http://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20140401/edit.htm#3
Henderson Brooks' review confined to operational tasking
Gen V. P. Malik (retd)
IN analysing any armed conflict, two aspects have great importance. Why did it happen, or what were the geo-political and strategic circumstances which led to the conflict? And, how was it fought on the ground? The Henderson Brooks' Operational Review (HB Review) of the 1962 India-China war, long overdue for de-classification and academic study, deals with the latter part. It was tasked only to look at training, equipment, system of command, physical fitness of the troops and capacity of the military commanders at all levels to influence the men under their command. For inexplicable reasons, General Chaudhury, who took over as Army Chief on November 19, 1962, advised the authors not to review the functioning of Army Headquarters (AHQ). As a result, the role of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), its relationship with the AHQ and the directions given to it by the former were not examined. The HB Review and its lessons thus deal only with operational tasking, logistics, staff duties and military leadership issues at the operational and tactical levels.
Since the Review was ordered by the Army Chief, follow-up action to correct shortcomings in the Army was prompt. I recall that several exercises e.g. Exercise Ram Ban and Ram Chakor were conducted in 1963 to learn more about mountain warfare and make necessary organisational changes. These resulted in the creation of mountain divisions, modification of infantry battalions and many other units for their role in the mountains. A better prepared Army for mountain warfare performed well in Kargil in the 1965 Indo-Pak war and in the India-China skirmish at Natula in 1967.
It is also important to note that since 1962, due to technological upgrade of military weapons and equipment, our military strategy, doctrines, command and control system and tactics have undergone substantial changes. This Review, therefore, has little relevance today except for military leadership issues, perennial deficiencies and in some cases antiquity of authorised weapons and equipment.
That brings me to the first, more important geo-political and strategic aspect because military preparedness, operational planning and tactics must flow from policy and grand strategy. Have we learnt lessons from that part of this disastrous war?
The armed conflict resulted from a chain of strategic events which started in 1950 when the Chinese PLA, after defeating Khampas in the battle of Chamdo, occupied Tibet. Within a month, on November 7, Sardar Patel wrote a detailed letter to Nehru giving the geo-strategic and security implications of the event and his cautionary advice on this issue. Nehru ignored it. He had a mindset on China. Patel's advice was not discussed in the Cabinet. It was confined to a vault for the next 18 years. Instead, our government assisted the PLA in routing its logistical requirement through Calcutta Port and Kalimpong.
The India-China cartographic tussle started soon thereafter. It had to because India's northern boundary on British era maps in many parts had been left blank with markings 'areas not surveyed'. Nehru was friendly with China but quite firm and was not prepared to yield any territory. As this was causing a problem in diplomatic negotiations and perception, he took the decision to delineate Indian maps with the McMahon Line in the Northeast, the India-Tibet boundary in the Central sector and a history-based line in the Northwest, which included Aksai Chin.
Military advice or the need to increase Army strength to establish check posts along the 4,056-km border was neither sought nor considered necessary.
Subsequent events of Chinese road construction across Aksai Chin (1951-57), patrol clashes and assaults on check posts in Ladakh and Northeast, and the Dalai Lama's surreptitious escape into India are well known. Despite the deepening of distrust between India and China, failing diplomacy over the boundary issue and increased tension on the border, the government kept reducing the strength of the Army and starving it of weapons and equipment.
When Shrinagesh took over as Chief in May 1957, the strength of the Army was about 4, 50,000. The government wanted to bring it to 1,50,000 reducing 10,000 men a year. Shrinagesh, in his diary noted later:
“Leaders of free India were busy impressing upon the world that we were a peace-loving nation, with people wedded to the ideology of Ahimsa, and steeped in the belief that peaceful attitude was a sufficient safeguard against any thought of aggression…….
“To me this kind of thinking seemed manifestly short-sighted. Dr Katju's (then Defence Minister) and my arguments on Pakistan seemed to make some headway with Panditji. He agreed that Pakistan was making military alliances, had been contemplating rearming with modern weapons, and had by no means forgotten Kashmir. But when it came to China, it drew a firm "No" because the Chinese were our trusted friends; and we (army commanders) were foolish, hot headed, and needlessly belligerent….we came away with the agreement to a 3,00,000 force, less than what we had contemplated, but still a force and a military one - not a labour corps!”
The civil-military alienation under Krishna Menon, Thimaya's retracted resignation, Kaul's political patronage and climb and the resultant dissension amongst senior military officers are too well known. Under these circumstances, Nehru approved the strategically disastrous 'forward policy' advocated by an unprofessional coterie (Menon, BN Mullick, BN Kaul, MJ Desai). This political policy direction led to military movements without concern for communications and logistic reach, or eyeball to eyeball confrontations. When the Chinese escalated the border skirmishes into a full-fledged war, our political leadership, the foreign and defence ministries and the intelligence organisation abdicated their responsibilities.
What stands out here is that we failed in our prolonged diplomatic dialogue and thoroughly neglected military preparedness. The Intelligence Chief was involved more in policy-making and less in intelligence collection and assessments. There was a total disconnect between the civilian and military leadership. There was gross political favouritism and interference in the military chain of command. This resulted in excessive influence and authority of some juniors and failure of some seniors to stand up firmly to the strategically flawed policies and measures.
The role played by the MoD to enable implementation of the policy and the Defence Secretary, who according to the Business Rules of the Government of India, is responsible for the defence of India, including preparation for defence by the armed forces, remains unanalysed.
As these strategic aspects and lessons are not covered in the HB Review, or in any other official document, India's higher defence control organisation thus remains oblivious to the strategic level mistakes of the 1962 war.
Henderson Brooks' review confined to operational tasking
Gen V. P. Malik (retd)
IN analysing any armed conflict, two aspects have great importance. Why did it happen, or what were the geo-political and strategic circumstances which led to the conflict? And, how was it fought on the ground? The Henderson Brooks' Operational Review (HB Review) of the 1962 India-China war, long overdue for de-classification and academic study, deals with the latter part. It was tasked only to look at training, equipment, system of command, physical fitness of the troops and capacity of the military commanders at all levels to influence the men under their command. For inexplicable reasons, General Chaudhury, who took over as Army Chief on November 19, 1962, advised the authors not to review the functioning of Army Headquarters (AHQ). As a result, the role of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), its relationship with the AHQ and the directions given to it by the former were not examined. The HB Review and its lessons thus deal only with operational tasking, logistics, staff duties and military leadership issues at the operational and tactical levels.
Since the Review was ordered by the Army Chief, follow-up action to correct shortcomings in the Army was prompt. I recall that several exercises e.g. Exercise Ram Ban and Ram Chakor were conducted in 1963 to learn more about mountain warfare and make necessary organisational changes. These resulted in the creation of mountain divisions, modification of infantry battalions and many other units for their role in the mountains. A better prepared Army for mountain warfare performed well in Kargil in the 1965 Indo-Pak war and in the India-China skirmish at Natula in 1967.
It is also important to note that since 1962, due to technological upgrade of military weapons and equipment, our military strategy, doctrines, command and control system and tactics have undergone substantial changes. This Review, therefore, has little relevance today except for military leadership issues, perennial deficiencies and in some cases antiquity of authorised weapons and equipment.
That brings me to the first, more important geo-political and strategic aspect because military preparedness, operational planning and tactics must flow from policy and grand strategy. Have we learnt lessons from that part of this disastrous war?
The armed conflict resulted from a chain of strategic events which started in 1950 when the Chinese PLA, after defeating Khampas in the battle of Chamdo, occupied Tibet. Within a month, on November 7, Sardar Patel wrote a detailed letter to Nehru giving the geo-strategic and security implications of the event and his cautionary advice on this issue. Nehru ignored it. He had a mindset on China. Patel's advice was not discussed in the Cabinet. It was confined to a vault for the next 18 years. Instead, our government assisted the PLA in routing its logistical requirement through Calcutta Port and Kalimpong.
The India-China cartographic tussle started soon thereafter. It had to because India's northern boundary on British era maps in many parts had been left blank with markings 'areas not surveyed'. Nehru was friendly with China but quite firm and was not prepared to yield any territory. As this was causing a problem in diplomatic negotiations and perception, he took the decision to delineate Indian maps with the McMahon Line in the Northeast, the India-Tibet boundary in the Central sector and a history-based line in the Northwest, which included Aksai Chin.
Military advice or the need to increase Army strength to establish check posts along the 4,056-km border was neither sought nor considered necessary.
Subsequent events of Chinese road construction across Aksai Chin (1951-57), patrol clashes and assaults on check posts in Ladakh and Northeast, and the Dalai Lama's surreptitious escape into India are well known. Despite the deepening of distrust between India and China, failing diplomacy over the boundary issue and increased tension on the border, the government kept reducing the strength of the Army and starving it of weapons and equipment.
When Shrinagesh took over as Chief in May 1957, the strength of the Army was about 4, 50,000. The government wanted to bring it to 1,50,000 reducing 10,000 men a year. Shrinagesh, in his diary noted later:
“Leaders of free India were busy impressing upon the world that we were a peace-loving nation, with people wedded to the ideology of Ahimsa, and steeped in the belief that peaceful attitude was a sufficient safeguard against any thought of aggression…….
“To me this kind of thinking seemed manifestly short-sighted. Dr Katju's (then Defence Minister) and my arguments on Pakistan seemed to make some headway with Panditji. He agreed that Pakistan was making military alliances, had been contemplating rearming with modern weapons, and had by no means forgotten Kashmir. But when it came to China, it drew a firm "No" because the Chinese were our trusted friends; and we (army commanders) were foolish, hot headed, and needlessly belligerent….we came away with the agreement to a 3,00,000 force, less than what we had contemplated, but still a force and a military one - not a labour corps!”
The civil-military alienation under Krishna Menon, Thimaya's retracted resignation, Kaul's political patronage and climb and the resultant dissension amongst senior military officers are too well known. Under these circumstances, Nehru approved the strategically disastrous 'forward policy' advocated by an unprofessional coterie (Menon, BN Mullick, BN Kaul, MJ Desai). This political policy direction led to military movements without concern for communications and logistic reach, or eyeball to eyeball confrontations. When the Chinese escalated the border skirmishes into a full-fledged war, our political leadership, the foreign and defence ministries and the intelligence organisation abdicated their responsibilities.
What stands out here is that we failed in our prolonged diplomatic dialogue and thoroughly neglected military preparedness. The Intelligence Chief was involved more in policy-making and less in intelligence collection and assessments. There was a total disconnect between the civilian and military leadership. There was gross political favouritism and interference in the military chain of command. This resulted in excessive influence and authority of some juniors and failure of some seniors to stand up firmly to the strategically flawed policies and measures.
The role played by the MoD to enable implementation of the policy and the Defence Secretary, who according to the Business Rules of the Government of India, is responsible for the defence of India, including preparation for defence by the armed forces, remains unanalysed.
As these strategic aspects and lessons are not covered in the HB Review, or in any other official document, India's higher defence control organisation thus remains oblivious to the strategic level mistakes of the 1962 war.
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