The Gathering Storm in the Ukraine

April 17, 2014

Gathering storm: Russia would find holding territory in Ukraine harder than taking it

The Economist

ACCORDING to satellite pictures and military intelligence, some 50,000 Russian troops are massed along the border with Ukraine. The forces represent a substantial fraction of Russia’s 270,000-strong army, and they cannot indefinitely maintain the high state of readiness they have been in since early March, not least because it is now the time of year when conscripts at the end of their term have to be sent home, and new ones trained.

Ukraine’s armed forces are, by comparison, small, ill-equipped and out of position. Ukraine has just 77,000 troops. The interior ministry’s paramilitary forces are of similar number, but in the south and east of the country their loyalty may be questionable. A reserve of 1m men might theoretically be mobilised—all those who are within five years of completing their military service—but it would probably be poorly disciplined, and of very limited use.

Russia spends more on its armed forces than any other country save China and America—$88 billion in 2013, half as much again as Britain. According to SIPRI, a research institute, its spending is increasing fast as deficiencies exposed in the 2008 war against Georgia are put right. On the other hand, Ukraine’s military spending amounted to $2.4 billion last year. Its forces are mainly equipped with Soviet-era tanks and field guns. Ukraine’s 36 Su-27 fighter aircraft are based in Crimea, and thus grounded. It has 90 smaller MiG-29s and some other aircraft capable of ground-attack missions, according to the latest edition of the “Military Balance” published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. But they would be overwhelmed by the far greater number of similar aircraft carrying more up-to-date missiles and radars that Russia has at its disposal. Ukraine’s air-defence system is a ropy Soviet-era remnant.

And Ukraine’s forces are in the wrong place, positioned in the West as if to counter an attack from NATO. Without significant bases or pre-positioned equipment east of the Dnieper river, which divides the country, Ukraine’s armed forces would be unable to offer much resistance to Russian military incursions. NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, US Air Force General Philip Breedlove, says that the force Russia has deployed along the border “is ready to go and we think it could accomplish its objectives in between three and five days if directed to make the actions.”

Much depends on what those objectives would actually be. One possibility is opening up a land corridor to Crimea through Donetsk and Mariupol. Another is a corridor extending from Crimea to Transdniestria, a pro-Russian breakaway territory in Moldova which is home to a Russian army, by way of Odessa. A third, extreme, option might be splitting the country along the Dnieper.

However, Russian military planners are almost certainly advising Vladimir Putin that, although an incursion with a strictly limited objective against weak defences might easily be achieved, occupying a large tract of land against the wishes of most of the people who live there is far harder. Getting bogged down and exposed to attacks by Ukrainian irregular forces would be all too likely. Stationing lots of troops in Ukraine indefinitely would have ramifications elsewhere, stretching forces in volatile regions such as the north Caucasus and Central Asia. On top of this, Mr Putin cannot be entirely confident about how his forces would perform. Their post-Georgia modernisation is a work in progress, with poor command and control and logistics hampered by incompatible equipment.

According to a recent biography of Mr Putin, one of his first KGB instructors complained that he had “a lowered sense of danger”. Faced with a decision to send his forces into Ukraine or stand them down, it is possible that not even he yet knows which he will choose.