Rakesh Sood
The Agni-IV intermediate range ballistic missile on parade during Republic Day
INDIA’S nuclear journey can be categorised into two broad parts, the ‘retrospect,’ covering the period from 1947 to 2008, and the other being the ‘prospect’ phase post-2008, which is still unfolding and whose achievements are yet to be fully harvested. Notwithstanding these phases, an element of continuity is reflected in three policy constituents – an Indian worldview, political will and a military-technical capability, which has to keep evolving.
The first phase actually began even before Independence when Dr Homi Bhabha wrote to the Sir Dorabji Tata Trust in 1944, drawing attention to the enormous potential of nuclear technology and suggesting the setting up of the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research. After Independence, things moved rapidly – establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1948, commissioning of the research reactor, Apsara, in 1956, and by 1969, the Tarapur power plant was on line. It was an optimistic period marked by the sentiment behind ‘Atoms for Peace’ and the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency with the idea of promoting international cooperation for peaceful applications.
India spelt out its three stage nuclear power programme with its closed fuel cycle, which remains an integral part of the Department of Atomic Energy’s mandate. This was also the phase when India took a number of disarmament initiatives to curb nuclear testing and the spread of nuclear weapons. However, during the 60s, particularly after the India-China war in 1962 and the Chinese nuclear test in 1964, there was a rethink. The nuclear issue had entered our security calculus for the first time and in the resolution at the All India Congress Committee Session at Durgapur in 1965, failure to obtain security guarantees from the US, USSR, UK and France, and the Indian rejection of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NTP) in 1969, lay the seeds of the ‘nuclear option.’
The 1974 Peaceful Nuclear Explosion demonstrated Indian capability but also attracted international criticism and sanctions. For the next quarter century, India’s nuclear policy was marked by restraint even though safeguarding the ‘nuclear option’ remained an article of faith with successive governments. The Indian nuclear establishment was forced to rely on indigenisation, leading to inevitable delays. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was set up. Meanwhile, during the 1980’s, the international community turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear weaponisation and acquisition of missile capability, with its implications for our security environment.
The end of the Cold War generated optimism about the prospects for nuclear disarmament but this was short-lived. The focus was on tackling proliferation threats, leading to further expansion of export control regimes to cover dual use goods and technologies. The indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT in 1995 was another indicator that salience of nuclear weapons was not going to come down any time soon. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations yielded an outcome which fell short of our expectations in being neither comprehensive nor a ban. There were growing concerns that the ‘nuclear option’ which had been safeguarded since 1974 could well cease to be a ‘credible option’ and wither on the vine.
The third phase began with the nuclear tests in mid-1998 when India declared itself a nuclear weapon state. Initially, the international reaction was strong. However, with sustained diplomatic efforts and changes in the international environment, particularly the realisation of the threat of global terrorism after 9/11, we were able to come out of the isolation phase. The circulation of the draft doctrine in 1999 was an unusually open step. Despite changes of government, this has stood the test of time except for a few small changes. Meanwhile, India was able to undertake a new set of security dialogues with its strategic partners and also engage China and Pakistan.
Through these turning points, there has been a degree of continuity, an intertwining of the strands of moral politik and real politik, a conviction that the three-stage nuclear power programme was essential and a determination that India would not be subjected to nuclear threats or coercion. Coupled with the unique restraint between demonstration of capability in 1974 and declaration of India as a nuclear weapon state in 1998, was also the conviction that a nuclear-weapon-free world is a desirable objective because it enhances India’s security and global security. This stand has been consistently maintained since Independence and is reflected in the nuclear doctrine as well.
Let me now turn to the prospects for nuclear India. Since the India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement of 2008, also called the 123 Agreement, a number of bilateral agreements have been signed, some with regard to supply of reactor fuel and others for setting up nuclear power plants. India has also adopted its Nuclear Liability Act, though this is a subject on which nuclear technology suppliers still have some questions. Gradually, India has overcome the barriers that isolated it from nuclear trade and commerce in the civilian field, though membership of export control regimes, particularly the NSG, remains a work in progress. Greater transparency in the nuclear establishment has come about as preliminary steps have been taken to separate the military and civilian fuel cycles by voluntarily placing some of our power reactors under IAEA safeguards and strengthening regulatory and oversight mechanisms. All these are ongoing processes which need to be followed through by the new government.
Bold decisions require a combination of both – external circumstances and domestic leadership – and it is these two together that constitute the turning point in our nuclear journey. However, the ‘prospects’ for a nuclear India, reflect the same underlying Indian worldview and political will that has characterised the turning points in the six decade long story even as we continue to build our military-technical capabilities in keeping with our doctrine.
The writer is Special Envoy of the Prime Minister for Disarmament & Non-Proliferation Issues. Excerpted from a lecture delivered at Ananta Aspen Centre, New Delhi
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