May 23, 2014 by Team SAISA
Filed under Analysis
Krantiveer
As US Pakistan relations slide to their nadir since 2001, Pakistan is hedging on a strong China backing to fill the vacuum thus created. It has been promoting China as the alternative benefactor that could deliver badly needed economic and military assistance. As per a Pakistani narrative, “What we hear least about is the tangled weave of national interests that means China courts Pakistan as a proxy for its own competition with India, to the point where Pakistani experts concede that, given a choice between alliance with the US or China, Pakistan’s military will choose China “every day of the week, and twice on Fridays”.
But is China interested?
It is this tentative Chinese approach to Pakistan which may prohibit Pakistan from rupturing its relationship with Washington anymore.
According to Andrew Small of German Marshall Fund, an American Policy Institute, “Pakistan may be taking up the ‘China option’ beyond where the Chinese are willing to go. China, he reckons, will be ‘reluctant to tilt too far towards what might look like an anti India alliance. ‘China, according to him, wants to keep its relations with India’ in reasonable order’.
Both share strategic interests to contain India. To that end, China has a major role in arming Pakistan but China’s real interests lie someplace else – in its competition with US and in East Asia. It is for this reason that it has been slow to resurrect Pakistan’s economy. China Pakistan trade today stands at a paltry US$ 9 Billion with Pakistan’s figure standing at US$ 1 Billion.
China’s compulsions to develop its Western regions have prompted it to look at Pakistan and Afghanistan’s northern areas. As per Foreign Affairs magazine, its aid is based on evaluation of geopolitical, political and economic risks.
Geopolitically, Indian rivalry has prompted China to support Pakistan. Friendly ties also help satisfy its strategic interests of peace in the Xinjiang province, spur economic growth in China’s Western provinces, contain India and preclude the rise of continental rivals. This also offsets ill effects of India’s ‘look east’ policy on China’s interests in East Asia.
As India’s strategic reach expands, a continuing rivalry with Pakistan that preoccupies its diplomacy and pulls its attention back to its own neighbourhood, remains a net positive for Beijing. China’s involvement in Pakistan will closely reflect Beijing’s own priorities and evolving risk assessments.
Strategically, China wants to open the land routes to the Gulf, Iran and Europe through its infrastructural development plans in Gilgit Baltistan and Afghanistan. It has invested in these, including the Aynak copper mines with a rail connectivity. Thirty years down the road, these links could be China’s gateway to the Gulf and Europe through Pakistan and Afghanistan, presenting an altogether different geo strategic picture than that we are used to, today. These cannot fructify in the military led terror oriented foreign policy of Pakistan. This is what makes China wary of investing too heavily in this terror prone area.
Unfortunately, the Pakistani foreign policy narrative is articulated by the military, which focuses on this relationship as being purely strategic. Looking at Chinese behaviour, India too needs to deal with the countries in the neighbourhood more pragmatically.
China Pakistan relations thus need to be studied from their proclivity to be biased towards India. It can be argued whether it should be China and India or China versus India. In the given geopolitical environment hawks would want it to be India versus China. But there is no reason why the two giants cannot grow together. In this equation Pakistan would want to support collusive machinations from a purely military point of view despite the “new chapter” phraseology of SAARC 2011. But as can be seen from the above discourse, military adventurism is the last thing on India or China’s mind. Biting this bait based on a “China Threat” theory may be realistic but not be in the larger interest of India.
Irrespective of the rise of an already formidable Chinese military prowess and the fact that it is arming Pakistan, India needs to develop suitable capabilities pronto, without hurting the growing Indo China trade – a fact that gives immense leverage to India and China while the western economies are melting. The precondition, though, is the capacity to inflict pain or pleasure.
Strategic Choices
Choice I – Adapt to China Driven Asia Century
v Internal development.
v Engagement with China.
v Punitive deterrence against Pak.
v Minimum deterrence against China.
Choice II – Bind with the US (Swing Player in Asia Pivot Strategy)
v Internal development.
v Engage China with Balance of Power (India- US- Japan……..).
v Punitive deterrence against Pak.
v Credible Deterrence against China.
Choice III – Strategic Autonomy with Interest Based Strategic Partnerships.
v Internal development.
v Engagement with China and Pakistan.
v Proactive, Collaborative and Supportive Engagement with South Asian and IOR countries.
v Interest based strategic partnership with the US, Russia and other Major Powers.
v Punitive deterrence against Pak.
v Credible Deterrence against China.
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