At sea, Sino-India ties need propulsion

Apr 11, 2014

Arun Kumar Singh
Given that China is looking for countries to invest its surplus $2 trillion, India should favourably consider the recent March 2014 Chinese offer of investing $300 billion to improve India’s creaking infrastructure

For centuries, great powers (initially Europeans and then US) have sent warships to the Indian Ocean (and other oceans, of course) to protect their sea-borne trade, for colonisation, intervention to topple unfriendly governments, influence political events and gather intelligence about regional navies and ocean hydrography, which is vital for submarine operations.

In 2008, China — which had already invested in building ports in Burma, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan — used the pretext of anti-piracy patrols in the Horn of Africa to deploy three to four warships permanently in the Indian Ocean.

A few days before the loss of Malaysian Airways Flight MH 370, the Chinese Navy had informed the Indian defence attache in Beijing that a new Chinese Shang-class tactical nuclear submarine (SSN) had completed a two-month submerged patrol in the Indian Ocean and had returned to its base in Hainan Island after linking up with the Chinese warships on anti-piracy patrol off Somalia.

The message to India was clear — Chinese SSNs, remaining undetectable, could gather intelligence on Indian Navy shipping deployments along with acoustic and electronic signatures of individual warships, while posing an omnipresent threat to disrupt India’s sea-borne trade should hostilities break out. Can India ever consider the option of deploying India’s only SSN (the Russian Akula-class, INS Chakra) on a two-month submerged patrol in the South and East China seas? Possibly not. But India can change the equation by urgently providing funds to induct at least four SSNs and a dozen more long-range maritime patrol anti-submarine aircraft.

Subsequent Chinese Navy deployments have left little doubt in the minds of the international maritime community about Chinese political will to deploy its growing Navy to distant regions in order to further Chinese national interests. These deployments are in addition to the deployment of Chinese Coast Guard and Naval units in the disputed waters of the South and East China seas, and off Somalia on anti-piracy patrol.

The Chinese Navy presently has 900 ships and 800 aircraft, and can “spare” three to four ships and one SSN or conventional submarine for deployment in the Indian Ocean. The China Coast Guard, created in 2013 by merging different agencies, has 1,800 vessels. The Indian Navy has about 140 ships and 250 aircraft and is expected to grow to 200 ships and 400 aircraft in a decade. The Indian Coast Guard has about 80 vessels and 55 aircraft. It is expected to stabilise at 160 ships and 100 aircraft by 2020.

The unexplained loss of MH 370 (a modern Boeing 777 airliner) in this age of satellite imagery and global connectivity made the international maritime community react with unprecedented alacrity. Of the 239 people on that ill-fated flight, more than 60 per cent were Chinese. The Chinese government, not unexpectedly, took the lead with its satellites, ships and aircraft initially searching the expected accident areas in the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand, and later shifted their attention to the Southern Indian Ocean, about 1,500 km north-west off Perth (Australia).

Nine Chinese Naval warships, including the two 20,000 ton brand new amphibious warships, Kunlunshan and Jinggangshan, had arrived off Perth by end March to commence search operations based on satellite photographic inputs. Two Chinese IL-76 aircraft also flew to the Australian Air Force base at Perth, to join the search operations, which included aircraft from seven nations.

Satellite data, provided by various nations, including Thailand, France, China and the US among others was used to refine the possible search area of about 1,800 km west of Perth. India, that had five citizens onboard MH 370, reacted with customary slackness. Despite its vaunted space programme comprising numerous satellite launches, a lunar mission and an ongoing mission to Mars, there was no input whatsoever from our satellites. The Indian Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard did carry out intensive air and sea searches in the Bay of Bengal, and an Indian Navy surveillance aircraft along with an Indian Air Force Super Hercules aircraft were flown to Kuala Lumpur, but India took no part in the massive search in the Southern Indian Ocean, despite the Indian Navy having a proven capability to carry out such tasks.

The Indian Navy, a few years ago, sent warships to evacuate Indian citizens from war torn Lebanon and Libya. Following the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, 2004, the Indian Navy and Coast Guard had won international acclaim for their prompt reaction to the unfolding humanitarian crisis. The Indian Navy has four 30,000-ton oil replenishment ships, any one of which could have been sailed along with a destroyer or frigate for eight weeks deployment for MH 370.

Our modern destroyers and frigates have advanced acoustic sensors, including towed arrays, which could have detected the “pings” emanating from the two black boxes (cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder) of MH 370. The British sent an SSN (HMS Tireless) to search for the two black boxes. Surely, India’s ultra modern SSN (INS Chakra) with a similar sophisticated acoustic sensor capability could have been sailed to the Southern Indian Ocean.

The international maritime community has been impressed by the display of political will and reach of China. Recent Chinese investments in ports, airports and roads in Sri Lanka have greatly boosted that island nation’s economy and its per capita income per annum at $2,850 is almost double that of India’s $1,500. Given that China is looking for countries to invest its surplus $2 trillion, India should favourably consider the recent March 2014 Chinese offer of investing $300 billion to improve India’s creaking infrastructure.

The new Indian government post-elections needs to understand and implement the term “comprehensive national power” and follow a dual policy towards China. It needs to enhance mutually beneficial trade with China, welcome Chinese investment in Indian infrastructure while simultaneously increasing its defence budget to three per cent of the gross domestic product from the existing two per cent. It also needs to double the Naval budget and modify its nuclear doctrine to ensure that it actually deters our two nuclear armed neighbours. And, finally, India and China need to urgently find a mutually acceptable solution to their historical border problem. For this, India needs a new, decisive leader.

The writer retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam

http://www.asianage.com/columnists/sea-sino-india-ties-need-propulsion-857