By IPCS
By Ruhee Neog
Since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) released its election manifesto that promises to “study in detail India’s nuclear doctrine, and revise and update it, to make it relevant to challenges of current times,” and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s statement about a global no first use (NFU) policy, there has much speculation on the subject.
The nuclear programme mandate that the BJP has delineated for itself, should it come to power in 2014, pins itself on the changing security scenario in South Asia. With Pakistan’s increasing nuclear stockpile and emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons (TNW), a retaliatory Indian nuclear posture is considered insufficient. The most significant of the implied revisions is to its NFU pledge, which is considered the bedrock of India’s declaratory policy as couched in its nuclear doctrine. It must be noted however that despite assumptions to the contrary, India’s NFU is not absolute.
An Absolute NFU or Flexibility of Response?
It has been argued that India’s own 2003 statement makes its NFU pledge ambiguous. It states, “However, in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons.” There are two concerns here: one, what defines ‘major’? Two, a literal interpretation of the statement means that India’s first response via nuclear means will also be directed against chemical and/or biological attacks – technically, this is in fact nuclear first use. That this may be a deliberate attempt to dilute the official stand on NFU only stands to strengthen the notion that the NFU is not meant to be unqualified, and flexibility of response was preferred but not signalled. However, this also questions the credibility of India’s NFU by the audiences for whom the doctrine is intended, which could have dangerous implications for nuclear postures and arsenals.
Accidental Nuclear Escalation
While India’s nuclear policy has the country’s civilian leadership at the top of the command and control structure, in the event of a crisis, conventional forces may prompt inadvertent escalation. As Vipin Narang writes, this may be by targeting the adversary without knowing (or caring to know) whether these targets are conventional or nuclear, and without prior political authorisation. Such an action will of course have huge implications: through the use of its own conventional abilities against a nuclear-armed adversary, India could trigger nuclear first use – either by putting the adversary in a ‘use-it-or-lose it’ situation or by causing an unintended ‘nuclear detonation’.
Election Posturing?
The draft Indian nuclear doctrine was promulgated in 1999 and the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) released a press statement in 2003. Significantly, the draft doctrine and the press release were both undertaken while the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government was in power. The sudden mention of India’s weapons programme – which is rarely discussed in public – at this critical time, can be read most importantly as posturing for elections. The BJP has sought to re-claim ownership of the doctrine and rebuke the Congress for having ‘frittered away’ the ‘strategic gains’ made under Prime Minster Atal Behari Vajpayee’s leadership. Manmohan Singh’s statement therefore seems to be an attempt at responsible nuclear pledge-making in the run-up to the elections.
It must also be noted however that that the BJP had made similar promises in its election manifesto of 1998, which it delivered upon. Interestingly, although the election manifesto offers a blanket doctrinal review, with no mention of the NFU, analysts have been quick to specifically argue the merits and de-merits of the NFU. If the BJP wins the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, it may keep to its word and undertake a review of the nuclear doctrine. There have long been calls for a US Nuclear Posture Review style exercise in India by security analysts to review and update the doctrine in response to the dynamism of the regional security environment. This would therefore be a very welcome move, given the increasingly complex security scenario, which includes the presence of tactical nuclear weapons (Pakistan’s Hatf-9), concomitant command and control issues, non-state actors (not sponsored by the State establishment), sub-state actors (sponsored by the State establishment).
Even if there is a review or revision of the Indian nuclear doctrine, the NFU itself is unlikely to change, seeing as its current form serves the purpose of ‘calculated ambiguity’ rather well – although it is unclear whether this ambiguity is calculated or accidental. It remains to be seen whether the associated dangers (of a flexible response) are given equal consideration in the event of a review.
Ruhee Neog
Senior Research Officer, NSP, IPCS
Email: ruhee.neog@ipcs.org
About the author: IPCS
IPCS (Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies) conducts independent research on conventional and non-conventional security issues in the region and shares its findings with policy makers and the public. It provides a forum for discussion with the strategic community on strategic issues and strives to explore alternatives. Moreover, it works towards building capacity among young scholars for greater refinement of their analyses of South Asian security.
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