http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2014/04/25/matt-gurney-if-putin-wants-ukraine-nato-wont-stop-him/
Matt Gurney | April 25, 2014 |
AP Photo/Efrem LukatskyA self-defense activist performs military exercises at a military training ground outside Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, March 31, 2014.
There was a frightening moment in Ukraine earlier this week. A mixture of Ukrainian Interior Ministry paramilitary personnel and army infantry were conducting “anti-terror” operations against pro-Russian forces in eastern Ukraine. Barricades were smashed, and shots exchanged. Casualties were reported — perhaps as many as five pro-Russians killed (there’s some confusion on this point, but at the very least, some confirmed deaths). But the Ukrainian forces suddenly broke off their attacks and pulled back, apparently because the central government in Kyiv had concluded that a Russian invasion was imminent. In the panic, they pulled the plug on their operations and regrouped their forces.
There was no invasion. The Russian military forces just over the border — an estimated 40,000 troops, with air support — were not crossing the frontier, they were staging exercises. But Ukraine was not wrong to fear such an attack. Russia’s military isn’t exactly a First World fighting force — it is large, but relies heavily on Cold War vintage equipment and one-year conscripts for its manpower. Yet it could still take on Ukraine’s forces, which are smaller and also underfunded and largely obsolete, as well as beset by worrying questions about the loyalty of many of its troops, some of whom may have ethnic or family ties to Russia.
There’s a lot of unknowns here, and that applies equally for all the concerned parties. Western defence experts seem to be approaching a consensus that Russia can’t invade and occupy all of Ukraine, but if it makes a limited grab for chunks of it, it can probably take and hold it. If that’s the plan, though, Russia had better act fast. It is time for it to discharge its conscripts and begin training the next batch. Better to go to war with trained troops than new enlistees, and training takes six months. If Russia is going to act, it will have to go soon.
Will it? Who knows? Putin has played a smart game so far, pushing aggressively against his neighbours and banking (correctly) that the West wouldn’t do much about it. Actually invading large swathes of a foreign country, however, is a major step (Crimea’s history and geographic made that a special case, but those factors don’t apply throughout the rest of Ukraine).
That’s the argument against invasion. But there’s also the counterargument, and it’s one that I’m more sympathetic to, that says, when a man says he’s willing to invade a sovereign country to defend “strategic [ethnic] minorities” there, and sends tens of thousands of troops to the border, and when this man already has a history of invading his neighbours, it’s worth taking him at his word. Russia says that if Ukraine cracks down on ethnic Russians living in Ukraine, even if those ethnic Russians are in rebellion against the Kyiv government, it will respond strongly to any such “crimes.” To ignore what Putin is saying in favour of what we hope he’s saying is dangerous.
The Ukrainians are taking him seriously, obviously, and few could blame them. But the West either isn’t buying what Putin is saying, or, more probably, has decided that Ukraine is on its own. Western reinforcements are moving into position in Eastern Europe’s NATO members, including a small detachment of Canadian CF-18 fighter jets. The alliance has been clear, however, that these forces are to reassure and, if necessary, protect, the NATO allies that directly border Russia. Ukraine isn’t in NATO, and there have been no direct offers of military aid to Ukraine.
Instead, the Obama administration is musing about tougher, broader sanctions. How tough and how broad? Probably not all that broad, or particularly tough. To be effective, the sanctions would need to be coordinated with the allies, and most European countries have deep trade ties with Russia. North America could afford to largely write off the Russians, but Europe would be cutting off its nose to spite its face if it cracked down hard (and that’s not even getting into its dependence on Russian natural gas). So the sanctions that the West would levy if Moscow gobbled up some more of Ukraine would be weak. Even President Obama himself is acknowledging that “additional sanctions may not change Mr. Putin’s calculus.”
So no military help for Ukraine. Probably not any sanctions, and we don’t expect those to really work, even if they happen. I’m not sure what the West washing its hands of the situation would look like, but it probably wouldn’t be all that different than this.
Putin may still not invade. It may be too much risk for limited gain. But whatever he decides, it’ll be for his own reasons. The West seems intent to sit this one out, and he knows it. And probably always did.
National Post
Matt Gurney | April 25, 2014 |
AP Photo/Efrem LukatskyA self-defense activist performs military exercises at a military training ground outside Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, March 31, 2014.
There was a frightening moment in Ukraine earlier this week. A mixture of Ukrainian Interior Ministry paramilitary personnel and army infantry were conducting “anti-terror” operations against pro-Russian forces in eastern Ukraine. Barricades were smashed, and shots exchanged. Casualties were reported — perhaps as many as five pro-Russians killed (there’s some confusion on this point, but at the very least, some confirmed deaths). But the Ukrainian forces suddenly broke off their attacks and pulled back, apparently because the central government in Kyiv had concluded that a Russian invasion was imminent. In the panic, they pulled the plug on their operations and regrouped their forces.
There was no invasion. The Russian military forces just over the border — an estimated 40,000 troops, with air support — were not crossing the frontier, they were staging exercises. But Ukraine was not wrong to fear such an attack. Russia’s military isn’t exactly a First World fighting force — it is large, but relies heavily on Cold War vintage equipment and one-year conscripts for its manpower. Yet it could still take on Ukraine’s forces, which are smaller and also underfunded and largely obsolete, as well as beset by worrying questions about the loyalty of many of its troops, some of whom may have ethnic or family ties to Russia.
There’s a lot of unknowns here, and that applies equally for all the concerned parties. Western defence experts seem to be approaching a consensus that Russia can’t invade and occupy all of Ukraine, but if it makes a limited grab for chunks of it, it can probably take and hold it. If that’s the plan, though, Russia had better act fast. It is time for it to discharge its conscripts and begin training the next batch. Better to go to war with trained troops than new enlistees, and training takes six months. If Russia is going to act, it will have to go soon.
Will it? Who knows? Putin has played a smart game so far, pushing aggressively against his neighbours and banking (correctly) that the West wouldn’t do much about it. Actually invading large swathes of a foreign country, however, is a major step (Crimea’s history and geographic made that a special case, but those factors don’t apply throughout the rest of Ukraine).
That’s the argument against invasion. But there’s also the counterargument, and it’s one that I’m more sympathetic to, that says, when a man says he’s willing to invade a sovereign country to defend “strategic [ethnic] minorities” there, and sends tens of thousands of troops to the border, and when this man already has a history of invading his neighbours, it’s worth taking him at his word. Russia says that if Ukraine cracks down on ethnic Russians living in Ukraine, even if those ethnic Russians are in rebellion against the Kyiv government, it will respond strongly to any such “crimes.” To ignore what Putin is saying in favour of what we hope he’s saying is dangerous.
The Ukrainians are taking him seriously, obviously, and few could blame them. But the West either isn’t buying what Putin is saying, or, more probably, has decided that Ukraine is on its own. Western reinforcements are moving into position in Eastern Europe’s NATO members, including a small detachment of Canadian CF-18 fighter jets. The alliance has been clear, however, that these forces are to reassure and, if necessary, protect, the NATO allies that directly border Russia. Ukraine isn’t in NATO, and there have been no direct offers of military aid to Ukraine.
Instead, the Obama administration is musing about tougher, broader sanctions. How tough and how broad? Probably not all that broad, or particularly tough. To be effective, the sanctions would need to be coordinated with the allies, and most European countries have deep trade ties with Russia. North America could afford to largely write off the Russians, but Europe would be cutting off its nose to spite its face if it cracked down hard (and that’s not even getting into its dependence on Russian natural gas). So the sanctions that the West would levy if Moscow gobbled up some more of Ukraine would be weak. Even President Obama himself is acknowledging that “additional sanctions may not change Mr. Putin’s calculus.”
So no military help for Ukraine. Probably not any sanctions, and we don’t expect those to really work, even if they happen. I’m not sure what the West washing its hands of the situation would look like, but it probably wouldn’t be all that different than this.
Putin may still not invade. It may be too much risk for limited gain. But whatever he decides, it’ll be for his own reasons. The West seems intent to sit this one out, and he knows it. And probably always did.
National Post
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