CNAS On ‘Digital Theaters,’ And Decentralizing Cyber Command And Control
The Center for New American Security (CNAS)/National Security Program released a new report titled: “Digital Theaters: Decentralizing Cyber Command And Control, by Ben Fitzgerald, Technology and National Security Program Director at CNAS, and Senior Military Fellow, LTC. Parker Wright, USAF. I have attached the link to the full document.
Not surprisingly, the authors highlight cyber as a “key priority for DoD, and one of the few areas experiencing budget, personnel, and capability increases.” They conclude that “C2 theater cyber forces,” should be the first area of focus for DoD, in order to “help mature cyber capabilities in a strategically mature manner.” Mr. Fitzgerald and LTC. Wright suggest, “DoD must find a balance between centralizing C2 at U.S. Cyber Command, (USCYBERCOM) and pushing C2 to the Combatant Commanders.” If CYBERCOM controls capabilities too tightly, it risks limiting development. If it loosens its oversight of cyber capabilities too much, then it risks their misapplication — with potentially strategic consequences.
The authors note that theater cyber is often overlooked in discussions of cyber, which usually emphasize rare, high-end, covert “strike” capabilities and the broader challenge of critical infrastructure protection. Within the Geographic Combatant Commands, the authors argue that DoD can most rapidly and meaningfully mature its cyber capability — and, integrate cyber into other military operations.
The authors conclude that USCYBERCOM must establish a C2 construct, for theater cyber, that sustains service interests and investment, and ensures that USCYBERCOM has the sufficient ability to oversee and manage cyber operations within a global context, and guarantees Combatant Commanders access to responsive cyber capabilities — at the required capacity.
The two authors examine four existing C2 models, considering the trade-offs that the DoD must deliberately balance: demands on unity of effort, force responsiveness, force availability, and organizational versatility.” They recommend that [cyber] combat mission forces conduct distributed operations from their home station — and, not deploy to the theater of operations. Combat mission forces [cyber] have a global reach, not limited by geography. The authors recommend:
USCYBERCOM should exercise COCOM, but delegate OPCON of combat mission forces to Combatant Commanders;
Combatant Commanders Should Establish Joint Functional Cyber Component Commands;
USCYBERCOM Should Field Specialized, Service-Aligned Combat Mission And Combat Support Teams;
DoD Should Establish USCYBERCOM As A Full Unified Command; But, Retain The Dual-Hatting Arrangement For The NSA Director And The Commander USCYBERCOM — Only Until Cyber Is Effectively Established As A Fighting Force.
Lastly, the authors provide recommendations for the DoD and Congress — to help responsibly decentralize C2 of theater cyber forces, concluding C2 structures must constantly evolve to remain effective and relevant. The authors believe “failure to commence this process in an international, collaborative manner, risks creating and locking in, ineffective and/or inappropriate C2 and technical architectures that will be difficult to change in the future.” V/R, RCP
No comments:
Post a Comment