Tuesday, 01 April 2014 | A Surya Prakash |
Responsibility for the series of naval mishaps in recent years cannot stop with the Navy chief. It has to go up to the bureaucracy at the Ministry of Defence and the political executive at the top
The tragic loss of lives in submarine accidents and the sudden exit of the Chief of Naval Staff Admiral DK Joshi, owning “moral responsibility” for the series of disastrous accidents in submarines and warships had turned the spotlight on the crisis within the Indian Navy in regard to a whole range of issues, from non-availability of equipment, obsolescence, poor maintenance and the tragic consequences of extending the Indian trait of jugaad to military matters. But, strangely neither the top bureaucrats in the Ministry of Defence nor the politicians who are primarily responsible for the current state of affairs have displayed the gumption to take their share of the blame.
The last six months have been the most troubling months for the Indian Navy because of the series of mishaps. While there could be maintenance and discipline related issues, most analysts feel that accountability should not stop with the Navy chief. It must go up to the bureaucracy in the Ministry of Defence, headed by the Defence Secretary, the Minister of Defence and the political executive because often, the problems faced by the Armed Forces relate to lethargy and inordinate delays in decision-making, specially in regard to procurement of equipment and spares.
This is the reason why defence Services have to cannibalise equipment and ‘somehow’ keep the show going. This approach however can place our soldiers, sailors and airmen in peril even in peace time and this is the point that has been emphasised by the brother of one of the naval officers who died in a recent accident. The officer had told his family that the submarine he was assigned to was not in a fit condition.
Generally, the Union Government takes anywhere from 10 to 15 years to eventually sign a deal, specially when it involves big ticket purchases like fighter jets, submarines and war ships. If one were to add the ‘Antony Effect’ to this, the entire procurement process becomes excruciatingly slow. This can have a deleterious effect on our defence preparedness.
The Comptroller and Auditor-General has dwelt on refit problems vis-à-vis naval ships in its reports over the years and has also spoken about the delays in procuring and deploying battery monitoring systems in submarines. The systems had remained idle for three years and the warranty had expired and because of shortage of spare parts the Navy was forced to cannibalise spare parts, the CAG had said.
In its latest report, tabled in the last session of Parliament, the CAG has put out some worrying facts which raise concerns about the Navy’s operational capabilities. It said 50 per cent of the ships in the Navy had surpassed 20 years of their service life. The advanced age profile of Indian navy ships had put considerable pressure in the refit management of ships. In order to keep them battle fit, ships have to undergone Mid-Life Update.
MLU is undertaken for ships which have a residual life of 10 to 15 years, so as to derive optimum utilisation because refits cost a lot of money. Examining the refit and repairs of naval ships, the CAG found excessive delays in refit of ships. “MLUs were undertaken at the fag end of a ship’s life”. It said efficiently managed refits is one way by which the Navy can ensure operationally ready vessels are available to it. It found that in the Indian Navy, “most of the refits were started and completed with considerable delays”. Only 18 per cent of the refits commenced as per norms and 74 per cent of the refits were completed with much delays. “A ship that is overdue for refit cannot be part of an optimal solution to India’s security needs.
Similarly, ships undergoing longer repairs are not available for the operational role for which she is commissioned”, the CAG said. Sadly. The CAG had drawn the attention of the Government to the delays in refits and its impact on the operational capability of the Navy in its report in 1999. Sadly, even a decade hence, the auditors found that “the same concerns continued to exist”.
These reports clearly indicate serious problems in decision-making from the Cabinet level downwards and this is affecting the overall standards of the Navy. As far as the Navy is concerned, the nation has had to put up with tardy decision-making since the 1960s.
For example, the Indian Navy felt the need for acquiring submarines in 1968, but like everything else in the Government, this idea too took considerable time to germinate and one saw some forward movement only eight years hence. The Government received specific offers for supply of submarines from six shipyards in foreign countries between 1976 and 1978 and it set up a Price Negotiation Committee in February, 1979 to examine the offers in detail. Finally, contracts were signed in December, 1981 with HDW for procurement of two submarines and for two packages for construction of submarines in India.
Another contract was signed for supply of ammunition with another firm. The construction of the two submarines by the PSU with the material packages supplied by the firm was to be completed in 1987 and 1988, but were behind schedule by at least three years. As a result of this abnormal delay, the CAG noted that the Navy would not be able to avail of the warranty of 30 months given by the company for equipment ordered in material packages. This was in addition to the cost over-runs that are likely to occur and the impact it would have on the operational commitments of the Navy.
The auditors also expressed concern over issues like self-noise and the spiraling cost of spares, which were glossed over by Government. Self-noise was deemed extremely important by Naval Headquarters at one time and the Navy wanted the right of rejection in this score, but that did not happen. Further, because of the delay in construction of two submarines in India by three years, the warranties of the packages had expired.
Overall, it appears the Indian Navy suffers because of a stodgy bureaucracy and a political executive that drags its feet when it comes to decision-making. But it’s the Navy which is having to answer for all this. When will we see some accountability vis-à-vis the bureaucrats in the Defence Ministry and the politicians who are eventually responsible for all decisions? Will a bureaucrat ever emulate Admiral Joshi?
http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/edit/defence-establishment--must-be-accountable.html
Responsibility for the series of naval mishaps in recent years cannot stop with the Navy chief. It has to go up to the bureaucracy at the Ministry of Defence and the political executive at the top
The tragic loss of lives in submarine accidents and the sudden exit of the Chief of Naval Staff Admiral DK Joshi, owning “moral responsibility” for the series of disastrous accidents in submarines and warships had turned the spotlight on the crisis within the Indian Navy in regard to a whole range of issues, from non-availability of equipment, obsolescence, poor maintenance and the tragic consequences of extending the Indian trait of jugaad to military matters. But, strangely neither the top bureaucrats in the Ministry of Defence nor the politicians who are primarily responsible for the current state of affairs have displayed the gumption to take their share of the blame.
The last six months have been the most troubling months for the Indian Navy because of the series of mishaps. While there could be maintenance and discipline related issues, most analysts feel that accountability should not stop with the Navy chief. It must go up to the bureaucracy in the Ministry of Defence, headed by the Defence Secretary, the Minister of Defence and the political executive because often, the problems faced by the Armed Forces relate to lethargy and inordinate delays in decision-making, specially in regard to procurement of equipment and spares.
This is the reason why defence Services have to cannibalise equipment and ‘somehow’ keep the show going. This approach however can place our soldiers, sailors and airmen in peril even in peace time and this is the point that has been emphasised by the brother of one of the naval officers who died in a recent accident. The officer had told his family that the submarine he was assigned to was not in a fit condition.
Generally, the Union Government takes anywhere from 10 to 15 years to eventually sign a deal, specially when it involves big ticket purchases like fighter jets, submarines and war ships. If one were to add the ‘Antony Effect’ to this, the entire procurement process becomes excruciatingly slow. This can have a deleterious effect on our defence preparedness.
The Comptroller and Auditor-General has dwelt on refit problems vis-à-vis naval ships in its reports over the years and has also spoken about the delays in procuring and deploying battery monitoring systems in submarines. The systems had remained idle for three years and the warranty had expired and because of shortage of spare parts the Navy was forced to cannibalise spare parts, the CAG had said.
In its latest report, tabled in the last session of Parliament, the CAG has put out some worrying facts which raise concerns about the Navy’s operational capabilities. It said 50 per cent of the ships in the Navy had surpassed 20 years of their service life. The advanced age profile of Indian navy ships had put considerable pressure in the refit management of ships. In order to keep them battle fit, ships have to undergone Mid-Life Update.
MLU is undertaken for ships which have a residual life of 10 to 15 years, so as to derive optimum utilisation because refits cost a lot of money. Examining the refit and repairs of naval ships, the CAG found excessive delays in refit of ships. “MLUs were undertaken at the fag end of a ship’s life”. It said efficiently managed refits is one way by which the Navy can ensure operationally ready vessels are available to it. It found that in the Indian Navy, “most of the refits were started and completed with considerable delays”. Only 18 per cent of the refits commenced as per norms and 74 per cent of the refits were completed with much delays. “A ship that is overdue for refit cannot be part of an optimal solution to India’s security needs.
Similarly, ships undergoing longer repairs are not available for the operational role for which she is commissioned”, the CAG said. Sadly. The CAG had drawn the attention of the Government to the delays in refits and its impact on the operational capability of the Navy in its report in 1999. Sadly, even a decade hence, the auditors found that “the same concerns continued to exist”.
These reports clearly indicate serious problems in decision-making from the Cabinet level downwards and this is affecting the overall standards of the Navy. As far as the Navy is concerned, the nation has had to put up with tardy decision-making since the 1960s.
For example, the Indian Navy felt the need for acquiring submarines in 1968, but like everything else in the Government, this idea too took considerable time to germinate and one saw some forward movement only eight years hence. The Government received specific offers for supply of submarines from six shipyards in foreign countries between 1976 and 1978 and it set up a Price Negotiation Committee in February, 1979 to examine the offers in detail. Finally, contracts were signed in December, 1981 with HDW for procurement of two submarines and for two packages for construction of submarines in India.
Another contract was signed for supply of ammunition with another firm. The construction of the two submarines by the PSU with the material packages supplied by the firm was to be completed in 1987 and 1988, but were behind schedule by at least three years. As a result of this abnormal delay, the CAG noted that the Navy would not be able to avail of the warranty of 30 months given by the company for equipment ordered in material packages. This was in addition to the cost over-runs that are likely to occur and the impact it would have on the operational commitments of the Navy.
The auditors also expressed concern over issues like self-noise and the spiraling cost of spares, which were glossed over by Government. Self-noise was deemed extremely important by Naval Headquarters at one time and the Navy wanted the right of rejection in this score, but that did not happen. Further, because of the delay in construction of two submarines in India by three years, the warranties of the packages had expired.
Overall, it appears the Indian Navy suffers because of a stodgy bureaucracy and a political executive that drags its feet when it comes to decision-making. But it’s the Navy which is having to answer for all this. When will we see some accountability vis-à-vis the bureaucrats in the Defence Ministry and the politicians who are eventually responsible for all decisions? Will a bureaucrat ever emulate Admiral Joshi?
http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/edit/defence-establishment--must-be-accountable.html
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