Abstract
The goal of this paper is to analyze the global-scale trend of American strategic shift towards the Pacific and East Asia. This development will be one of crucial trends of international relations in the foreseeable future which will have a determining effect on the global security environment. While immediately following the release of new U.S. Strategic Guidance in January 2012 it was referred to in the media and discussions as “something new,” in fact it is quite to the contrary. The most important driving forces and reason of this change started to emerge at least 2-3 decades ago. The realization in the old continent came late due to “Eurocentric worldview” that was temporarily overwhelmed by events in her neighborhood and by the US engagement in Europe´s conflicts (wars in South-Eastern Europe as a most prominent example), but the rest of the globe realized it a long time ago. Moreover, Obama administration´s steps toward Pacific and East Asia are to a large extent based on changes initiated or realized by previous administrations, particularly that of G.W. Bush. From that point of view Obama´s “Pacific shift” is a combination of both continuity and new elements based on long-term historical/strategic trends. On the whole, we are witnessing more of an evolution than revolution is US strategic positioning.
Introduction
The goal of this paper is to analyze the global-scale-trend of American strategic shift towards the Pacific and East Asia. This development will be one of crucial trends of international relations in foreseeable future which will have a determining effect on the global security environment. While it was referred in media and discussions during the last few months immediately after the release of new U.S. Strategic Guidance in January 2012 as “something new” the opposite is the truth. The most important driving forces and reason of this change started to emerge at least 2-3 decades ago. Sure, Europe´s “Eurocentric worldview” was temporarily overwhelmed by events in our neighborhood and by the US engagement in Europe´s conflicts (wars in South-Eastern Europe as a most prominent example), but the rest of the globe realized this shift some time ago. Moreover, Obama administration´s steps toward Pacific and East Asia are to a large extent based on changes initiated or realized by previous administrations, particularly that of G.W. Bush. From that point of view Obama´s “Pacific shift” is a combination of both continuity and new elements based on long-term historical/strategic trends. Thus, on the whole, there is more evolution than revolution.
Historic and strategic trends
The United States possesses simultaneously both an Atlantic and a Pacific vector of its global strategy. The primacy of the Atlantic vector in foreign policy and strategy – with European allies as most important partners in world affairs – was based on “Europe first” tenet made during the WWII. That decision was based on strategic assessment that Germany represents a more serious strategic threat than Japan as well as on United Kingdom´s special relationship as the US most important ally. The emergence of the Soviet center of power, which decisively focused on Europe during the Cold War as well as in the post-War strategic environment, extended that strategic approach. Because of that primacy, the Atlantic vector secured its dominant position for half century in American foreign and security policy and strategies.[1]
During the last third of 20th century the fundaments of this geo-strategic situation started to change. The impact of long term historical and geopolitical trends with roots in 70´s and 80´s established a basis for the current developments. A global “redistribution of power” and gradual emergence of other-than-European and Atlantic centers of power, mainly in East and South Asia – which accelerated after geopolitical earthquake in early 90´ – are the most important driving forces behind the current trends. From the US perspective it is a crucial fact that since 2000 Asia became America´s most important source of imports. From the global perspective Asia´s share of the world’s GDP rose from 14 to 26 percent with further high growth potential. Asia´s share of global defense expenditures rose to about 21% and de facto reaches the level of European defense spending. The World´s six largest armed forces are in Asia (China, India, USA, Russia, North Korea, South Korea). China becomes the second to US in terms of military expenditures. The rise in Chinese military spending and capabilities a significant influence on other countries it terms of increases to their defense budgets.[2]
The collapse of the USSR and the diminished strategic rivalry in Europe, as well as the dramatic current self-demilitarization of European allies, compounded with American disappointment with them ‒ are among the most prominent sources of current trends. The financial austerity which has a decisive impact on the US military budget is also putting significant pressure on the prioritization of sources.[3] We also have to take into consideration the non-existing multilateral regional security mechanisms in East Asia, and the inherited instability this causes.
As the central player of current world order, the United States has to react to the ongoing trends if wants to maintain its position. While the relative power of other-than-Western centers is rising, the United States still possesses sufficient capabilities as well as the will of its leaders to remain the main centre of power for decades to come. The United States still generates approximately 25 percent of the global economic power. Actually the US share of global GDP is relatively constant – 26 % in 1975, 25 % in 2012 – the rise of Asian states goes partially at the expense of Europe, whose economic output has decreased from more than 37% in 1975, to 27% in 2012, compared to Asia´s increase from 14% and 26%).[4] Thus it is likely that the US with the only global power-projection capabilities at strategic level will maintain primacy in international affairs in the foreseeable future. The US will not share the “destiny of the Netherlands” (by Paul Kennedy) – that once was the world´s leading power, and now is a small European state without decisive influence on global affairs – despite the rise of other centers of power.
All US post-Cold-War presidents were in line with long-term tradition of American strategic culture. “… America must continue to lead the world we did so much to make” emphasized President Clinton in his first Inaugural address in 1993 (Clinton 1993), followed by President Bush´s words that “America remains engaged in the world by history and by choice, shaping a balance of power that favors freedom” during his Inaugural address in 2001 (Bush 2001). President Obama also stated that “We remain the most prosperous, powerful nation on Earth” (Obama 2009).
Continuity with G.W. Bush´s administration initiatives
Europe´s central position in US strategic thinking started to erode almost immediately at the start of the 90´s but was temporarily masked by several events, for example the Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo conflicts. However, the Old Continent´s preeminence measured strictly by share of total US forces stationed abroad started to see these changes (the drawdown from more than 300 thousand troops in the late 80s to less than 100 thousand today). But these trends were not all that dynamic given that the US was not engaged in major strategic military operations between 1991 and 2001. The global posture of US forces witnessed only some minor changes (concerning Middle Eastern developments and the naval presence in the Pacific), but basically a decade after the end of the Cold War it was still based on structures and network of military bases pre-dating the 90s.
It also means that during the Clinton era the shift of American attention from Europe to other regions was rather slow, gradual and was not declared clearly in strategic documents. Military operations during this era were geographically confined mainly to Europe and to a lesser extend the Middle East (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo in 1994-95 respectively 1999, Iraq 1998 and demonstration of US power in the Taiwan Strait in 1995/1996).
First significant change came with the era of President G.W. Bush. It was due to several reasons: obviously the events after 9/11, but also the rapidly-growing influence of East Asian neighbors and absence of major strategic challenge in Europe. Post-9/11-operations launched by the Bush administration – Afghanistan, Iraq – moved the US and rest of the World´s attention from Europe. Moreover, the elevated importance of the Middle East and Central Asia was crucial to the point that it was temporarily able to override the historical trends and growing importance of East Asia and the Pacific (see for example the structure and essence of QDR 2006). Thus, East Asia´s place in US foreign policy suffered due to the ongoing military operations within the broader Middle East. On the other hand we have to note that during the presidency of G.W. Bush first steps towards a more realistic global post-Cold-War posture of US military were made. Bush’s first Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld outlined important changes in Global Defense Posture Review 2004, among others, which represented the most far-reaching restructuralisation of US forces abroad since the beginning of the Cold War. It is also important from today’s perspective as it outlined the first major strategic vision of future global US military posture. It openly declared the major shift in American strategic thinking with East Asia as a strategic hot-spot and a long-term effort to dramatically modify the global military presence of the United States. Donald Rumsfeld in his vision proposed the following important steps: (extract, listing just major issues concerning the topic of this paper)
Mission and (as a consequence) nature of US forces in Europe started to change – simultaneously with reduction of numbers the troops will be tailored for out-of-Europe deployments and less to maintain static basing structures in Europe. More focus on ad- hoc coalitions of the willing than existing formal Alliances. The final decision about US Forces in Europe was postponed and modified by Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates by leaving just 2 instead of 4 US Brigades in Europe and deployment of third one on a rotational basis for training and exercises with Allies (decision from early 2012). The deployment of third brigade – for training and exercises with European Allies – is also a part of the answer how to keep a certain level of interoperability and maintain the potential for military-to-military cooperation gained in Afghanistan. In reference to the latter, the planned withdrawal of major combat units by 2014 poses a serious challenge to NATO militaries: to lose the know-how and capability to act together or invest into relatively large-scale joint training and exercises.
Increased significance of South-Eastern Asia – US strategic documents, most notably Quadrennial Defense Review Reports, declared openly that the most important challenges for long-term American strategic interests are rooted in this region (“Of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time off set traditional U.S. military advantages absent U.S. counter strategies”, QDR, pp. 26) but it is the particular region where US force´s capabilities are more limited, especially as concerns South-East Asian and East Asian Littorial. D. Rumsfeld´s initiatives were focusing on new agreements with region´s countries (Singapore, Thailand, Australia, etc.) enabling more freedom of action of US forces, as well as building up new bases, including Guam´s increased significance.
Strong presence in Japan and South Korea – keeping strength to react to local crisis as well as increase their capabilities to act out of region´s geographic borders (partial redistribution of forces from Okinawa to Guam).
Rise in Africa´s importance underlined also by the creation of AFRICOM – Middle East operation´s support from East Africa, counterterrorist activities in Sahel and focus on strengthening local capabilities (Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership).
New US military presence in Central Asia – as a footing for Afghanistan operations.
Focus on “new style of bases” and several categories of bases: first, Power Projection Hubs based on traditional structure with permanent US forces (Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom), second, Main Operating Basis also based on traditional robust structure, third Forward Operational Sites, created as a new structure, based on rotation of US forces and limited permanent presence, also with possibility of locating pre-positioned equipment for future deployments, fourth, Cooperative Security Locations, with focus on regional security cooperation, logistics and support, possibility of pre-positioned equipment as above. There is high level of continuity with the current approach by DoD leadership.
While changes in the US global posture were a projection of growing importance of Asia into the military reality, there were also political initiatives with ambition of shaping global balance of power. The major political-strategic initiative of Bush administration with regard to Asian and global strategy was the establishment of US-Indian strategic partnership. The Year 2005, when the then-U.S. President and Indian Prime Minister declared willingness to transform the relationship of the two countries into a global partnership that will provide leadership in areas of mutual concern and interest was a crucial moment [of the changing posture] (Joint Statement 2005). First steps towards building up this partnership were made by the Clinton administration (symbolically described as a “partnership of two greatest democracies in the World”), but Bush´s team elaborated it into a strategic reality. Although there are still a lot of unanswered question about intentions of both sides, it is one of the crucial axes which will determine not only the strategic situation in Asia but also at the global scale. India gained US recognition as a nuclear power which significantly contributed to rise of its prestige as a global power and also it would be a mistake to underestimate the economic benefits for New Delhi. Washington – if it succeeds in keeping India in the strategic partnership long-term – will reap the benefits of positive attitude as the only power to at least partially counterbalance Chinese influence in Southern and South-Eastern Asia. From American perspective it is the real long-term strategic gain of that partnership which trumps all the other benefits including economic ones.
Obama´s administration – 3 key areas of evolution
While the Bush administration declared a gradual change in military posture and established the strategic partnership with India, it still politically and militarily remained anchored in the Middle East. The majority of US resources – not to mention political “attention” and “energy” – went to the broader Middle East. The symbolic change came with President Obama (de facto facilitated by the withdrawal from Iraq and gradual but significant reductions of US presence in Afghanistan). Although still significantly bounded by two wars in the Middle East and Central Asia Obama emphasized a shift in American perspective in favor of Asia. Describing himself as “America’s first Pacific President” Barack Obama stated that “The Pacific Rim has helped shape my view of the world,” as he mentioned in Tokyo on November 14, 2009 (Talev 2011). “During his lifetime”, he said, “The fortunes of America and the Asia-Pacific have become more closely linked than ever” (Talev 2011). Besides analyzing it as a reaction of strategic trends it is also a witness to changes in “American Identity” which is more and more anchored by Pacific and confirming “inter-US” shift from the traditional Atlantic orientation towards the West.
At the level of strategic documents the most important and most actual change was the Strategic Defense Guidance titled “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities of 21st Century Defense” (Priorities 2012) issued in January 2012. As the document declares, “U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia, creating a mix of evolving challenges and opportunities. Accordingly, while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region” (Priorities 2012, pp.2). Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta confirmed this during his speech at Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore (June 2012) where he clarified goals and objectives as of January 2012: “We have made choices and we have set priorities, and we have rightly chosen to make this region a priority” (Panetta 2012a).
Besides these declarations, there is more specific evidence of the importance of East Asia and the Pacific. The first foreign visit of President Obama´s first Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton was to Asia. In February 2009, almost immediately after being appointed she visited Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, and China. In comparison with previous Secretaries (C. Rice, C. Powell, M. Albright) she visited East Asian and Pacific countries the most – almost 20 percent of her visits during first 3 years in office were to the above-mentioned regions (C. Rice 9.8%, C. Powell 13.5%, M. Albright 13.2%). Europe´s share decreased from more than 50% during M. Albright to less than 30%. Moreover, the “relative importance” of South and Central Asia, including India, also has risen from 1 to more than 9 percent (also as a consequence of Afghanistan deployment, but not exclusively) (Manyin–Daggett 2012). Of course, these numbers tell nothing of the substance or results of state visits, but have a symbolic message.
In a broader context, the continual change of US approach during Obama`s first term is supported by several mutually interlinked factors. The first and most discussed are modifications of the global military posture. In that regard not only the geographical changes but also the changes of the nature and strategy of deployment of the US forces are important. Second, emphasis on multinational structures which have to be build in East Asia and surrounding regions and strengthening US ties with the already existing multinational structures. It is important to note that according to the new approach East Asia, Western Pacific, Southeast Asia, and South Asia are not treated as separate regions anymore, but are part of broader geopolitical picture of U.S. foreign and security policy. The aspect of “multinationality” also includes initiative of establishing Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership as well as Free Trade Area and also ASEAN´s growing importance for the US.[5] Third, we are seeing a further strengthening of “traditional bilateral alliances and partnerships” (Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Thailand, Australia) and deepening of new ones (India, Vietnam).
The US will tailor its global military posture to future strategic environment with East Asia and the surrounding regions as the most important strategic hot-spot and source of major challenges. It has evident implications for geographical distribution of American alliances, partnerships, the re-dislocation of US forces as well as nature and structures of American military. According to Leon Panetta “by 2020 the Navy will re-posture its forces from today’s roughly 50/50 percent split between the Pacific and the Atlantic to about a 60/40 split between those oceans” (Panetta 2012a). There are already announced additional steps: new deployment of U.S. Marines to Australia´s Darwin of around 2500 troops, intensified use of Western Australia´s harbor of Perth, deployment of four Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore among the most prominent examples. A Darwin base – close to strategic straits of Southern Asia[6] – will give to US forces strategic depth as well as significant contribution to freedom of maneuver, in addition to Singapore´s deployment direct access to the region. On the other hand we can read this as a first steps in broader realignment or just as a symbolic change – to strengthen the confidence of Asian allies that the United States is preserving its will and capabilities to be a normative power in the broader region despite domestic financial problems. More importantly, at a strategic level it is important to analyze the US distribution of resources and attention among different regions. Regions of South-East and East Asia belong to very exclusive group of “destinations” without warranting a decrease of US military presence in the future – on the contrary. Additionally, the future distribution of resources among the four services of US Armed Forces has significance, too. Overall financial reductions of US defense budget, which goes hand-in-hand with reductions in numbers, de facto will not affect the Navy seriously according to Defense Guidance (the US Navy will maintain eleven aircraft carriers despite the expectation for reduction by one, and will keep the current level – 33 – of amphibious ships for Marines) – contrary to Army and Marine Forces, and lesser extend to Air Forces (Priorities 2012). It clearly shows what kind of future deployments are expected and planned. As President Obama declared “As we end today’s wars, I have directed my national security team to make our presence and mission in the Asia Pacific a top priority. As a result, reductions in U.S. defense spending will not ‒I repeat, will not ‒ come at the expense of the Asia Pacific” (Obama 2011).
The character and structure of US Armed Forces will witness important changes which are clear evidence of possible future scenario of operations and their geographical scope. The focus on combined naval-air forces as a driving force of modernization, structure-shaping and capability-building and development are predicating the potential areas of operations and mission. Focus on naval-air capabilities is more tailored for Pacific and East Asian theatres (including South-Eastern Asia) than others (the Korean peninsula is the only Land and Air Forces-dominated theatre in East Asia and Pacific with significant US presence). The regional realities, including access routes to potential hot-spots, naval communications, existence of chain of US military bases on island states of East Pacific are the best theatre for combined naval-air capabilities. The emerging eminence of the so-called Air-Sea Battle concept[7], also in reaction to increased level of Chinese “anti-access capabilities,”[8] and American concerns over Chinese activities in cyber-space after more than a decade of large-contingency ground operations, will further strengthen focus on East Asia and Pacific.
Despite these important developments, it would be a huge mistake to reduce the core of the topic just to military and military-related changes – as stated above, there is a combination of three interlinked elements. Obama administration’s most important novum is the increased attention to multilateral structures – both new ones (with focus on economic cooperation such as Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership and Free Trade Area) and already existing ones, such as ASEAN. H. Clinton as the first US Secretary of State visited ASEAN secretariat, soon after her appointment and the Obama administration launched more intensified diplomatic presence in the region, continuing in the steps taken by the Bush administration, for example creation of the new position of the US Ambassador to ASEAN. Leon Panetta was the first U.S. Secretary of Defense to meet with all ASEAN defense ministers in October 2011. The Obama administration signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) with ASEAN in 2009 – a desperately anticipated step, put on hold by the previous Bush administration which caused doubts about US engagement in South-East Asia. Moreover, there is a new “comprehensive geographical approach” which includes East Asia, Western Pacific, Southeast Asia, and South Asia as one huge geopolitical and strategic region and not separate geographical entities. H. Clinton described the Asia-Pacific as “stretching from the Indian Subcontinent to the western shores of the Americas, the region spans two oceans ‒ the Pacific and the India ‒ that are increasingly linked by shipping and strategy” (Clinton 2011). Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Kurt Campbell emphasized the objective of “operationally making the linkage between the Indian and Pacific Oceans as “the next challenge” of U.S. strategic thinking” (Manyin–Daggett 2012, pp.5). It is important to note also the complexity of the political situation of ASEAN countries’ approach. While they are welcoming a strong US presence in the region, simultaneously they are trying to maintain balanced partnerships with Beijing. For majority of them China is the leading trading partner and there are significant Chinese minorities in the countries in the region with strong economic presence. This means that they welcome US presence but do not want to be a subject of something like “great-power-rivality.” In the words of Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa “ASEAN will not let the region become a competition arena for countries who consider themselves big powers, whoever and whenever they may be” (Jakarta Post 2011). On the other hand, in September 2010, the Indonesian Foreign Minister rejected China’s view that the United States should not become involved in the South China Sea dispute (Ten Kate – Li 2010).
The third aspect of US foreign and security policy is the emphasis on partnerships. Japan is maintaining its position as the most important US ally not only from a regional perspective, but also globally. According to Leon Panetta “the United States-Japan alliance will remain one of the cornerstones for regional security and prosperity in the 21st century” (Panetta 2012a). Washington is supporting Tokyo´s international aspirations, including permanent seat in the Security Council of the UN; supporting and contributing to strengthening of Japanese military capabilities with focus on missile defense, reconnaissance, intelligence and also urging for greater Japanese responsibility for security of East Asia/Western Pacific. The US also made clear Japan´s priority in bilateral Japanese-Chinese disputes over Diaoyu/Senkaku islands when State Department spokesman Victoria Nuland declared that the islands fall under the scope of Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan defense treaty (Nuland 2012). These factors constitute a continuum in US regional approach, regardless of who is in the White House. The US is also initiating Japanese-South Korean reconciliation (in order to be able to focus on regional threats) by trilateral security-related consultations and by maintaining a strong military presence despite some re-dislocation of American forces from Okinawa to Guam. In South Korea the US troops are in a peculiar situation: it is the only theatre where clear and present military threats are still on the table, which is why the US is maintaining a strong military presence, nevertheless US forces stationing here will make them more deployable outside the country (as was seen in cases of Iraq and Afghanistan). For both countries the US strategic shift means an increase of their general political and strategic importance, but with smaller exemptions there are few new elements.
Australia strengthens its position as a key US military ally. Besides increased military presence (rotational deployment in Darwin, Perth) there is a trend of strengthening the overall importance of US-Australian alliance, involving Australian forces in US-led operations (Afghanistan), strong support of bringing Australia closer with NATO, intensified consultations on security issues, trilateral US-Australian-Indian and quadrilateral (with Japanese involvement) consultations on security questions related to South- and South-Eastern Asia as well as strategic affairs. Australia clearly belongs to “winners” of the new trends which are increasing its political, military and strategic importance and also by more US focus on a region crucial to Australia´s security (South-East Asia).[9]
One of predictable changes is the area in the proximity of the Philippines. While the US militarily left Philippines after the Cold War there is a security Alliance between two countries and the US is committed to defense of Philippines. According to new global posture, some rotational[10] US troops will be deployed to islands to assist Philippine military training. The importance of this move was raised in the context of the recent Chinese-Philippine incidents (Scarborough Shoal). In this context the credibility of US engagement was more than significant for the region´s countries. The US representatives, including Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, confirmed that “While we do not take sides on the competing sovereignty claims to land features in the South China Sea, as a Pacific power we have a national interest in freedom of navigation, the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, and the unimpeded, lawful commerce across our sea lanes. The United States supports a collaborative diplomatic process by all those involved for resolving the various disputes that they encounter. We oppose the threat or use of force by any party to advance its claims. And we will remain in close contact with our ally, the Philippines” (Clinton 2012) … and “the U.S. values this great partnership and the importance of the Mutual Defense Treaty that remains the cornerstone of our security relationship” (Panetta 2012b). The issue of American credibility in times of economic troubles is crucial and the Obama administration started with a “regional-confirming-tournament” which was emphasized also by M. Flournoy and J. Davidson in a Foreign Affairs article: “Further South, U.S. naval and air forces engaged in Australia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand give allies in Southeast Asia greater confidence that the United States will not abandon the region at a time of great change and uncertainty” (Flournoy – Davidson 2012).
Vietnam belongs to “new partners” “discovered” by the Bush administration. Its position as a country close to the strategic pivot, South-China Sea and main naval transport routes give it a specific place in regional geostrategy. SLOC[11] close to Vietnam is crucial not only for the Chinese economy but also for Japan and South Korea. What’s more, the potential existence of gas and oil deposits is strengthening its importance even further. Because of territorial disputes (Paracel, Spratly) and a growing Chinese assertiveness in South China Sea, as well as Vietnam´s traditional rivalry with China, Hanoi is seeking an external power to counterbalance the increased Chinese geopolitical pressure towards the South. The US makes for an ideal partner from that point of view – thus strategic interests are helping bridge historical animosities.
India is the only country in South and South-Eastern Asia with global aspirations, and potential to partially counterbalance Chinese geopolitical influence in these regions. Moreover, in regard to significant capabilities of the Indian Navy, it allows the US naval forces to share the responsibility with a friendly actor – it also means increased warship numbers and operational cost considerations – in the area of the Indian Ocean. Moreover, India has significant influence in Afghanistan, Eastern Africa, South Asia and South-Eastern Asia, as well as nations of the Indian Ocean. India´s pre-eminence in the broader region is widely recognized by the Obama administration and declared also by current Defense Strategy: “The United States is also investing in a long-term strategic partnership with India to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region” (Priorities 2012, pp. 2). Any US administration in future will invest significant political resources and attention to deepen US-Indian partnership.
Instead of conclusions: the Chinese factor
The strategic discussion about future challenges in East Asia started almost immediately after the end of the Cold War – simultaneously with the launch of the debate about the future of the United States in global affairs. As the US became the most important global power with dominant presence in each strategic region and global reach, it transformed it into a “status quo power” in East Asia. From that position it has to answer the most important challenge of the future – rise of new centers of power, potentially competitors, with China as the most prominent example. The central question was – and still is – how to handle the rising Chinese influence and its consequences for the broader region. Basically there are two possible scenarios at the level of the theory. First, try to integrate Beijing into already existing international order, created and managed by the United States. It requires sharing responsibility – and influence – with China. This scenario is supported also by significant level of economic US-Chinese interdependence which – according to some theoretical schools – will significantly reduce the possibility of any conflict among them. Second, to build up strategic countermeasures in order to counterbalance Chinese power by traditional means, including regional alliances, increased military presence and maintain military superiority not only globally but also in the region. Although it is not the goal of this paper to predict the future, it is possible to say – even without a crystal ball – that the American strategy will be a combination of these two theoretical scenarios. Their weight will depend on the strategy and approach of individual administrations – but what is certain is that it will be the crucial strategic challenge for future American presidential administration for decades to come.
The Defense Strategy 2012 declares: “Over the long term, China’s emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect the U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways” (Priorities 2012, pp. 2). The US long-term approach was declared clearly, while China is not mentioned per se, nobody is questioning who is the subject of strategic calculus when “The United States will continue to make the necessary investments to ensure that we maintain regional access and the ability to operate freely in keeping with our treaty obligations and with international law… Working closely with our network of allies and partners, we will continue to promote a rules-based international order that ensures underlying stability and encourages the peaceful rise of new powers, economic dynamism, and constructive defense cooperation” (Priorities 2012, pp. 2). Moreover, “Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges” is among the key primary missions of US forces according to Strategy (Priorities 2012, pp. 4). On the other hand, similar declarations, mainly with focus on Chinese anti-access capabilities and securing American freedom of action were treated several times in previous administration´s documents, including QDRs.
With China as the only player able to challenge US positions in Asia-Pacific, the “new” approach of Obama administration will be tested by its ability to manage Beijing’s rise. The US will try to “shape strategic decisions” of China by a combination of military, political, diplomatic and economic steps. It is based to a large extent on Chinese strategies and which aspect will prevail: a gradual rise simultaneously with integration of Beijing into international system and network or a strategic rivalry.
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Panetta, Leon, 2012b, Remarks With Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario, and Philippines Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin After Their Meeting, April 2012, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/04/188982.htm, 14.9.2012
Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), 2006, United States Department of Defense, February 6, 2006, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf, 12.9.2012
Real Historical Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Shares and Growth Rates of GDP Shares for Baseline Countries/Regions (in percent) 1969-2012, Economic Research Service, Economic Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture, http://www.ers.usda.gov/datafiles/International_Macroeconomic_Data/Historical_Data_Files/HistoricalGDPSharesValues.xls, 31.8.2012
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, US Department of Defense, January 2012, hereafter “Priorities 2012”, http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf, 10.9.2012
Talev, Margaret, 2011, Asia Rise Drives Obama Message as U.S.’s First Pacific President, Bloomberg, November 16, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-11-16/asia-rise-drives-obama-message-as-u-s-s-first-pacific-president.html, 3.9.2012
Ten Kate, Daniel – Li, Susan, 2010, Indonesia Rejects China Stance that U.S. Stay Out of Local Waters Dispute, Bloomberg, September 22, 2010, http://www.bloomberg. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-22/indonesia-rejects-china-stance-that-u-s-stay-out-of-local-waters-dispute.html, 15.9.2012
The Jakarta Post,2011, New US base in RI’s backyard, November 17, 2011, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/11/17/new-us-base-ri-s-backyard.html, 15.9.2012
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2012, Analysis: China, http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH, 19.9.2012
Walker, Dinah, 2012, Trends in U.S. Military Spending, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/geoeconomics/trends-us-military-spending/p28855, 29.8.2012
[1] Even though by far the largest Cold War real-war engagements of US forces were in East Asia (Korean and Vietnam Wars)
[2] For details see: Background paper on SIPRI military expenditure data 2011, 2011, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/sipri-factsheet-on-military-expenditure-2011.pdf, (data from 2011).
[3] In 2011 the military spending decreased by 9 billion US Dollars, a first decrease after 1998. The 2013 defense budget will go down by approximately 50-60 billion USD, almost by 10 percent, which still represents about 630 billion USD. For details see: Walker, Dinah, 2012, Trends in U.S. Military Spending, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/geoeconomics/trends-us-military-spending/p28855.
[4] Real Historical Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Shares and Growth Rates of GDP Shares for Baseline Countries/Regions (in percent) 1969-2012, Economic Research Service, Economic Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture, http://www.ers.usda.gov/datafiles/International_Macroeconomic_Data/Historical_Data_Files/HistoricalGDPSharesValues.xls.
[5] The United States designated an Ambassator to ASEAN as the first non-ASEAN state (by G. Bush´s administration).
[6] Accounts for around a half of world container traffic and approximately 75% of Chinese oil imports (6 million bbl/d by May 2012). U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2012, Analysis: China, http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH.
[7] The US Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta signed the Air-Sea Battle Concept (ASBC) into effect in 2011 and in November 2011 the Pentagon announced the establishment of Air-Sea Battle Office. The ASB´s ultimate goal is to enable US forces to counter current and future threats posed by advance capabilities as long-range conventional ballistic missiles and cruise-missiles, electronic and cyber capabilities, submarines, integrated air and missile defense systems, etc. majority of them belonging to the so-called “anti-access capabilities” which are developed most exclusively by Chinese military. It is the reason why the ASBC is seen as one of crucial elements of US-counter strategy to growing Chinese presence and assertiveness in South-East Asia. According to General Schwartz and Admiral Greenert, key personalities of realization of ASBC, Air-Sea Battle Concept will use “Networked, Integrated Attack-in-Depth” to “disrupt, destroy, and defeat” (NIA-D3) adversary capabilities. A joint force has to be created (integrated air, ground, and naval forces) “armed with resilient communications (networked) aims to strike at multiple nodes of an enemy’s system (attack-in-depth) along three lines of effort. If we can consider these lines in terms of an enemy archer, one could choose to blind the archer (disrupt), kill the archer (destroy), or stop his arrow (defeat). Balanced capabilities geared towards executing all three will be required.” Forbes, J., Randy, 2012, America’s Pacific Air-Sea Battle Vision, The Diplomat, March 8, 2012, http://thediplomat.com/2012/03/08/americas-pacific-air-sea-battle-vision/.
[8] “Anti-access capabilities/strategies” are described as those which are trying to significantly limit the possibilities of the United States forces to project power into particular regions. Typically one concurrent power is trying to deny US access to its coastal or near-to-coastal waters, for example South-China See. For more see the Annual Department of Defense reports to US Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China. For the 2011 report see: Annual Report To Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011, US Department of Defense, 2011, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_CMPR_Final.pdf. For 2012 report see: Annual Report To Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2012, US Department of Defense, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2012_CMPR_Final.pdf.
[9] South-East Asia´s place in Australian strategic culture is crucial: from geographical point of view it is the first line of Australia’s defense.
[10] The “rotational nature” of new US deployments will be crucial – as it will differ from large constant “Cold-War-like” bases. There is lot of emphasis on this “new approach” by American representatives, see for example both former and current Secretaries of Defense speeches, Donald Rumsfeld´s and Leon Panetta´s most recent speech at Shari-La dialogue: Panetta, Leon, 2012a, Speech at the 11th IISS Asia Security Summit, The Shangri-La Dialogue, First Plenary Session – The US Rebalance Towards the Asia-Pacific, Singapore, June 2, 2012, http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2012/speeches/first-plenary-session/leon-panetta/.
[11] Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC)
Ondrejcsák, Róbert, 2012, The United State´s Strategic Shift Towards the Pacific – Continuity and Change, In: Majer, M. – Ondrejcsák, R. – Tarasovič, V. (eds.): Panorama of global security environment 2012. Bratislava: CENAA, pp. 25-41.
This analysis was written by
Ondrejcsák Róbert – who has 14 posts on this site
Dr. Róbert Ondrejcsák holds PhD. in International Relations, Mgr in Political Science, History and Philosophy. In 2010-2012 Dr. Ondrejcsák was State Secretary of Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic, where he led the process of Strategic Defence Review and preparation of White Book on Defence. Dr. Ondrejcsák was responsible for security policy, NATO and EU issues, as well as international multilateral and bilateral cooperation. In 2007-2010 he was a Director of Center for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA) and lecturer at the Faculty of Political Science and International Relations at Matej Bel University. Previously Dr. Ondrejcsák was a Director of the Institute for Security and Defence Studies (research centre of the Slovak Ministry of Defence), he also served as a Deputy Chief of Mission of the Slovak Embassy to Hungary, as well as Foreign and Security Policy advisor to Vice-Chairman of the Slovak Parliament, advisor of the NATO Department at the Slovak Ministry of Defence and analyst of the Slovak Centre for Strategic Studies. Dr. Ondrejcsák is a co-founder of Panorama of global security environment and Transatlantic Files. He is author and editor of numerous publications about international relations and security policy. He is lecturer at several universities and member of advisory board of numerous journals in Slovakia and abroad.
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