Wednesday, 16 April 2014 | Ashok K Mehta |
The ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons is a policy that security experts are best equipped to address. Politicians will do well to consult them before making grand statements. Moreover, time has come to re-visit the NFU
By declaring that his party would leave unchanged, its ‘no first use policy, BJP president Rajnath Singh appears to have been hustled into not reversing it, preempting, as stated in the party’s manifesto, any ‘meaningful’ revision and update of nuclear doctrine to the make it relevant to the contemporary strategic environment. Admittedly, this premature response to the criticism levelled against a speculative change of policy first adopted by the NDA Government will only dilute the review process, which is an idea whose time has come.
National Security Advisory Board convenor Shyam Saran has been urging that the nuclear doctrine be made public, debated and revised in order to strengthen India’s credible minimum deterrent. In view of the geo-strategic changes, especially in relation to Pakistan’s growing nuclear capability and the increasing strategic gap between China and India, and more confounding, the security alliance between Pakistan and China, this exercise is necessary for deterrence stability and escalation control in the region. Ideally any review posture should be preceded by a Strategic Defence and Security Review, one that has never been done in the country. This will define the contours of the evolving geo-strategic environment.
The speculation about renunciation of the NFU has derived from statements attributed to National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon during a lecture at the National Defence College, though the articulation that the NFU applies to non-nuclear weapon states only has never been confirmed. Recent internal debate among BJP strategists has fuelled thoughts about abandoning the NFU. As late as last year, Mr Saran said India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, but if attacked with even a tactical nuclear weapon, the retaliation will be massive and designed to cause unacceptable damage. Different authorities have made differently worded policy statements which need to be brought at par, though many believe that the NFU is piously declaratory and can be rescinded in a crisis.
The unquestionable logic of First Use Nuclear, or FUN, goes back to the Cold War era when conventionally inferior Nato forces were required to deter the overwhelmingly conventionally superior Warsaw Pact armies from sweeping across central Europe. Nuclear deterrence worked to prevent both a conventional campaign and nuclear war-fighting with the use of tactical nuclear weapons. This deterrence theory has worked between India and Pakistan, but with a caveat: While it has prevented a full-blown conventional war, it has not deterred a Kargil or a terrorist attack. Ironically, Pakistan has crafted space below the nuclear threshold to continue sponsoring terrorist attacks and similar misadventures. India has been unable to exploit this space with its superior conventional forces to deter sub-conventional terrorist assaults.
Bar the Kargil skirmish (1999), there has been no war after India inflicted a humiliating defeat to Pakistan in 1971, and that pain and New Delhi’s conventional superiority has deterred Pakistan from indulging in bravado till the tit0-for-tat nuclear tests in 1998, when India, in a catch-22 situation, lost its conventional edge against Pakistan to win a strategic equaliser with China.
The biggest defect in the credible minimum deterrent is over its credibility — credibility of nuclear forces due to a variety of contestations between nuclear scientists about yield etc, which have not been set to rest; and credibility of political will, that “we will do what we say we will do”. In other words, credibility of a second strike after riding out the first. Our challenge is in dealing with Pakistan which holds India’s resolve to retaliate with a second strike at very low credibility. Given the empirical evidence of political dithering even after a terror strike, it does not believe the leadership has the political will to hit back with nuclear weapons.. What use is military or strategic capability if, in the eyes of the adversary, it is seen as unusable?
Looking back, it would seem we have erred on the side of caution or strategic restraint. In Kargil we preferred joining battle to evict intrusions by declaring the Line of Control will not be crossed and surrendering strategic options. The same restraint was demonstrated after the attack on Parliament, to be followed by zero military response after Mumbai.
Pakistan is the only Islamic country which has usable nuclear weapons that are India-centric, and both its nuclear arsenal and delivery capability are superior to India’s. By successful lowering of the nuclear threshold and rationally portraying its irrationality, Islamabad has reduced the space for politically significant conventional military operations. Dealing with this innovatively will likely enhance the credibility of political will for conventional and nuclear retaliation. Pakistan believes its FUN has deterred India’s response to a terrorist attack. Islamabad must be acquainted with risks attached to such misconceptions through resumed nuclear risk-reduction dialogue and appropriate deeds.
With China, India has plenty of catching up to do, both conventionally and strategically. Typically, Beijing neither recognises India as a nuclear weapons state nor will it engage it in a nuclear discourse in any strategic conversation. This impasse has to be broken. Re-visiting the nuclear doctrine is the opportunity to clear the cobwebs about the NFU. Of the nine nuclear weapon states, only two — India and China — espouse the NFU; the Chinese with the qualification that its nuclear weapons will not be used against non-nuclear weapon states and on its soil. This relates to all its territorial claims. The review process should weigh political correctness and diplomatic niceties of the NFU against operational disadvantages. If India decides to drop the NFU eventually, it will join any Universal NFU Treaty. Other issues for review are: Do dirty bombs breach NFU; configuring credible minimum force, massive retaliation, unacceptable damage, survivability of forces and leadership and selective EMP hardening of nuclear assets.
The military must enjoy the strictest confidence in assured credibility of nuclear force, its capacity to deter and if deterrence fails, the resolve of the political leadership to retaliate. Strategic signalling must disabuse Pakistani thinking that India is self-deterred. After the strategic and doctrinal review, an all-party meeting should adopt the revised nuclear doctrine in Parliament. The NFU or the FUN must be accompanied with a strong message that any terrorist attack that can be sourced to the neighbourhood will attract severe military reprisals. The NSAB’s ongoing programmes of educating young MPs is a good start. Let us become serious about nuclear doctrine and national security. Let nuclear experts, not Mr Singh, decide India’s nuclear doctrine.
The ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons is a policy that security experts are best equipped to address. Politicians will do well to consult them before making grand statements. Moreover, time has come to re-visit the NFU
By declaring that his party would leave unchanged, its ‘no first use policy, BJP president Rajnath Singh appears to have been hustled into not reversing it, preempting, as stated in the party’s manifesto, any ‘meaningful’ revision and update of nuclear doctrine to the make it relevant to the contemporary strategic environment. Admittedly, this premature response to the criticism levelled against a speculative change of policy first adopted by the NDA Government will only dilute the review process, which is an idea whose time has come.
National Security Advisory Board convenor Shyam Saran has been urging that the nuclear doctrine be made public, debated and revised in order to strengthen India’s credible minimum deterrent. In view of the geo-strategic changes, especially in relation to Pakistan’s growing nuclear capability and the increasing strategic gap between China and India, and more confounding, the security alliance between Pakistan and China, this exercise is necessary for deterrence stability and escalation control in the region. Ideally any review posture should be preceded by a Strategic Defence and Security Review, one that has never been done in the country. This will define the contours of the evolving geo-strategic environment.
The speculation about renunciation of the NFU has derived from statements attributed to National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon during a lecture at the National Defence College, though the articulation that the NFU applies to non-nuclear weapon states only has never been confirmed. Recent internal debate among BJP strategists has fuelled thoughts about abandoning the NFU. As late as last year, Mr Saran said India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, but if attacked with even a tactical nuclear weapon, the retaliation will be massive and designed to cause unacceptable damage. Different authorities have made differently worded policy statements which need to be brought at par, though many believe that the NFU is piously declaratory and can be rescinded in a crisis.
The unquestionable logic of First Use Nuclear, or FUN, goes back to the Cold War era when conventionally inferior Nato forces were required to deter the overwhelmingly conventionally superior Warsaw Pact armies from sweeping across central Europe. Nuclear deterrence worked to prevent both a conventional campaign and nuclear war-fighting with the use of tactical nuclear weapons. This deterrence theory has worked between India and Pakistan, but with a caveat: While it has prevented a full-blown conventional war, it has not deterred a Kargil or a terrorist attack. Ironically, Pakistan has crafted space below the nuclear threshold to continue sponsoring terrorist attacks and similar misadventures. India has been unable to exploit this space with its superior conventional forces to deter sub-conventional terrorist assaults.
Bar the Kargil skirmish (1999), there has been no war after India inflicted a humiliating defeat to Pakistan in 1971, and that pain and New Delhi’s conventional superiority has deterred Pakistan from indulging in bravado till the tit0-for-tat nuclear tests in 1998, when India, in a catch-22 situation, lost its conventional edge against Pakistan to win a strategic equaliser with China.
The biggest defect in the credible minimum deterrent is over its credibility — credibility of nuclear forces due to a variety of contestations between nuclear scientists about yield etc, which have not been set to rest; and credibility of political will, that “we will do what we say we will do”. In other words, credibility of a second strike after riding out the first. Our challenge is in dealing with Pakistan which holds India’s resolve to retaliate with a second strike at very low credibility. Given the empirical evidence of political dithering even after a terror strike, it does not believe the leadership has the political will to hit back with nuclear weapons.. What use is military or strategic capability if, in the eyes of the adversary, it is seen as unusable?
Looking back, it would seem we have erred on the side of caution or strategic restraint. In Kargil we preferred joining battle to evict intrusions by declaring the Line of Control will not be crossed and surrendering strategic options. The same restraint was demonstrated after the attack on Parliament, to be followed by zero military response after Mumbai.
Pakistan is the only Islamic country which has usable nuclear weapons that are India-centric, and both its nuclear arsenal and delivery capability are superior to India’s. By successful lowering of the nuclear threshold and rationally portraying its irrationality, Islamabad has reduced the space for politically significant conventional military operations. Dealing with this innovatively will likely enhance the credibility of political will for conventional and nuclear retaliation. Pakistan believes its FUN has deterred India’s response to a terrorist attack. Islamabad must be acquainted with risks attached to such misconceptions through resumed nuclear risk-reduction dialogue and appropriate deeds.
With China, India has plenty of catching up to do, both conventionally and strategically. Typically, Beijing neither recognises India as a nuclear weapons state nor will it engage it in a nuclear discourse in any strategic conversation. This impasse has to be broken. Re-visiting the nuclear doctrine is the opportunity to clear the cobwebs about the NFU. Of the nine nuclear weapon states, only two — India and China — espouse the NFU; the Chinese with the qualification that its nuclear weapons will not be used against non-nuclear weapon states and on its soil. This relates to all its territorial claims. The review process should weigh political correctness and diplomatic niceties of the NFU against operational disadvantages. If India decides to drop the NFU eventually, it will join any Universal NFU Treaty. Other issues for review are: Do dirty bombs breach NFU; configuring credible minimum force, massive retaliation, unacceptable damage, survivability of forces and leadership and selective EMP hardening of nuclear assets.
The military must enjoy the strictest confidence in assured credibility of nuclear force, its capacity to deter and if deterrence fails, the resolve of the political leadership to retaliate. Strategic signalling must disabuse Pakistani thinking that India is self-deterred. After the strategic and doctrinal review, an all-party meeting should adopt the revised nuclear doctrine in Parliament. The NFU or the FUN must be accompanied with a strong message that any terrorist attack that can be sourced to the neighbourhood will attract severe military reprisals. The NSAB’s ongoing programmes of educating young MPs is a good start. Let us become serious about nuclear doctrine and national security. Let nuclear experts, not Mr Singh, decide India’s nuclear doctrine.
No comments:
Post a Comment