26 April 2014

Not Post-American Yet

Published on The National Interest (http://nationalinterest.org)
April 25, 2014

Several years ago, in the course of the great recession and the aftermath of the Iraq and Afghanistan invasions, a wave of books depicted, dissected, and debated America's purported decline. Excellent scholars and writers, from Ikenberry [3] to Kupchan [4] to Kagan [5] to Edelman [6] to Zakaria [7] to Friedman and Mandelbaum [8] toLieber [9] to Bremmer [10] to Brzezinski [11], examined America's power in the context of a rapidly changing international system. The debate was evocative of the late 1980s, when Paul Kennedy and Samuel Huntington led a similar national discussion during what should have been a geopolitically happy time, the period of Soviet glasnost and perestroika followed by the end of the Cold War, but which became a period in which America doubted its long-term competitiveness and thus its long-term ability to remain a superpower. This time, the stakes are arguably greater still. Instead of Japan and Germany worrying America about its future ability to sustain preeminence, it is a somewhat less friendly China that is providing much of the basis for concern.

Into this debate now steps Bruce Jones, my colleague at the Brookings Institution but also the director of the New York University Center on International Cooperation. That latter vantage point has provided Jones a perspective many scholars who write on this weighty subject do not have, as he has been a close and careful student of the workings of the UN system as well as many other dimensions of the contemporary international order. Armed with that perspective, as well as his remarkable breadth that makes him a rock-solid student of global economics, military affairs, energy markets, and various other aspects of today's world, Jones has produced what may be my single favorite book in the whole decline debate: Still Ours to Lead: America, Rising Powers, and the Tension Between Rivalry and Restraint [12].

On balance, Still Ours To Lead is an encouraging book about the United States and its role in the international system today and in the future. And that should be welcome news at this particular moment. While America's economy is doing somewhat better and China's is slowing, relative to a couple years ago, the basis for angst about our nation's future is still quite great even at this juncture in 2014. Everything from Iran and North Korea to Putin's shenanigans in Ukraine to the poor state of great-power relations in Northeast Asia to the souring of the Arab spring to a general sense of American fatigue and disengagement globally make this a moment of national hand-wringing about what lies ahead. Persistently poor showings on international education metrics, polarized politics in Washington and budget trends that augur badly for our competitiveness in the future (even if federal deficits are temporarily smaller these days) add to the sense of woe.

Jones is far from complacent about this nation's problems. Indeed, his original working title for the book, as he informs us in the introduction, was "Still Ours to Lose"—implying not too subtly that we could indeed enter a period of sustained and significant decline if we made bad decisions. That possible future is still one of the scenarios that could await us. But only if we collectively blow it.

Jones' basis for guarded optimism about the United States, and more generally the international system that it largely built and still upholds in various ways, includes some of the metrics that I have found compelling in my research and writings as well. America still leads the way in global research and development spending, in the quality of our universities, in innovation and patents, in advanced manufacturing of pharmaceuticals and aerospace and other key cutting-edge technologies, and in the openness and transparency and legal dependability of our investment and business climates. Despite our failure to enact immigration reform, we remain the world's most alluring melting pot, and arguably have the healthiest demographic profile of any major power (modest real population growth, and a population that is not aging nearly as fast as Europe's, Japan's, Russia's or China's). Despite our gradual pullback from the Middle East, and mixed record in recent wars there, we of course have far and away the world's strongest military.

In much of this discussion, Jones echoes Robert Kagan's short and impressive book from a couple years ago, The World America Made. That tome provided not only a concise summary of America's enduring strengths, but a timely reminder of the fact that today's world, as peaceful and prosperous as it has generally become by historical standards, did not arise on its own and will not be sustainable on its own anytime soon.

But Jones really hits his stride when discussing the multilateral aspects of today's world that are so organic to how it functions—and so inherently favorable to reinforcing America's position within it. He emphasizes that our strength today depends largely on alliances and coalitions, not just simple accounting ledgers showing our national power—and we are actually fairly good at coalition management, for all our flaws and foibles in particular cases. In military terms, the United States has several dozen allies that account for at least 30 percent of world defense spending on top of the 40 percent we provide ourselves. In political terms, we are the most powerful democracy in a world increasingly run by the democracies—a statement that holds up even in light of China's rise. In the economic realm, we are arguably among the countries most comfortable with, and naturally suited to, globalization in a world increasingly dominated by interconnectedness.

Jones has an excellent feel for the achievements and future aspirations of countries such as Brazil, Turkey, India and Indonesia. He has watched from close up how they work individually and collectively to try to employ and adapt the international system to their liking. He points out that much of global governance today is about issues like intrastate conflict, energy and climate security, economic integration and growth, and promotion of human rights and human dignity. On these issues, the rising powers around the world do have certain expectations and desires. They are making their voices heard and their newfound muscle felt in how the issues are raised, in international fora from New York to Washington to Geneva and in the day to day workings of the international economy. Established powers accustomed to deference from the weaker states of the developing world will have to accept the fact that those days are gone.

However, the crucial point for the future is that, as Jones sees it, the rising powers are not interested in a global revolution because they are smart and pragmatic enough to recognize that today's international order is generally a pretty good start on where they want to go. Not every aspect of it is optimized to their liking, of course, but it constitutes a sound strategic edifice that is a good starting point for their interests. It is far better modified and revamped here and there than discarded altogether. The very fact that the BRICS—Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa—and other nations have been rising so impressively demonstrates that an open international system works well for most. The fact that American power and leadership help uphold the stability and safety of this system is lost on very few. The alternatives to a U.S.-led international order, if they exist, have not really been identified by any credible theorists, writers or statesmen.

Two central conclusions stand out in my mind after reading the book. Both are impossible to miss because both are the titles of individual chapters in this highly accessible and reader-friendly 250-page manuscript. First, there is "no mortar in the BRICS." Jones's point is hardly to denigrate the achievements of any of the rising powers. Rather, it is to argue, originally and persuasively, that they do not and will not constitute an alternative geostrategic bloc to the EU/NATO/G7/Western community of advanced democracies more generally, or to any other existing grouping of nations. Their interests do not naturally coalesce around any clear agenda; they disagree with each other as often as they agree; many of their interests in fact align with those of the established powers and are best pursued cooperatively. Moreover, they have figured this out already, themselves.

Second, America and China are not natural friends in every sense of the word, but they are hardly likely to become enemies either. As Jones writes, they are "competitors, not Cold Warriors." Surely, everyone watching the international scene today is aware of the dangers within this crucial relationship, stoked as they often are by the complexities of relations between China and America's key East Asian allies. So while the future is far from predictable, the case for hopefulness about this relationship and thus the prospects for great-power peace more generally in the decades ahead is on balance rather strong. The two countries need each other, benefit from each other—and again, they are both smart enough to know it.

That reality hardly guarantees peace in 2014 and beyond, just as a similar if shallower interdependence did not prevent Europe of 1914 from going to war. But a cold and careful prognostication based on the realities of today's world still should leave one more hopeful than not. And that is a very welcome message in these unsettled times.

Michael O'Hanlon, senior fellow at Brookings, is coauthor with Jim Steinberg of the new book, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: U.S.-China Relations in the 21st Century [13].


Links:
[1] http://www.addthis.com/bookmark.php?v=250&username=nationalinterest
[2] http://nationalinterest.org/profile/michael-ohanlon
[3] http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0691156174/ref=as_li_ss_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=0691156174&linkCode=as2&tag=thenatiinte-20
[4] http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0199325227/ref=as_li_ss_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=0199325227&linkCode=as2&tag=thenatiinte-20
[5] http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0345802713/ref=as_li_ss_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=0345802713&linkCode=as2&tag=thenatiinte-20
[6] http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1595589368/ref=as_li_ss_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=1595589368&linkCode=as2&tag=thenatiinte-20
[7] http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0393340384/ref=as_li_ss_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=0393340384&linkCode=as2&tag=thenatiinte-20
[8] http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B0085RZAMI/ref=as_li_ss_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=B0085RZAMI&linkCode=as2&tag=thenatiinte-20
[9] http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/052128127X/ref=as_li_ss_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=052128127X&linkCode=as2&tag=thenatiinte-20
[10] http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B00B1L1ICG/ref=as_li_ss_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=B00B1L1ICG&linkCode=as2&tag=thenatiinte-20
[11] http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/046502954X/ref=as_li_ss_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=046502954X&linkCode=as2&tag=thenatiinte-20
[12] http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0815725973/ref=as_li_ss_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=0815725973&linkCode=as2&tag=thenatiinte-20
[13] http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0691159513/ref=as_li_ss_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=0691159513&linkCode=as2&tag=thenatiinte-20
[14] http://nationalinterest.org/topic/global-governance
[15] http://nationalinterest.org/region/americas/north-america/united-states
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