That are we to make of President Obama’s decision, assuming formal approval later this summer from the next Afghan president, to keep nearly 10,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan after the current NATO mission finishes this year—but then to cut that figure in half by the end of 2015 and reduce it virtually to zero by the end of 2016?
First, I would like to commend the president for taking an approach on Afghanistan that he has generally avoided until now. In his speech Sunday from Bagram Air Force base near Kabul, he talked positively and confidently to the assembled U.S. troops about the need to “preserve the gains that you have helped to win.” He devoted separate paragraphs to celebrating Afghan gains in counterterrorism, security in general, quality of life and political transition.
Of course, there have been frustrations; of course, the relationship with Hamid Karzai, the outgoing Afghan president, has been far too hard; naturally, as with any war, the loss of life has been tragic; and this particular war has gone on much too long. But we should remember to try to turn this adversity at least partly to our advantage. Americans have fought shoulder to shoulder with Afghan partners for years despite the difficulties, because the cause was just and the stakes high, because the enemy was ruthless and cruel, because as a result the international coalition included the largest number of countries in the history of warfare. On Sunday, for the first time in quite a while, Obama made these kinds of arguments with enthusiasm.
As for the new policy ideas the president unveiled upon his return from Afghanistan, the plan to keep 9,800 U.S. troops in-country next year is quite reasonable. It allows the United States to keep more than half a dozen bases, strategically located throughout the country. Because there are numerous al Qaeda targets near the country’s north and east, we need forces there. Because the fearsome Haqqani network is a bit further southward, with bases just over the border from Khost in southeastern Afghanistan, we need capabilities close to that location. Because much of the Taliban seeks to take refuge in Pakistan just over the border from Kandahar, its traditional home, the United States needs assets there and in Helmand province next door. Also, America’s European partners will stay engaged in the north and west of the country as long as the United States helps them with certain logistics enablers at those locations.
These regional bases, each typically requiring 1,000 to 1,500 Americans to be fully safe and effective, will operate drones, signals intelligence equipment, fighter jets, mine-clearing technology and helicopters. Afghan airpower and high-tech intelligence units have lagged behind the development of the Afghan infantry, so this help will be useful—even as the U.S. numbers are modest enough to ensure that GIs will not be a crutch for any unmotivated Afghan units or commanders.
Another advantage to having up to half a dozen or so regional bases is the ability to partner with the major Afghan army corps headquarters in the field, of which there are six. U.S. forces, together with some other NATO help, will be able to continue to assist them all in 2015. Meanwhile, the United States can work with ministry officials in Kabul on training everyone from accountants to logisticians to communications experts to policy teams. They may not be able to create a mini-Pentagon in the Hindu Kush, but they will help build an institution that functions passably well.
So far so good. And Obama making these decisions now will help NATO commanders ensure an orderly transition process as many bases are closed, others downsized and reconfigured, and most equipment shipped home in the coming months.
But there is a problem with Obama’s new policy. For a war in which Americans have been so patient, we risk losing our cool at the end stage of the effort. Almost as soon as that enduring force of 9,800 is postured properly in the country, it will have to plan for its own termination and begin to dismantle its new capabilities. The president’s plan to cut that number of U.S. troops in half in the course of 2015 means that most of these regional bases will be closed almost as soon as they get into their new groove. And the decision to then go to zero American troops, beyond the confines of Kabul proper, by the end of Obama’s presidency will take away drones and commandos that could be used against al Qaeda in Afghanistan or Pakistan, as well as whatever residual other help Afghan forces may still need then.
I would have favored a plan that was roughly twice as slow, and that might have added about 3 percent to total war costs over the period since 2001. Such an approach would have deprived the Taliban of any hope that the next year would be such an abrupt transition period as to throw the government’s forces into disarray. Rather than close all regional American bases in 2015, Obama could have planned to close one or two if possible, and then observe and learn from what ensued. Then, 2016 could have been the main year when these regional locations were truly downsized.
And why the insistence on getting to zero? The United States is still in Korea and Japan and Germany after all these years. Same thing for Bahrain and Qatar and Djibouti. Success rather than a declaration of “mission accomplished” or “mission over” should be our preeminent concern. Obama will be remembered well by history and the American people if he keeps this country safe. He need not worry so much about completely ending a mission that most of the country is not paying much attention to at this point in any event, and that is already costing us far less than it once did.
Perhaps there is still room for reassessment and adjustment in late 2015 and into 2016. I hope so. We can surely keep reducing the American footprint in Afghanistan each and every year in the future. But doing so on a fixed, predetermined schedule and aiming for a rapid termination of the entire mission is neither necessary nor wise.
Michael O’Hanlon is senior fellow at Brookings and coauthor with James Steinberg of the new book Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: U.S.-China Relations in the 21st Century.
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