement. “I feel we need not have reiterated our foreign policy. Such reiteration implies that this step could be construed as a departure from that policy and we are being apologetic or defensive about it”, he complained to Nehru. Patel was supported by K.M. Munshi, who complained, “U.S.S.R. never has been a friend of India and never will be. Why should we lose the goodwill of friends without whom we cannot face Russian expansion? If they fall, we go under.”
Patel’s letter
As we noted earlier, Patel’s famous letter of November 1950 concluded with the enigmatic comment that consideration of the issues he had raised “may lead us to (the) wider question of our relationship with China, Russia, America, Britain and Burma”. Was he seeking a fundamental review of India’s foreign policy? Patel did not spell out his views in his letters or speeches but his stand on early recognition of the Beijing regime and the Korean War provide important clues to his thinking.
A declassified American document appears to provide another important clue. On November 10, 1950 — just three days after Patel’s letter — Ambassador Henderson informed Washington, “Patel has been stating privately that within next few days he will insist in cabinet meeting that India not only change policy in direction of closer cooperation with western powers, particularly US, but that it make announcement to that effect… Patel and others advocating change in India’s policies are arguing that India must strengthen its military establishment if it is effectively to face its Communist neighbor, and that it cannot properly strengthen its military establishment without aid from US unless it makes clear before (the) whole world that it stands with (the) West against aggressiveness of international Communism”.
Opposition to Nehru
Patel was, of course, the last person to contemplate any compromise of India’s strategic autonomy but he was convinced that it was in India’s own national interest to join hands with the western powers in confronting the Communist bloc in Asia. Nor was he alone in the cabinet in opposing Nehru’s foreign policy. Rajaji and Munshi, too, voiced their criticism in cabinet meetings. We learn from the diary of Patel’s daughter, Maniben, that he expected support from Baldev Singh, Jagjivan Ram and Sri Prakasa, in addition to Rajaji and Munshi, in the event of a showdown in cabinet with Nehru’s China policy.
In the event, there was no showdown. The Deputy Prime Minister was terminally ill and his health deteriorated rapidly even as he prepared to join battle. He was unable to attend the cabinet meeting on November 21, in which Tibet policy came up for discussion. The Sardar breathed his last on December 15. None of the other Indian leaders had sufficient stature to mount a serious challenge to Nehru’s foreign policy.
Thus, in November 1950, India briefly found itself at a crossroad in foreign and defence policy. Sardar Patel headed a group of ministers who sought a major policy revision involving close cooperation with the Western powers in Asia in confronting the Communist bloc. We need not go into the semantic question of whether such a policy would have amounted to a departure from non-alignment; the answer to that question depends on how we define non-alignment. It is important to note, however, that Patel’s policy prescription would inevitably have made India a frontline state in the Cold War in Asia.
Panchsheel treaty
Jawaharlal Nehru believed in a moral approach to international politics. He was an exponent of a peaceful approach and devoted to techniques of negotiation and co-operative understanding. Nehru had been an exponent of panchasheel or the five cardinal tenets of international amity and concord. In June 1954, the fundamental concepts of pancha sila were laid down in the course of a joint declaration by Nehru and Chou-en-Lai. They are:
* Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty:
* Non-aggression
* Non interference in each other’s internal affarirs
* Equality and mutual advantage and
* Peaceful co-existence and economic cooperation.
These principles were meant to enhance the sense of security, trust and confidence.
Chinese checkers
* India’s relations with China until 1960-62 rested on an age-long friendship and contact. The contact developed in the form of Chinese pilgrims coming to India from 221 B.C. to about 10th c. A.D. Diplomatic as well as commercial relations prevailed through the coast of Arakan and to the Pagan.
* The sea routes were also significant for maritime trade between China and India. These routes became points of numerous contacts — religious, trade, diplomatic and cultural. Buddhism was ardently followed in India. Trade contacts between regions of the Far-East and South India developed amicably during the early Christian centuries.
* The Government of India in 1947 inherited certain extra-territorial rights in Tibet. Delhi now expressed concern to Peking over the unsettled Sino-Tibetan relations that were to be adjusted through peaceful negotiations in 1950.
* Even when the Chinese troops entered Tibet on October 1950, Delhi followed a policy characterised by forbearance and patient negotiations. Thereafter, even in the UN General Assembly India supported the cause of China in the Korean War and condemned US aggression of Indo-China.
* The attempt to cross into Barahoti by the Chinese troops was also protested by India. But on July 26, 1956, Peking for the first time claimed that Barahoti was Chinese territory and denied that Tunjun La was a border pass.
* Towards the end of November, Chou-en-Lai paid a visit to India. Nehru and Chou discussed the border question in their meeting and Chou assured his Indian counterpart that the Tibet border dispute would be solved through negotiations. The border with Burma was also recognised.
* On July 28, 1955, China occupied the Barahoti area in south of Ladakh and in September they had intruded 10 miles inside India’s territory. Gradually, they crossed the Shipki pass into India.
* In April 1958, talks were held on the question of Barahoti. While China agreed to withdraw military personnel their civilian personnel continued to stay in the area. In April 1960, the talks between Chou-en-Lai Nehru ended in failure amidst violations on the border as well as air space of India.
* The relations of China and India were further strained on the question of giving asylum to Dalai Lama. Right from 1959, owing to large-scale demolition of Buddhist monasteries and confiscation of lands, the Chinese had caused discontent among the Tibetans. In the revolt of the Tibetans, certain insurgents together with Dalai Lama fled in the direction of India.
* By October 10, 1962 a massive Chinese attack was launched on Indian posts and the next day the Chinese captured the Thagla Ridge, the traditional Indo-Tibetan border. The Chinese refused to recognise the McMahon line or the accepted eastern border.
* It took a lot of deliberations before cease-fire was declared and the Chinese agreed to withdraw to the line as it was on September 8, 1962 .
The author is a former ambassador.
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