03/04/2014
In his final address to Afghanistan's parliament on 15 March, the Afghan President Hamid Karzai fired possibly his last verbal salvo (as the President) at the US, when he said US soldiers can leave Afghanistan at the end of the year because the Afghan military (ANSF), which already protects 93 per cent of the country, was prepared to take the responsibility for the entire country.[1] He reiterated that he would not sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the US unless peace could first be established in Afghanistan. Karzai in his speech also again urged the Afghan Taliban to join the peace process.
As the US veers between threatening the “zero option” and pulling out all troops from Afghanistan at the end of this year to maintaining appropriate presence irrespective of the BSA[2], there is this narrative that continued US presence in Afghanistan post 2014 does not serve Indian strategic interests. Such a narrative would also raise some broad questions in the Indian context; Will a Taliban dominated stable Afghanistan pose any security threat to India? What is the US strategy in Afghanistan, what implications does the US strategy hold for India and is there an overlap between Indian and US interests in Afghanistan? The aim of this paper is to address some of these issues.
Afghanistan sans US Troops
A respected Indian strategist recently argued in an article that continued US military presence in Afghanistan makes little operational and strategic sense (for India), and it will only keep the region’s jihad factories, especially in Pakistan, in business and in turn compel US to seek greater cooperation from the Pakistan Army and ISI.[3] He added that US regional counterterrorism objectives are hardly in sync with those of India. Keeping Afghanistan in turmoil allows Washington to play geopolitical games regionally, including propping up the Pakistan military. It is also implied that US is “peremptorily offering the Afghan Taliban administrative autonomy in the south and east, including provincial governorships”, to extract in exchange a security guarantee for the planned US bases. The article concludes that a complete US military withdrawal, coupled with international efforts to strengthen the hands of the next Afghan administration and further US aid to Pakistan being made contingent on non-interference in Afghanistan, will be the best of the available options to help stabilise the country.
The argument presupposes that the US presence is the motivation for the multitude of jihadi groups in FATA, Pakistan is the driver of the Afghan Taliban, al Qaeda is now a fringe player in the region and that threat to India emanates from the Pakistani jihadi groups. In a nutshell, if Pakistani and US interests (and interference) is removed from the Afghan political equation, we would see a stable Afghanistan with a reconciled and reintegrated Taliban, pursuing its own national interests which may or may not result in very close relations with India but Afghanistan will not support any anti-India elements on its soil.
US Support to Afghanistan
The US residual presence in Afghanistan post 2014 has been assessed as critical because, one, the ANSF though now largely considered capable of launching independent tactical actions, lacks ‘key operational enablers’ in terms of logistics, recce & surveillance, close air support, casualty air evacuation assets, which are at present being provided by the US and the ISAF. Two, training requirements of the ANSF, which has a high rate of attrition due to various reasons, are met by the ISAF and ISAF contributing nations in turn have indicated that they won't stay in Afghanistan without the US presence. Third, the provision of the future US economic aid to Afghanistan, crucial for the maintenance of the ANSF, has been tied to the presence of US troops in Afghanistan post 2014.The above issues will have to addressed in the near term before an Afghanistan without US forces is deliberated. It must also be noted that a UN peacekeeping force replacing the ISAF will be found deficient in all key areas and possibly finds support in the rationale that US presence in the region is the sole driver of local jihadis.
US Strategy Post-2014
The US basing plans in Afghanistan is an outcome of its post-2014 strategy for the region and Afghanistan. Broadly, two issues appear to influence US desire to continue to have boots on ground in Afghanistan; China and natural resources. After Chinese in roads into Central Asia, failure of the ‘reset’ in US-Russia relations, growing Russia China cooperation, the strategic importance of bases at the “cross-roads of Asia” overlooking Pakistan, is salient. Secondly, Afghanistan and Myanmar are two mineral rich counties on the periphery of China. The Chinese presence in Myanmar is significant and US is just beginning to knock at the door. Given the blood and treasure US has expended in Afghanistan it flies in the face of all logic that they would walk out of the country leaving the field to China. Chinese presence in Afghanistan would also put an end to US-Pak partnership. US efforts to bring Iran back into the regional equation is a part of this strategy.
Security Threat from Afghanistan
One of the main (stated) objectives of Indian engagement of Afghanistan is to prevent the country from becoming a source of extremist militants targeting India. The assessment of this security risk goes beyond a metric such as how many Afghan terrorists have been killed/captured in J&K so far over the years or the notion that historically a Pashtun does not fight outside the borders of Afghanistan. This is simply because our threat analysis, duly harmonised with nature of events in the Middle East and North Africa, would see Afghanistan as a likely haven for islamist terrorists of diverse ethnicity and nationalities and targeting not just Kashmir but the entire Indian subcontinent; and, possibly, in coordination with terror outfits in Bangladesh and Myanmar. Addressing this threat at certain level would be in sync with US objectives in Afghanistan.
Indian Interests
Which strategic equation would best serve Indian interests can be ascertained from the answers to some questions. What would be India’s minimum acceptable scenario on Afghanistan? Strangely, it is the same question the US appears to have found an answer to; is a security guarantee of not harbouring extremists from an independent peaceful Afghanistan (yet more aligned with Pakistan and China), be a sufficient reason to disengage from the country? Probably not. Secondly, from India’s point of view do the US military bases and operations contribute to keeping insurgency alive in Afghanistan or a counter to militancy that threatens the entire region? Given the complexity of the ‘Great Game’ the Indian approach to hedge against, rather than shape the future appears to be more prudent.
The author is a Delhi based defence analyst.
Endnotes
[1] Kathy Gannon and Rahim Faiez. ‘Karzai says Afghanistan doesn't need US troops,’ AP, March 15, 2014. http://news.yahoo.com/karzai-says-afghanistan -doesnt-us-troops-110618616.html
[2] Deb Riechmann. Existing Afghan deal would cover US post-2014, AP, March 12, 2014. http://news.yahoo.com/existing-afghan-deal-cov er-us-post-2014-040609121.html
[3]Brahma Chellaney. ‘The best of bad options for Afghanistan,’ Livemint, March 10, 2014. http://www.livemint.com /Opinion/TKlenoURh45NNbKRsmsfZN/The-best-of-bad-options-for-Afgha nistan.html
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