01/05/2014
E-Mail- dhruvkatoch@hotmail.com
The call by Maoists to boycott the national elections has not had the desired impact in their strongholds. For the most part, people in the affected areas came out to vote in large numbers despite death threats issued by the Maoists. The strong presence of security forces was perhaps instrumental in ensuring a largely peaceful poll, though Maoists resorted to the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to cause casualties and create fear and mayhem. In this, they have been largely unsuccessful, despite the fact that over a score of people have been killed and many have been injured in Maoist perpetrated violence during this election season. The Maoists have been active in the Bastar Division of Chhattisgarh, South Western parts of Bihar, some districts in Jharkhand and the Gadchiroli district of Maharashtra. For the most part, they resorted to using IEDs to cause casualties. Their reluctance to engage the security forces in one on one encounters indicates a cautious attitude and a healthy respect for the police forces.
On 11 April, Maoists in Jamui district of Bihar blew up a jeep in which CRPF personnel were travelling killing two and injuring four. Two days earlier, the security forces had successfully recovered eleven bombs planted by Maoists in Gaya and Aurangabad districts of Bihar. A huge haul of explosives was also recovered from the Bastar division of Chhattisgarh. In Gadchiroli, Maoists fired on police parties but no damage was caused. In Jharkhand too, Maoists exploded a series of landmines in the forests of Latehar and exchanged fire with police personnel, but there were no casualties on either side.
Amongst the various attempts by Maoists to disrupt the polls, two incidents stand out and remain a source of concern. On 7 April, three security personnel including a deputy commandant of the CRPF were killed and seven others were injured while attempting to defuse a landmine placed on the Banua-Jharna road near Dhibra in the Aurangabad district of Bihar. The incident took place about 500 yards from the Dhibra police station. Then on 12 April, in two separate incidents in Bastar division, Maoists blew up a bus and an ambulance carrying election security force personnel. In the former blast, seven people died and five were seriously injured. The latter incident resulted in seven fatalities, with four persons suffering serious injuries. An examination of these two incidents is necessary to suggest what needs to be done to minimise casualties to our police personnel.
In the Bastar incident, the IEDs had been buried deep in the ground, when the road was under construction. The Director General Police of the state made a statement to the effect that the explosives were placed about four feet under the ground and they had no mine detectors to identify such objects at that depth. That may be true, but let us assume that metal detection equipment was available at that depth. Would the tragedy have then been averted? The answer unfortunately is in the negative. Let us assume a party was moving with such a device along the road. Now, many small metal objects such as nails or other such material are likely to be found, buried all along the road. Will the security force personnel dig up the road every time they get a beep to indicate that a metal object exists under the ground? If they do so, then the entire road will have to be dug which of course is neither practicable nor feasible. When the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was operating in Sri Lanka, the LTTE too made use of earlier road building activity to bury IEDs at various places along the road. The solution to detecting such IEDs is not metal detectors but good road opening drills. Buried mines require human activation through electric detonation. The terrorists generally complete the connection using a wire of 50 meter or more in length, placed diagonally across the road, a night prior to detonation. The connection is activated through human interface when a vehicle goes over the spot where the IED is buried, to cause the necessary destruction. The counter to such mines is hence to detect the wire through good road opening drills. This is a laborious process, as the road opening party has to walk cross-country parallel to the road on either side. Such movement also will result in the human activator running away, on seeing the approaching security force personnel. Once the area is clear, the road has to be picqueted to ensure that it remains clear.
The second incident which caused heavy casualties occurred when the IED was discovered. Here casualties were caused when the IED was being defused. It would have been appropriate for the police party concerned to have waited for the arrival of trained personal to defuse the IED, but even if they attempted to do so themselves, it is necessary to follow basic drills. The most important drill is to isolate the area and if possible, place a series of sand bags around the IED. Under any circumstances, more than one person must not approach the IED. In the worst-case scenario then, should the IED get accidentally activated, the casualties will be restricted to one only. This is a training aspect. Such basic drills need to be repeatedly emphasised to the personnel who are operating in these areas. Under no circumstance should our personnel crowd around the IED, as this will cause great damage if the explosive detonates.
It is also important to keep areas of operational responsibility under domination, both by day and by night. This will restrict the ability of the Maoists to operate by night and consequently hamper their attempts to place IEDs on our lines of communication. Also, basic drills such as using different routes, avoiding set routine patterns, and maintaining the security of the movement of our troops will help in keeping casualties down to the lowest level. Good leadership is essential to keep the troops alert, as over a period of time boredom sets in and troops tend to get slack. That is the time when casualties occur. The junior level leaders operating in these areas must ensure that laid down drills are adhered to, especially when the area of operation is incident free. Constant vigil, good intelligence building at the ground level, area domination by day and night and following laid down procedures is the only way to win the battle against Maoist terror.
Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch (Retd) is the Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies. Views expressed are personal.
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