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19 April 2014

Ukraine Crisis: Russia's Neighbors Are Worried

Published on The National Interest (http://nationalinterest.org)

April 17, 2014

Moscow's aggression against Ukraine has spawned not only an international crisis, but fears throughout Russia's neighborhood. Even countries that cooperate closely with Russia worry they could be next in line for creeping annexation. No former Soviet country endorsed “independence“ of South Ossetia and Abkhazia after the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, and the lack of support for Moscow's annexation of Crimea is striking. Those former Soviet neighbors that lag in economic development or freedoms are more vulnerable. The West should help those willing to help themselves.

The seizure of Crimea on fabricated pretenses of threats to ethnic Russians and the most recent provocations in eastern Ukraine by Russian forces and proxies have sent shock waves from the Baltic states to Central Asia. Kyiv has initiated an “antiterror” security response in the Donetsk region. Even as the outcome of the current crisis in Ukraine remains uncertain, it and the other former Soviet countries are looking at what more they can do to steel themselves against Russian coercion.

Ukraine

In some ways, Crimea was special. Russia has major strategic interests because its Black Sea fleet resides there. Despite a treaty giving it basing rights until 2042, Moscow could not be sure a future Ukrainian government would not seek the fleet’s ouster. Nearly three-fifths of Crimea’s population, or 1.5 million people, are ethnic Russians.

On the other hand, even the relatively pro-Western Yushchenko government, in power from 2005 to 2010, did not jeopardize the Black Sea fleet’s basing rights. Ethnic Russians living in Crimea, as in other areas of Ukraine, have faced no systematic threats or violence before or after President Yanukovych fled his office in February.

The remainder of Ukraine has nearly 7 million ethnic Russians, most of whom reside in the eastern regions, where they are minorities. Ethnic Russians make up only two-fifths of the population in the eastern regions of Luhansk and Donetsk, one-fourth in Kharkiv and Zaporizhya, and one-fifth in Odessa. Elsewhere they are less than one-fifth of the population (in the Kyiv region only 6 percent, and less than 5 percent in every western region). Ethnic tension in Ukraine has been almost nonexistent. Most people are bilingual, and many, whose mother tongue is Russian, identify themselves as Ukrainians.

Ukraine’s problems, apart from Russia’s current interference, stem from a lack of economic reform, extraordinary corruption, and the resulting poverty. According to World Bank data for 2012, based on purchasing power parity, Ukraine’s income per person is $7,180 [11], only a third of Russia’s $22,720. In the World Bank’s ease of doing business index for 2013, Ukraine ranks 112 out of 189 countries [12]; and in Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index for 2013, Ukraine is 144 out of 175 countries [13]. Both indices rank Ukraine as even worse than Russia.

Last month, Ukraine’s parliament passed a set of tough economic reforms, long sought by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in return for its support. Some essential steps, such as slashing natural gas subsidies, will create public unease. Russia is increasing the pressure by raising gas prices to Ukraine and demanding payment for overdue bills. In the current emergency, Ukrainians may realize they have no other choice, but the odds remain slim for reform of an economy suffocated by corruption and Soviet-style regulation.

Ukraine now understands the risks of not having an effective territorial defense that can raise the cost to Russia of aggression, but a wealthier economy will be required for a major change in defense posture. Ukraine must also develop reliable law enforcement and security services; the current ones are corrupt and penetrated by Russia.

Ukraine’s democratic credentials are stronger. Its media is mostly free and it has achieved several free and fair national elections and peaceful turnovers of power. These gains bolster national unity. Successful presidential elections next month, and the devolution of more power to elected officials in regions and localities, will strengthen governmental legitimacy. Moscow’s effort to intimidate Ukraine into creating a radically decentralized political system, misnamed “federalism,” would leave the country unstable and vulnerable to Russian interference. Ukraine should advance its parliamentary elections, now set for 2017. Russian aggression has begun to unite Ukrainians in ways not seen before.

Russia’s provocateurs in eastern Ukraine have so far been unable to mobilize wide, pro-Russian support there. Ukrainian authorities have done little better. People there are disillusioned after two decades of governments that have failed to improve governance or create prosperity for any but a small group of oligarchs. A wealthier economy based on the rule of law is essential for building popular support and funding an effective defense. That retirees in Crimea exult that their pensions will double under Russian rule shows how poverty can erode national loyalty. That Ukraine’s military capabilities suffer from low funding shows how poverty can also weaken a country’s defense posture.

Central Asia

Kazakhstan is next up in the number of ethnic Russians, with some 3.5 million. Nearly a quarter of the population is ethnic Slav, mostly located close to the long border with Russia. The fraction was higher in Soviet times, but Kazakhstan has spurred immigration northward of ethnic Kazakhs, and it moved its capital to the north-central part of the country. Many ethnic Russians have emigrated over the last two decades, but a measure of prosperity has helped stem the outflow. Gross national income per person in Kazakhstan is $11,790, about half the Russian level.Kazakhstan is 140 on the Transparency index [13], almost as bad as Ukraine.

Kazakhstan’s leadership has fostered ethnic tolerance, although most of the political power lies in ethnic-Kazakh hands. Authoritarian rule and tight limits on media freedom heighten risks of political or social explosions. If Moscow were to turn its propaganda fire on Kazakhstan, the results could be unpredictable; closed politics suppress warning signs of problems.

With its large ethnic-Russian population, Kazakhstan may be the country most vulnerable to Kremlin aggression allegedly aimed at “protecting compatriots”. President Nursultan Nazarbayev shows sensitivity to Moscow’s initiatives that do not unduly impinge on Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan belongs to Putin’s favored Eurasian Customs Union [14], despite the higher external tariff wall, which raises prices of automobiles and other imports from outside the union, stirring popular resentment in Kazakhstan.

Russian actions in Crimea will cause Kazakhstan to be more careful with Moscow, but Nazarbayev will quietly seek to buttress his country’s security posture. Loyalty and military strength in Kazakhstan benefit from its relative wealth, but are weakened by politics that are closed and discriminate against ethnic Russians.

Uzbekistan, with some 1.5 million Russians, just over 5 percent of the population, has widespread poverty and strict authoritarian rule, but is less vulnerable because it does not share a border with Russia and its economy is less tied to Russia’s. Always leery of Moscow’s intentions, President Islam Karimov viewed the seizure of Crimea [15] with disapproval [15]. Long ago he weeded out ethnic Russians from the military and security services, protecting himself from Moscow’s mischief. Now, Karimov will look with greater skepticism at Russia’s military presence in neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Any increase could be grounds for alarm in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan’s closed politics make its large Tajik minority an unpredictable factor if the country were to come under greater external pressure or a popular revolt were to occur.

Russia’s new aggression might have the least impact on Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Russia has a growing air force base in Kyrgyzstan [16], and Russia has an army division and a large contingent of border guards in Tajikistan. Hundreds of thousands of migrants from the two countries work in Russia, often illegally. Their remittances make up large fractions of the national income of both countries. Both grindingly poor, neither is in a position to challenge Moscow. Turkmenistan has cool relations with Russia, which has long sought to dominate the export of Turkmenistan’s natural gas while offering low prices for it.

Russia has intimated that it could use naval power in the Caspian Sea to impede transport of Kazakh and Turkmen energy to the South Caucasus and world markets. A greater threat to Kazakhstan is that Russia could hamper the export of its oil through the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. In recent years Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have begun to export energy via pipeline to China, bypassing Russia. [17] Efforts to build a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan have foundered on their disputes over delimitation of borders within the Sea.

Belarus and Moldova

Of the former Soviet countries, Belarus has one of the least developed national identities and it shares a border with Russia. Most Belarusians speak Russian, and Russian influence is strong through economic linkages and energy subsidies that largely keep the unreformed economic system above water. In security terms, Belarus is one of Russia’s only allies. For all his talk of closer ties with Moscow, President Alexander Lukashenko does not want Belarus to be submerged within Russia. He has staked out a nuanced position on Crimea offering to mediate between Russia and Ukraine.

The crisis in Ukraine will have repercussions on Moldova and the Transnistria separatist conflict there. Transnistria’s population is evenly balanced between ethnic Moldovans, Russians, and Ukrainians, but the government depends on Russia. Moscow supplies its forces and allies in Transnistria via a land bridge across Ukraine. One Kremlin goal if it invades eastern and southern Ukraine will be to secure Russia’s position in Transnistria. Separatist calls there for annexation by Russia might influence Kremlin calculations. Moscow claims that Ukraine and Moldova are “blockading” Transnistria [18], but the European Union, which has an assistance mission there, denies this.

Moldova is also vulnerable to Russian coercion in Gagauzia, a district populated by a Russified Turkic minority. Gagauzia held an illegal referendum [19] in February in which it voted heavily in favor of joining the Eurasian Customs Union and of seceding from Moldova if Moldova “gave up its independence” (a reference to joining the EU).

The South Caucasus

The three South Caucasus countries do not have large Russian minorities but most of their peoples, especially adults, speak Russian. Relations with Russia differ considerably. Armenia has a military pact with Russia [20]. Under pressure it has agreed to join the Eurasian customs union, reluctantly spurning a possible Association agreement with the EU.

Azerbaijan, the wealthiest of the three due to energy exports, has stayed out of military and economic unions with Moscow. It engages the EU only on a limited basis due to its poor record of democracy and respect for human rights. Azerbaijan’s major concern with Moscow is to keep it from interfering with its energy exports outside of Russian pipelines. Azerbaijan is adept at balancing ties with the West and Russia. It may be vulnerable to the growing Islamist insurgency in the Russian republic of Dagestan, on Azerbaijan’s northern border.

Russian troops have occupied the separatist enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia since the 2008 war, and are encroaching further by constructing barbed-wire fences in Georgia beyond South Ossetia. Moscow bitterly opposes Georgia’s quest for NATO membership and aims to prevent Georgia from signing trade and partnership accords with the EU. Georgia has held democratic parliamentary and presidential elections and undergone peaceful transfers of political power.

Oil and gas pipelines from Azerbaijan across Georgia make it less dependent on Russian resources than are many European countries. Georgia will come under greater Russian pressure not to continue its westward course if Ukraine falls under Moscow’s sway. Russia is trying to find other ways to entice Georgia, such as through relations between the church hierarchies of the two overwhelmingly Orthodox states [21].

The Baltic States

The Baltic states, members of NATO and the EU, have Western backing and security assurances that are the envy of Russia’s other neighbors. Yet even the Baltics are concerned. In Estonia, only a quarter of the population is ethnic Russian. However, in the Estonian region of Narva (bordering Russia), nearly 90 percent of the 60,000 residents are ethnic Russian. Narva residents prefer Estonia, where conditions are better, but if Russian troops were to occupy the region they might change some Estonians’ minds (as happened in Crimea, where prior to Moscow’s propaganda onslaught and invasion most ethnic Russian residents preferred to remain in Ukraine).

In Latvia, ethnic Russians make up just over a quarter of the population, but they are more evenly distributed, geographically, and better integrated into politics and society. Most have no interest in joining Putin’s Russia. Some have family roots in Latvia that go back centuries. Others settled there during the Soviet era. About 300,000 people, or 14 percent of the population, mostly ethnic Russians, are “noncitizens.” They are often economically marginalized and politically alienated. Latvians make up less than 20 percent of the population of Latvia’s second-largest city, Daugavpils, in the southeastern corner of the country.

While Moscow-directed disinformation claims otherwise, most ethnic Russians in the Baltic states—especially the 18-35-year-old demographic—are generally pro-Europe and proud of their respective countries.

Western Responses

This is not yet a new Cold War, but Russia’s rising threat to the post–Cold War security order raises serious concerns about the Kremlin’s imperial designs. Russia’s neighbors are not just faraway places. The Crimean crisis has energized debate in the West about how much it should get involved in aiding and protecting former Soviet countries on Russia's periphery. All of them now face greater threats of coercion from Moscow. What should the West do to help them reduce these risks?

The best way for most of Russia’s neighbors to bolster deterrence against external aggression is to speed political and economic reforms. An expansion of democratic opportunity is vital to creating citizen loyalty and national consensus. Western aid that encourages reforms must remain a priority.

There is wide consensus that the three Baltic states—all prosperous democracies—deserve strong support consistent with their full membership in NATO and the EU. The elevation of the crisis in Ukraine to the top of the Western political agenda and the dispatch of a large team of OSCE observers to Ukraine show that Western security interests do not stop at NATO’s edge.

Following the popular uprising against the Yanukovych government, Europeans now view Ukraine as more European and thus, meriting special priority. The West’s most effective response to Russia’s threat to Ukraine will be long and multidimensional. To deter further aggression, the West ought to ratchet up asset seizures and visa bans, especially in Europe where they will have the most effect. The West ought to sanction every Russian parliamentarian who voted for Crimea’s annexation. Western governments should not delay in imposing sanctions on key economic sectors, such as energy, finance, and the mining and metals industry. Europe and the United States should make clear that sanctions will increase not only if Russia commits more aggression against Ukraine, but even as it continues to occupy Crimea.

Russia has repeatedly used its regional dominance in gas and oil supplies to pressure or punish Ukraine and the Baltic states. To lessen long-term dependence, the United States should clear the backlog of licensing applications to export liquefied natural gas to Europe. Market economics will determine how many export facilities will be built. Europe should bite the bullet and reduce its energy dependence on Russia.

In terms of military support, NATO has begun to add air surveillance capabilities in the Baltics; this should move forward briskly and become permanent. NATO should deploy forces in the Baltics as well as in Poland. NATO members should respond favorably and quickly to sensible Ukrainian requests for military support and defensive weapons. The aggression in Crimea should remove any barriers to NATO forward deployments that may have emerged from discussions with Russia about expansion of the Alliance. Based on Russia’s actions in Ukraine, France should cancel its sale of Mistral-class amphibious assault vessels to Russia. These helicopter carriers are well suited for rapid attack against neighbors, an evident reason why Russia ordered them after frustrations in conducting its war with Georgia in 2008.

Most of Russia’s other neighbors will welcome close consultations with the West regarding Russian threats and capabilities in the region. Popular support in Western countries for aiding authoritarian governments, however, is low.

Azerbaijan suffers from dictatorial rule and severe corruption, but it is an important energy supplier to Europe. Azerbaijan and Armenia have strategic locations adjacent to Iran. Armenia enjoys strong support from its diaspora in the West. As an energy transit country and an emerging democracy, Georgia remains important to the West. Georgia participates with enthusiasm in programs with NATO and the EU Eastern Partnership.

Central Asia generally has lower priority in the West because of geography. More important, excepting some democratic development in Kyrgyzstan, Central Asia is burdened by dictatorial rule. Central Asia and Azerbaijan will try to use Russia’s threat as a hook to keep the West involved in regional security after NATO draws down troops in Afghanistan, and to spur the West to suppress its appetite for criticizing human rights abuses and political repression.

In Crimea, Russia has violated the widely accepted international norm of not seizing and annexing territory by force. This is also relevant to the purposes of the Minsk Group (co-chaired by France, Russia, and the US), which spearheads the OSCE’s thus far unsuccessful efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Minsk Group has opposed referenda on the status of the separatist region.

The Information Space

Russian state television, widely watched in the former Soviet space, because it features better-quality entertainment programs than local stations, dishes out virulently anti-Western propaganda, even more so than in Soviet times. This helps to shape popular views. To counter this, the West should also step up broadcast- and Internet-based informational programming.

The post-Soviet generation that grew up, was educated, and started work after the Soviet collapse in 1991 has no interest in joining the backward-looking Russia that Putin dreams of restoring. The West should give much higher preference to programs that introduce young leaders from the region to the West. As thousands of Fulbright and Rhodes scholars have shown, what counts is not only the formal education foreign students obtain, but the life-long change in mental outlook that comes from sharing ideas with young Westerners in democratic settings.

Conclusion

Russia is no longer a normal country in the international system. The West must sanction it, but will still benefit from cooperation on such issues as nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea. Moscow will likely become less cooperative, yet it has a strategic interest in working with the West to reduce threats that could boomerang against Russia, such as Islamist acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Western assistance to Russia’s neighbors should seek specially to counter the creeping annexation tactics that Moscow is employing in eastern Ukraine, using paid provocateurs and seizure of key facilities. Interestingly, these actions have not led to local popular rebellions against Ukrainian rule.

We are now in a different world. The West must strongly support Ukraine even as it presses for reforms.

Ian Bond was British ambassador to Latvia. Brian Carlson was US ambassador to Latvia. Denis Corboy was EU ambassador to Armenia and Georgia. William Courtney was US ambassador to Georgia and Kazakhstan. John Herbst was US ambassador to Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Richard Kauzlarich was US ambassador to Azerbaijan and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ints Silins was US ambassador to Latvia. William Taylor was US ambassador to Ukraine. Kenneth Yalowitz was US ambassador to Belarus and Georgia.


Links:
[1] http://www.addthis.com/bookmark.php?v=250&username=nationalinterest
[2] http://nationalinterest.org/profile/ian-bond
[3] http://nationalinterest.org/profile/brian-carlson
[4] http://nationalinterest.org/profile/denis-corboy
[5] http://nationalinterest.org/profile/william-courtney
[6] http://nationalinterest.org/profile/john-herbst
[7] http://nationalinterest.org/profile/richard-kauzlarich
[8] http://nationalinterest.org/profile/ints-silins
[9] http://nationalinterest.org/profile/william-taylor
[10] http://nationalinterest.org/profile/kenneth-yalowitz
[11] http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD
[12] http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BUS.EASE.XQ
[13] http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/
[14] http://www.rferl.org/content/eurasian-economic-union-signed/25319588.html
[15] http://www.vzglyad.kg/mnenie/2620_posle_kryima/
[16] http://rt.com/politics/russia-kant-kyrgyzstan-military-628/
[17] http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/24/world/asia/china-gains-new-friends-in-its-quest-for-energy.html?_r=0
[18] http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68182
[19] http://www.dw.de/moldovas-gagauz-region-leans-toward-moscow/a-17504239
[20] http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_President_Medvedev_To_Visit_Armenia/2131915.html
[21] http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2014/03/29/anne-applebaum-russian-ideology-is-a-mishmash-with-legs/
[22] http://nationalinterest.org/topic/global-governance
[23] http://nationalinterest.org/region/eurasia/south-caucasus/armenia
[24] http://nationalinterest.org/region/europe/eastern-europe/belarus
[25] http://nationalinterest.org/region/eurasia/south-caucasus/azerbaijan
[26] http://nationalinterest.org/region/eurasia/central-asia/kazakhstan
[27] http://nationalinterest.org/region/europe/eastern-europe/estonia
[28] http://nationalinterest.org/region/eurasia/south-caucasus/georgia
[29] http://nationalinterest.org/region/europe/eastern-europe/latvia
[30] http://nationalinterest.org/region/eurasia/central-asia/tajikistan
[31] http://nationalinterest.org/region/europe/eastern-europe/lithuania
[32] http://nationalinterest.org/region/europe/eastern-europe/moldova
[33] http://nationalinterest.org/region/eurasia/central-asia/turkmenistan
[34] http://nationalinterest.org/region/eurasia/central-asia/uzbekistan
[35] http://nationalinterest.org/region/europe/eastern-europe/ukraine
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